Air carrier flight crew reported after starting the number one engine there was abnormal vibration due to ingesting the hot air heater cart hose. They shut down the engine and deplaned passengers.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported after starting the number one engine there was abnormal vibration due to ingesting the hot air heater cart hose. They shut down the engine and deplaned passengers.
Narrative
When I pulled up the initial flight plan for Aircraft X Date I noticed an inordinate number of maintenance issues; so much so that I added 500 lbs. of fuel to cover possible extended ground operations that come with a pneumatic ground start to start engine 1 and follow on crossbleed start to start engine 2. Existing deferred items on the aircraft included: APU Bleed Air Supply System inoperative; Engine 2 Fire Loop B inoperative; AC External Power Ground Power Control Unit inoperative; One latch for hydraulic hand pump inoperative; Maintenance status message DAR displayed on lower ECAM screen; Fuel Center Tank Pump 1 low power (Auto Fuel Feed System Inoperative).Ultimately; the APU was not available to provide pneumatic air to heat the aircraft; but was required to provide electrical power since the external power receptacle was deferred inoperative. It was extremely cold out (-9 C) and a hot air cart had been connected to the aircraft prior to our arrival to heat the cabin due to the inoperative APU bleed. When we got to the aircraft 'Green Reservoir Lo Air Pressure' was displayed on the upper ECAM screen. I reported it via Maintenance through ACARS and followed up with a phone call to Maintenance Control. Maintenance was called out to service the green hydraulic system. Boarding had already begun; so I elected not to stop it at that point. After this maintenance issue was sent I noticed the actual fuel on board was 18;400 lbs.; as opposed to the 9;800 lbs. that was planned for in Release 1. Dispatch was informed and Release 2 sent. I pulled it up and signed it; then finished my cockpit flows. Once this was completed I updated the passengers on the status of the flight and the maintenance issues we were working.At this point; getting ready to block out as soon as maintenance was completed; we noticed no air cart for the pneumatic air start. We contacted Operations and coordinated to have a cart positioned for the air start. The Ramp Lead came up on the flight deck to coordinate the start; and we briefed the procedures. The Mechanic came up to check the status of the Low Air Pressure on the Green Hydraulic system; and it was still showing Low Pressure. I contacted Maintenance Control again while the Mechanic was on the flight deck; and he was then told to contact Maintenance Control for additional steps to take to correct the problem. This took another 20 to 30 minutes; during which time the passengers were updated again.The Mechanic was finally able to correct the low air pressure on the green system; and we got a clean Maintenance Release Document (MRD) at around XA45 local time. At this point we were an hour late for departure; and we were concerned with passenger connections. Some passengers had already opted to get off of the flight; and others were asking about it. At about that time the new MRD started printing so we quickly verified it and made sure it was correct. With Maintenance completed we had the Gate Agent close the boarding door and pull the jetway. We completed our final checklists and established communications with the ground crew. When they said they were ready we advised Ground Control of the pneumatic start on the gate. The QRH procedure for Ground Pneumatic Start was followed. I coordinated with the Ramp Lead on the headset confirming they were ready for #1 engine start. With confirmation we asked for air on #1. The start went normally until the engine reached idle rpm; at which point we felt abnormal vibration and shut it down. After we shut down the Ground Crew advised us we had ingested the heater hose into the #1 engine. I assumed when I asked the Ground Crew if they were ready to start the #1 engine that the area was clear and the heater cart had been pulled and stowed. This turned out to be a very bad assumption.
Second reporter narrative
Prior to arriving at Aircraft X; nose number X in ZZZ; the Captain and I discussed our Operational Flight Plan for Aircraft X on Date. It was -9C and the aircraft had an inoperative APU bleed system; therefore; we would need low pressure ground air in order to heat the cabin and flight deck. Upon arriving at the aircraft; during the preflight the captain discovered the 'Green Reservoir Lo Air Pressure' message on the ECAM; so he contacted Maintenance Control regarding the hydraulic issue. Initially the Captain elected to stop the boarding process; but Maintenance assured him that the process would only take about fifteen minutes. The passengers then continued to board while we worked with Maintenance on the hydraulic issue. Maintenance took longer than expected to resolve the issue; and at this point the aircraft was completely boarded. When the Ground Crew asked the Captain whether we were ready to disconnect the low pressure air; the Captain replied that we would continue to need the low pressure air in order to provide heat to the passengers; as we were not finished working through the hydraulic maintenance issue. After Maintenance resolved the hydraulic issue; we were ready to continue the flight once we were back in service. During my Pilot Flying briefing; I briefed the operational threats associated with our flight this morning and we discussed the importance of slowing down and making sure everything was done correctly. We would need a high pressure air cart in lieu of the APU in order to start the first engine. I used the Ground Pneumatic Start Supplementary Procedure from the Flight Manual to start engine one. Upon reaching idle; we noticed an abnormal vibration and the Captain turned the engine master to OFF. We then received a call from the Ground Crew advising us that engine number one had ingested the low pressure air hose. After we shut down the engine; we debriefed; contacted Maintenance and safely deplaned the passengers with no further event.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.