ACR X FLC TECHNIQUE FLYING DISTR TCASII TA EXCEEDED 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FT. PLTDEV.

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AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 22R AT EWR; WE WERE ON A 220 DEG HDG AS PART OF THE SID. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO DEP CTL; THE DEP CTLR CLRED US TO 'MAINTAIN PRESENT HDG AND CLB/MAINTAIN 10000 FT.' THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL CLRNC BECAUSE WE WOULD NORMALLY BE GIVEN A R TURNOUT TO A NNWESTERLY HDG TO KEEP US CLR OF THE ARR FLOW FOR LGA. I STATED TO MY FO THAT I THOUGHT IT WAS UNUSUAL TO CONTINUE ON THE 220 DEG HDG AND ALSO CLB TO 10000 IN THAT DIRECTION. I WAS ABOUT TO DIRECT HIM TO QUERY ATC ABOUT OUR CLRNC WHEN WE RECEIVED A 'TFC! TFC!' ADVISORY FROM OUR TCASII SYS. VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY; DEP CTL RADIOED US TO 'STOP CLB IMMEDIATELY!' THIS OCCURRED AT APPROX 8800 FT MSL. OUR RATE OF CLB WAS RAPID. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND INITIATED A PUSHOVER. OUR FLT PATH ARCED UP THROUGH APPROX 9300 FT AND THEN BACK DOWN TO 9000 FT. THEN; OUT OF THE HAZE; ACR Y APPEARED AT 12 O'CLOCK; MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION ABOVE US. ALTHOUGH ATC SAID WE WERE CLR OF THAT TFC; IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE MIDAIR POTENTIAL WAS VERY GREAT; HAD OUR CLB CONTINUED UNABATED. ALSO; BECAUSE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MLG AUTO THROTTLE SYS; THE ENG PWR STAYED AT CLB PWR BECAUSE WE HAD LEVELED OFF PRIOR TO THE ALT ARMED IN THE 'ALT ALERT' WINDOW OF THE FLT GUIDANCE. (10000 WAS SET IN THE WINDOW.) THE AIRSPD RAPIDLY INCREASED ABOVE 250 KIAS AND I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY NOTICE IT BECAUSE MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED IN LEVELING OFF AND SIMULTANEOUSLY SCANNING OUTSIDE FOR THE TFC. I THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTO THROTTLES AND MANUALLY RETARDED THE THROTTLES AND DECELERATED TO 250. AS A SIDELIGHT; I SHOULD MENTION THAT WE HAD AN FAA INSPECTOR IN THE JUMPSEAT FOR AN ENRTE INSPECTION. MY INITIAL CONCERN AT THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WAS COMPOUNDED SOMEWHAT BY CONCERN OVER WHAT HE WOULD THINK ABOUT ALL THIS. HE APPEARED TO TAKE IF ALL 'IN STRIDE' BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY MORE THAN YOUR RUN-OF-THE-MILL LINE CHK! (AT THE END OF THE FLT; HE STATED THAT WE HAD DONE A GOOD JOB AND HE HAD NOTED NO PROBLEMS DURING OUR LINE CHK.) I BELIEVE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO MY EXCEEDING 250 KIAS BELOW 10000 FT WAS AN INGRAINED HABIT PATTERN OF EXPECTING THE AUTO THROTTLES TO RETARD PWR DURING A LEVEL OFF FROM A CLB. OF COURSE; THEY WORK BEAUTIFULLY UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS; BUT WHEN THE UNUSUAL HAPPENS; AN 'AUTOMATIC' SYS CAN REAR UP AND 'BITE' YOU RIGHT WHEN YOU DON'T NEED IT! IN ADDITION; THE OLD MAXIM OF QUESTIONING AN UNUSUAL OR AMBIGUOUS CLRNC IS AS RELEVANT AS EVER. THE NEXT TIME; I'LL QUESTION THE CTLR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHEN THERE IS A SUSPICION OF SOMETHING AMISS.