Commercial Fixed Wing First Officer reported the new STAR; CLPRR1; which has a confusing NOTAM issued for Rwy 10L unusable. This resulted in confusion loading FMS final fix to the runway. The STAR transition also conflicts with adjacent OSU airspace and traffic flows.

Date: 2021-09 · Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing · Phase: approach

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

Commercial Fixed Wing First Officer reported the new STAR; CLPRR1; which has a confusing NOTAM issued for Rwy 10L unusable. This resulted in confusion loading FMS final fix to the runway. The STAR transition also conflicts with adjacent OSU airspace and traffic flows.

Narrative

Recently; new RNAV STARs were implemented in CMH to correspond to the IAF for each Runway's RNAV RNP approach. I experienced and observed a safety hazard with the CLPRR1 arrival when landing east in particular and the new RNAV STARs in CMH in general. While flying the CLPRR1 into CMH on (date); we were assigned Runway 10L for landing. Thankfully; my Captain did an excellent job briefing NOTAMs and we had caught that the 10L transition for the CLPRR1 was NOTAM'd unusable. This is a strange NOTAM for us; especially with programming the arrival into 10L properly. We could not find a way to load the 10R transition for a landing on 10L. Therefore; at night in IMC while considering weather we had to load the wrong Runway to fly the proper transition (10R). When we reached the end of the STAR (i.e. HALUR) and began on the 281 track after HALUR; we had to reload the FMS to fly vectors for 10L. There are several safety concerns with this arrival in particular. First; the transition designed for 10R is poor relative to the airspace. It crosses directly through the departure corridor for CMH and interferes with OSU airspace as well. I believe this is why it has been NOTAM'd unusable. This transition fails to account for the common; safe; and efficient operating practice in CMH of landing traffic based on their gate assignment rather than their direction of flight. The new STARs assume traffic lands in CMH based on direction of flight. This is incorrect. There is no efficiency or safety gain in landing by direction of flight; the traffic load is acceptable for landing based on gate assignment; maximizing efficiency. This is why aircraft from the south and east are often assigned the north Runway; especially for Company operations being heavy on the gates in CMH. In general; the new RNAV stars in CMH disrupt the normal operating flow of the airspace more than is justified. Rather than lead to more efficient RNAV operations; they have in fact led to increased confusion and distrust of RNAV procedures; increased controller and pilot workload; and decreased safety margins during critical phases of flight. Having a transition for each Runway is a good idea in theory; but in practice it leads to tremendous confusion when the operating practice is to assign Runways based on gate assignment. It appears from a user perspective the RNAV STARs into CMH were designed without effective user-in-the-loop testing and feedback from users in the field; such as pilots and ATC based in CMH. As a large operator in CMH Company should play a larger role in determining how future RNAV STARs are designed. Further; we should recommend to the FAA that the existing procedures be redesigned quickly based on feedback from Columbus ATC; Company; and other players in the field at CMH. I have flown with several crews now who all express the same frustration and confusion with the new procedures. Given that we fly RNAV STARs every day; this confusion is not indicative of resistance to change; rather; it indicates poorly designed procedures that require immediate feedback and redesign. A specific recommendation is to have one transition on the STAR for landing east/landing west into CMH. Align the RNAV RNP fixes to that transition and simplify the airspace in coordination with the typical practices of Columbus controllers and the efficiency lessons they have learned. Seek more input into the design of new procedures from active players in the field and utilize more user-in-the-loop evaluation and feedback for these procedures.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.