B737-800 flight crew reported braking issues during landing rollout in wet conditions resulting in a loss of aircraft control and runway excursion. The crew suggested ATC should provide braking action reports; especially when reversing runway landing direction.
Synopsis
B737-800 flight crew reported braking issues during landing rollout in wet conditions resulting in a loss of aircraft control and runway excursion. The crew suggested ATC should provide braking action reports; especially when reversing runway landing direction.
Narrative
The conditions were wet for landing at ZZZ on Runway XL; and the only feasible turnoff was the runway end due to construction and taxiway closures. As PM; everything seemed normal to me until we neared the expected turnoff; and I felt that the speed seemed excessive. I made a comment to that effect but forget the exact verbiage. It was something like 'we need to slow down'. The First Officer immediately declared 'your aircraft'. I assumed control of the aircraft and applied full brake pedal pressure. I didn't feel any more deceleration; so I deployed the thrust reversers. They had previously been stowed to facilitate our long roll to the end of the runway. There was still not enough deceleration to stop in time; so I stowed the reversers to prevent engine damage and turned the aircraft a little to the left to try to find better pavement with more friction. There was still no meaningful change to the braking and I was out of options. I steered toward the middle of two lights and we slowly rolled through them; stopping with the nose wheel a few feet beyond the runway end lights. We immediately notified ATC. I then made a passenger PA; started the APU; shut down the engines; and made notifications to the company. The aircraft was stopped with the nosewheel approx 10' past the runway end lights. This is my guess based on my view of it. All tires remained on paved surfaces; and neither the aircraft nor the airport lights were damaged in any way. Cause - This seems like the perfect condition for something like this to happen. The runway was wet. The only feasible turnoff was the runway end. The runway is not grooved on the ends; which I admit is not something we noticed on the 10-9 pages. Only the ends are not grooved and it's only identified with a ball note on the 10-9 page. No braking action advisories were made; and in warm weather we did not expect ice or any braking detriments. There was an aircraft in trail of us by 4 miles per ATC; so an expeditious exit from the runway would be expected from us; and normally not a problem at all. Everything seemed entirely normal to me until the speed seemed excessive as we approached the turnoff; and the First Officer handed me the controls. At that time I realized what the problem was. Suggestions - More care is always an easy answer; but if we'd had braking advisories or any form of indication that the runway end was exceedingly slippery; then this would have been avoided. It was the First Officers landing. He is fairly new to Company and aircraft this size. But let me say that he is one of the most professional pilots I've flown with here. He is calm; cool; and sober minded; and I love to fly with pilots just like him. I do not intend to suggest that he approached the exit too fast; because I'm not sure exactly when the friction broke from the pavement; and his decision to transfer the plane to me without spending time explaining anything may have saved precious tenths of seconds; and 20 more feet of forward travel could have put the main wheels into the runway lights; causing large delays; aircraft damage; airport damage; customer fear; and plenty of cost. I suggest putting a permanent braking advisory for that runway so long as the end is the only exit available and it is not grooved. There is no better outcome that could have happened except for it to not have happened at all.
Second reporter narrative
The runways at ZZZ were wet and the airport had reversed the landing direction from Runways XXL/R to Runways YYL/R with no braking action reports provided. We were assigned Runway YYL to land; which we noted had multiple taxiway closures that would require an exit at Taxiway 1X for taxi in. On final; Tower advised of traffic four miles behind us also landing on Runway YYL and requested we clear at Taxiway 2 or expeditiously at Taxiway 1X. After landing in the touchdown zone with Flaps 30 and Auto Brakes 3 with a slight bounce; the aircraft decelerated normally so I elected to begin manually breaking passing through 90 knots and manage the aircraft's speed to assist with Tower's request. During the last 3;000 feet of the runway; braking became ineffective on my side (even with max pressure applied); the Captain asked why we weren't decelerating; and I said 'Your aircraft' so the Captain could attempt braking from the other side of the aircraft. After the Captain applied max braking and full reverse from the left seat; the nose gear exited the runway 10 feet into the overrun and came to a stop.Cause - Recently reversing the runway's landing direction on a wet; non-grooved runway likely made the departure end of the runway more slippery than the rest of the runway due to the rubber from other aircraft touching down in that area. A braking action report would have been very helpful. Tower's request to expedite clearance from the Runway put us under artificial pressure to help out the aircraft on short final behind us. An exchange of controls in the last 3;000 feet of landing rollout may have induced confusion between crew members and prevented timely brake application.Suggestions - Tower should try to provide braking action reports; especially after reversing landing direction. Although we briefed a [regular landing] running the landing app with different levels of braking actions may have provided more situational awareness to what to expect if braking action was worse than expected on landing rollout. Additionally; a more thorough study of the 10-9 pages to find the runway was non-grooved may have triggered us to be more conservative with our landing rollout. When Tower requested us to 'expedite' to Taxiway 1X; we could have either pushed back or disregarded the request due to the wet; non-grooved runway. As the First Officer; if I had waited for the '80' and '60' callouts before stowing the reversers and then exchanged aircraft control; then the Captain would have had more discretion over the aircraft's taxi speed approaching the departure end.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.