Captain reported the loss of Hydraulic System #2 on approach to landing. After a normal landing the nose wheel steering was inoperative; but the crew taxied the aircraft to the gate using differential braking and thrust and passengers deplaned normally.

Narrative

On the ILS PRM XXC approach at the final approach fix; HYD SYS 2 LO PRESS message appeared on the EICAS. Gear and Flaps were already in the landing configuration. The QRH procedure was followed which led us to performing the LOSS OF HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 2 QRH procedure. HYD SYS 2 LO QTY EICAS message also appeared. The hydraulic system MFD page showed a quantity of 0. The flight crew quickly reviewed what systems were inoperative and verbally acknowledged to NOT command the Engine 2 Reverser. We addressed the fact that only inboard brakes would function; nose wheel steering would be inoperative; normal extension of the landing gear and retraction of the landing gear would be inoperative due to fluid loss; and spoilers would be inoperative. Reduced stopping effective was considered along with possible utilization of the parking brake (if required). All of these items including current airport conditions; exits points; contingencies; etc.; were acknowledged by the flight crew and a plan was established. A normal landing was conducted and the aircraft was able to be maneuvered off of the runway by differential braking. As indicated by the QRH; there was an absence of nose wheel steering and some reduced stopping effectiveness. However; the application of outboard braking and utilization of the number 1 thrust reverser safely slowed the aircraft. After exiting the runway; a brake overheat message appeared for the right-hand outboard brake. Because of this message; the crew elected to request assistance and have airport rescue and firefighting equipment examine the aircraft. Nothing out of the ordinary was noted by ARFF. Additionally; prior to the arrival of ARFF; both the aft FA and the FO (from the flight deck) observed the right landing gear and did not note anything out of the ordinary (but remained ready to address any changes to the current conditions observed).No brace commands were given to the passengers as [priority handling was not requested] until after landing. All members of the crew continued to monitor both the aircraft and passenger status during the event. Passengers announcements were made frequently to keep them advised of the situation. Per the flight attendants; the passengers remained calm throughout the event and the only issue raised by the passengers was that of the status of connecting flights. Additionally; ARFF followed the aircraft as it as being towed to the gate. Everything proceeded normally. The aircraft was parked and chocked at the gate; and all passengers and crew exited normally by jet bridge. The aircraft was then turned over to maintenance who informed the crew that hydraulic fluid; had; in fact; been observed. This would appear to be consistent with a hydraulic system leak/failure due to loss of hydraulic fluid. CRM was utilized at a high level. The timing and slightly unusual circumstances (gear retraction would not have been possible) required an evaluation of the situation and adaptation to meet the uniqueness of the issue (hydraulic fluid loss).