Center Controller reported there was UAS activity in an area near fixed wing aircraft arrivals in conditions of low visibility and ceilings and was concerned about the proximity of the UAS to other aircraft.

Narrative

I was working the airspace that was IMC throughout. I received a GI (General Information message) from the OM (Operations Manager); which was at the time regarding UAS activity at the ZZZ [VOR] 145 [radial] 24 [NM] fix 5;000 ft and below. I used the draw feature on my scope to specifically see where this was and how it affected my airspace. I was already concerned at the idea of UAS in IMC conditions up to 5;000 ft. The area we were notified as being used was about X miles northeast of ZZZ and overlayed fixes named ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 which are IAF's for ZZZ [Airport] and ZZZZZ1 is very commonly used for holding aircraft and inbound aircraft to ZZZ1. The UAS activity also abutted Sector X's airspace. [At] XA:33 weather at ZZZ: XA:17 01003KT 1/2 SM RXX/2000V2400FT FG VV002 02/01. ZZZ1: XB:53 00000KT 1/4SM FG VV002 00/00 A3032. I first alerted the CIC (Controller in Charge) to my concern. Once they saw and realized where it was; they called the OM that issued the NOTAM; who told them to look up the COA (Certificate of Authorization) on the drive. There was no COA to be found regarding UAS at this location. I talked to ZZZ [TRACON]; who was never notified of this activity except on the landline because of my concern. They pointed out an aircraft holding at ZZZZZ1 at 5;000 ft; I alerted them of the possible activity and they climbed the aircraft to 6;000 ft. Though the OM did not initially seem interested in what the effect on sectors/airspace/ and other facilities had; we continued to press for more information and eventually found that the OM put out an incorrect radial for the UAS activity in question. The actual radial was on the ZZZ 195. This radial still affects traffic at ZZZ and ZZZ2 and abuts Sector X's airspace; who; was still not notified. We (the CIC) eventually did find the COA after a lot of digging on the drive and found some information about chase planes and seemed ambiguous as to the meteorological conditions in which they could operate and whether or not they'd be able to. After reviewing; we don't think they could even operate in this low of weather. The number one thing to prevent this sort of confusion and potentially dangerous situations is to have a manager that is taking these phone calls that understands or even baseline cares about the operation and the impact to safety. Sending out a mistyped GI blocking 5;000 ft and below in hard IMC along approaches and missed approaches; near airports; along MEA's without being able to answer basic questions or express any concern over operational impact shows the slip from safety interests that exist in certain managers practices. Knowing how bad the weather is immediately raised questions for every controller in the room about UAS activity yet it was treated without scrutiny to detail by the Operations manager. The fact that the GI about this possible activity was never passed to ZZZ [Approach] who has IAF's that go through the airspace is a systemic issue and not the first time I've heard of this. As our airspace becomes more congested and UAS becomes more prevalent; their proximity to airspace needs to be looked at with greater scrutiny by those that are taking the calls from the user that the UAS may be active so that all parties are knowledgeable. This situation caused a lot of confusion and luckily we had available altitudes and time on sector to bring more attention to it.