History of Flight
On June 30, 2019, about 0911 central daylight time, a Textron Aviation B-300 (marketed as King Air 350), registration N534FF, was destroyed when it impacted a hangar shortly after takeoff from runway 15 at Addison Airport (ADS) in Addison, Texas. A postimpact fire ensued. The airline transport pilot, the commercial co-pilot, and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The airplane was owned by EE Operation LLC and operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight en route to Albert Whitted Airport (SPG) in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Preflight Activities
Personnel from Flyte Aero, an aviation service provider at ADS, reported that they arrived at the owner's hangar between 0700 and 0730 on the morning of the accident to prepare the airplane for the flight; they did not perform any maintenance. According to fueling records, all four of the airplane's tanks were filled with a total of 329 gallons of fuel. The pilots and passengers arrived about 90 minutes before the flight. The co-pilot greeted the passengers and loaded their bags into the baggage compartment; no scale was present, and none of the bags were weighed. Flyte Aero personnel observed both pilots walk around the airplane before the flight but did not see the airplane taxi out.
Cockpit Voice Recorder Data
The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), though not required, which recorded the taxi and accident flight. The CVR started recording at 0706:54. At 0749:51, an unidentified person began discussing an oil consumption issue concerning the left engine with the pilot and stated that the issue needed to be monitored. The person concluded by saying the pilots needed to “keep a log” on the issue and “keep notes.” Flyte Aero personnel reported that they did not have this conversation with the pilot; the person's identity was not determined.
About 0826, the flight crew obtained local weather via ATIS. At 0830:11, they received clearance to SPG on ground control. At 0902:59, the CVR recorded a noise similar to an engine starting, and at 0903:15, another sound similar to the second engine starting. The pilots did not call for any checklists nor discuss emergency procedures.
Takeoff and Initial Climb
The pilot contacted ground control about 0905, stating he was ready to taxi, and was provided taxi instructions to runway 15. At 0909:41, local controller gave takeoff clearance. A sound similar to an increase in propeller rpm was recorded about 0910:11, and the co-pilot called “airspeed's alive” at 0910:25. An NTSB sound spectrum and performance study estimated that rotation occurred about 0910:32 at a groundspeed of about 101 knots (102 knots calibrated airspeed). A reduction in broadband noise at 0910:34 was consistent with the airplane lifting off. The performance study calculated that the airplane fully lifted off about 1,900 ft from the beginning of the takeoff roll at a groundspeed of about 105 knots (106 knots calibrated airspeed). Propeller speeds at liftoff were consistent with takeoff power, and both propellers operated about the same speed (1,714 to 1,728 rpm).
No V speeds were verbalized. With reported weather (wind 6 knots from 100°, temperature 26°C) and at maximum takeoff weight, V1 would have been 106 knots, Vr 110 knots, V2 117 knots, and Vmc 96 knots (flaps retracted) or 94 knots (approach setting).
Engine Failure and Loss of Control
Six seconds after liftoff (0910:40.1), the pilot stated, “what in the world?” The CVR recorded the sounds of the engines' propeller rpm diverging; groundspeed was about 109 knots. The NTSB sound spectrum study determined that the left engine's propeller speed decreased to about 1,688 rpm, and the right engine's to 1,707 rpm. A click sound was recorded at 0910:41 followed by a sound similar to a stall warning horn less than 1 second later. The stall warning horn ended at 0910:43; left engine propeller speed was 1,545 rpm. At 0910:43.6, the co-pilot stated, “you just lost your left engine.” The performance study determined that the airplane had passed over the left edge of runway 15 at this time and continued to climb while turning left.
At 0910:44, a chime was recorded followed by a click. The left engine propeller speed increased to 1,632 rpm but began decreasing again. The airplane began to roll left about 0910:45. The stall warning horn sounded again at 0910:45.2 and continued until the end of the recording. About 0910:47, the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 100 ft agl. At 0910:48.8, the “bank angle” annunciator sounded; the airplane had rolled to 10.6° left-wing down. At 0910:49.5, an expletive from the co-pilot was recorded along with two more “bank angle” annunciations. The airplane's altitude was about 70 ft agl and its groundspeed about 85 knots.
At 0910:51.1, the sound of impact with the hangar was recorded. About this time, the estimated speed of the left engine propeller was 1,403 rpm, and the right engine propeller was above 1,700 rpm. Digital video showed the airplane rolled left and impacted the hangar in an inverted attitude; an explosion immediately followed. The airplane then impacted the hangar floor, breached a closed roll-up garage door, came to rest on its right side outside the hangar, and was consumed by fire.
Witness Observations
Multiple witnesses observed the flight. One witness on the ramp reported the airplane sounded underpowered immediately after takeoff “like it was at a reduced power setting.” A second witness reported it sounded like it did not have sufficient power. A third witness described the rotation as “steep” and, along with two others, thought the airplane was “showboating” or performing aerobatics.
Personnel Information
According to people who knew both pilots, they had flown together many times. Although the B-300 is certificated for single-pilot operation, an acquaintance of the pilot reported he was not comfortable flying it alone and always had a co-pilot.
The accident pilot completed recurrent training in the accident airplane on March 23, 2019, at Rich Aviation Services. The training included 2.7 hours in the airplane, covering abnormal and emergency procedures, and ground training on systems. The flight instructor stated the pilot performed well on the simulated single-engine failure on takeoff. He noted the pilot was strong on knowledge and had a good attitude, but was weak on avionics. The instructor did not reduce engine power on the runway for safety; he waited until positive rate of climb and 200-300 ft agl.
Several pilots who knew the accident pilot reported that he used two hands during rotation, had an aggressive rotation technique, and would “pull up abruptly.” One pilot reported he was not strong on using checklists. His business partner said he was “bad about using checklists” and generally would not do a weight and balance calculation if familiar with the airplane, but usually verbalized V speeds.
The co-pilot was not type rated in the B-300. He completed recurrent training in a B-200 simulator on May 14, 2019. The instructor recalled the co-pilot was “low time” but did a “fine job,” performing well with radio communications, checklists, and understanding procedures. The co-pilot was described as “very, very particular” and “by the book.” His wife stated he never expressed concerns with the pilot's flying abilities and did not discuss aircraft systems issues.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was purchased by EE Operations LLC on March 21, 2019, primarily for family business and personal travel under Part 91. An aircraft management agreement with the pilot's company, S&H Aircraft LLC, covered maintenance, scheduling, and pilot services.
Before sale, the airplane underwent phase 1-4 inspections, special inspections, and engine and propeller maintenance at Textron Aviation Services. The airplane had 624.2 hours and 423 cycles at sale and accumulated about 67.03 hours and 31 cycles by the accident.
The airplane was powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-60A engines driving Hartzell HC-B4MP-3C propellers. The propellers were four-bladed, hydraulically operated, constant-speed with full feathering and reversing. Normal in-flight operating range was 1,450 to 1,700 rpm.
Weight and Balance
The maximum takeoff and landing weight was 15,000 lbs. Based on FAA records, passenger weights from family, baggage and items recovered, and fuel on board, the estimated ramp weight was 15,660 lbs. The computed center of gravity was 206.71 inches aft of datum; the aft limit was 208.0 inches.
Airplane Performance
According to the manufacturer, the left engine is the critical engine; loss of left engine power results in greater yaw and rolling moment than loss of right engine. The appropriate response is right rudder. The engine-out procedure during takeoff (at or above V1) directs a pitch attitude of 10°, retract landing gear when positive climb established, maintain V2 to 400 ft agl, and feather the propeller of the inoperative engine. Performance charts indicate a one-engine-inoperative climb capability of about 700 fpm under standard conditions.