EMB-170 Captain reported cabin pressure control switches were not placed in proper positions and resulted in a CABIN ALT HI annunciation in flight. The flight continued after the flight crew positioned the cabin pressure controls to the correct positions.
Synopsis
EMB-170 Captain reported cabin pressure control switches were not placed in proper positions and resulted in a CABIN ALT HI annunciation in flight. The flight continued after the flight crew positioned the cabin pressure controls to the correct positions.
Narrative
During climbout passing thru 10;000 ft. MSL on the way to 15;000 ft. MSL we received a CABIN ALTITUDE HI master warning EICAS message. I was the PM and immediately called ATC and requested a level off at 10;000 ft. MSL. This was followed by the immediate action of running the QRC and memory items followed by the QRH. The first item on the QRH after the QRC is to ensure that the pressurization MODE switch is set to AUTO and the DUMP button is pushed out. The pressurization MODE switch was set to MAN. As the PM running the QRH I returned the MODE switch to AUTO and then monitored Cabin Altitude in accordance with the QRH. During this time the First Officer (FO) who was Pilot Flying (PF) was accepting vectors from ATC and maintaining 10;000 ft. MSL. Once the Cabin Altitude returned to normal pressurization we were both comfortable with continuing on with the flight. We requested back on course from ATC and continued on to ZZZ without any further issues.There are two causes for this event to have occurred. One; according to the aircraft logbook a pressurization leak check maintenance procedure was done after the top cap DV window seal re-bonding was done. This is noted on log. The pressurization MODE switch was not returned to the AUTO position and left in the MAN position after this procedure was accomplished. During my preflight inspection of the aircraft logbook I did take notice of this maintenance item and pointed it out to my FO. This brings us to the second cause. Two; despite making a note of the maintenance item and procedure both my preflight flow and my FO's preflight flow failed to notice that the MODE switch was set to MAN and not AUTO. We also both failed to notice that the CABIN ALT indications on the EICAS was not displaying any values. To my knowledge there are no other EICAS messages associated with the MODE switch being in MAN. This oversight in my preflight flow directly contributed to the aircraft failing to pressurize after take off and subsequently getting a CABIN ALTITUDE HI master warning and EICAS message right as we hit 10;000 ft. MSL. I will endeavor in the future to pay much closer attention to my preflight flow of the aircraft to make sure every switch is in its proper position so that such an incident will not happen in the future.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.