A319 First Officer reported a diversion after the operating pack failed with the other pack already deferred. The flight crew determined that there was insufficient fuel to continue to destination.

Narrative

We were enroute and about halfway to our destination at 37;000 feet with Pack 1 deferred and Pack 2 operating normally at high flow (selected per MEL) when the amber ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) message AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT appeared. The Pack 1 switch indicated off (per MEL) and the Pack 2 switch indicated FAULT. Captain and I immediately identified the potential issue on hand as the ECAM procedure's first step was to select the faulted pack OFF leaving us with zero operating packs and no pressurization. We did not sense any changes in cabin pressure and consulted the System Display screens which confirmed that the remaining faulted pack was supplying air normally. Every single indication on every system screen was green and in normal operating ranges. Cabin vertical speed rate was 0 and the cabin altitude was holding perfectly steady. We agreed that there was no immediate threat and decided to talk about the malfunction before running the ECAM and rendering ourselves with no pressurization. It seemed to us as though running the ECAM procedure immediately might only induce an emergency that did not exist in the first place; so we were methodical and deliberate with our actions as we consulted and talked about all the ECAM; QRH; and FM information we could. The QRH procedure seemed to imply that the AIR PACK 1+2 FAULT was induced by the combination of PACK 1 being off and PACK 2 being faulted; we thought possibly from a transient pack overheat that was no longer indicated. The QRH procedure's focus seemed to be on resetting and recovering the faulted pack; but in our case the faulted pack was operating fine and within all parameters already.We requested a descent to 31;000 feet initially. In principle we wanted to run the ECAM to its completion; but we also knew that we needed to descend to 10;000 feet to do so. We were south of ZZZ in day VMC at the time enroute to ZZZ1 and about an hour out from landing. Terrain was not an issue; but we also realized that the early descent would impact fuel burn and make a diversion likely. We communicated the issue to Maintenance and Dispatch who only agreed with completing the ECAM/QRH procedure. We continued the descent to 10;000 feet and completed the procedure which turned the faulted pack off and opened the ram air thereby depressurizing the cabin. It quickly became evident that we would likely burn into our reserve flying all the way to ZZZ1; so we considered ZZZ2. That diversion airport made sense and was reasonable; so we communicated that to Dispatch who provided information. We requested priority handling so that we experienced no undue delay that might burn into our existing fuel further and we proceeded to ZZZ2; landed; and taxied to our gate without incident.We were immediately notified by station personnel that the passengers and all their bags would be transported to ZZZ1 via buses. We debriefed the situation and indications we observed to ZZZ1 maintenance. They ran a couple diagnostic tests and saw that both Pack 1 and Pack 2 ram air outlet door actuators were failed which one mechanic remarked was very peculiar and something he had never seen in 20+ years of working on Company A320 fleet. The airplane was taken out of service for repairs.