DA2000 flight crew reported a trim malfunction during takeoff climb and performed an air turnback.
Synopsis
DA2000 flight crew reported a trim malfunction during takeoff climb and performed an air turnback.
Narrative
During takeoff on Runway XXR just after rotation out of ZZZ the pilot flying and PIC (Pilot in Command) informed me that he didn't have trim. At the same time; I was taking a radio call and frequency hand-off and completing the climb checklist. As I completed those tasks and checked in with Departure; the pilot flying and I started troubleshooting and reverting to the emergency elevator trim. We agreed to return to ZZZ since we were still in the traffic pattern on an upwind leg but did not [request priority handling] at this time. I notified Departure that we needed to return to the field. He asked if everything was ok so I told him we were having some trim malfunctions. He asked if we would like to [request priority handling] and I told him no.Around this time the pilot flying asked for the flaps to be brought up. I brought the flaps up while taking radio calls. When the flaps came up the Hydraulic ISOL light on the master warning panel illuminated. At this time the pilot flying and I started to feel like events were starting to build on us and we were feeling busy. This is when we decided to go ahead and [request priority handling]. At some point being vectored back for a visual approach to Runway XXR while the pilot flying was using the emergency elevator trim; he reset the Trim Circuit Breaker and was able to get normal trim back. We also noticed that the hydraulic isolation valve switch was not in the correct position - auto. We flipped the Hydraulic ISOL switch to auto and the light on the master warning panel extinguished. We were on short final at that time so we decided after [requesting priority handling]; etc. - that we were committed to getting the plane back on the ground.After long thought and discussion between the pilot flying and I; we both agreed that somehow the emergency elevator trim switch must have been bumped; which trips the Elevator Trim Circuit Breaker. We also agreed that we failed to do a thorough completion of checklists which caused us not catching the hydraulic isolation valve switch to not be in the correct position.
Second reporter narrative
This flight was an empty repositioning flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The crew were comprised of two experienced captains; each dually type rated and extremely current on the DA2000 aircraft. This particular aircraft was going to be placed under management from our employer's Part 135 charter department. Upon conducting our preflight; we did find some knobs and switches left in unorthodox positions. We continued with preparing for the flight and began to taxi.Shortly after departure; crew noticed normal elevator trim was inoperative. PIC (Pilot in Command) who was the pilot flying was able to control pitch via control column inputs and from the emergency trim switch as the PNF (Pilot not Flying) communicated with ATC that we were going to need to stop our climb and look at the issue. Shortly after; a master caution indicator illuminated HYD2 ISOL. It was at this moment; that the PNF; the much more experienced Captain; recommended that things were turning for the worse and compounding; he was feeling task saturated and advised ATC we needed to return to the field. When queried by ATC as to needing to [request priority handling]; we both agreed it would be the safest bet as we were unsure about the status of our hydraulic components. We would configure early and return to an easy right downwind for Runway XXR.As I; PF (Pilot Flying); reached to trim via the emergency switch on the downwind to Runway XXR; I saw that the Trim Circuit Breaker had been popped. I reset the breaker; and I had normal trim function. I then asked for flaps 10. As the PNF selected flaps 10 I saw the HYD2 ISOL caution light extinguish. This triggered my memory on the position of the hydraulic isolation valve; its automatic closure sequence based on flap position. When I looked at the isolation valve mode switch; I could see that it was not fully selected in the AUTO position. After selecting the switch to auto; all systems were functioning properly. We landed under max gross weight without incident.This situation could have been resolved by really hyper-focusing on each line item on the power-off acceptance checklist. Seeing that the aircraft had been operated previously by crew not employed by our Company and not standardized to our department; we should have been more alert to switches out of normal position. This may have led to discovering that the HYD2 ISOL switch was not fully in the AUTO position.It is our belief that the Elevator Trim Breaker was tripped on the takeoff roll or perhaps by something bumping the emergency trim switch; possibly my phone - during taxi; popping the trim breaker [and] disabling normal trim and the autopilot. Seeing that the switch is next to the airbrake lever; I will incorporate the trim switch check with our line up check.This event was basically a combination of 2 separate issues pertaining to switch position which we interpreted as related. It could be criticized that we did not use the QRH when resolving the situations. Given our location of heavy traffic density; PF having to hand-fly; PNF feeling task saturated; and the belief that our situation was deteriorating; I will support our decision to [request priority handling] and return to the field.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.