B737 flight crew reported an engine failure after take off; resulting in an air turnback and precautionary landing at the departure airport.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported an engine failure after take off; resulting in an air turnback and precautionary landing at the departure airport.
Narrative
Captain [was] Pilot Flying and First Officer [was] Pilot Monitoring. Takeoff roll on Runway XXL was uneventful. On climb out; Pilot Monitoring noticed the autothrottle (A/T) disengaged and re-engaged it. It happened a second time with the same results. The number 2 engine had trouble exactly matching the commanded climb thrust. I also reengaged the A/T at least once. After engaging the autopilot around 5-6;000 ft. MSL; Pilot Flying noticed excess yaw and roll and disengaged autopilot. Both pilots noticed the number 2 engine was at approximately 60 percent N1 with a white arc showing commanded vs actual position. There were no other engine indications or abnormalities. The crew accomplished Immediate Action Items for the 'Engine Limit or Surge or Stall' checklist. Pilot Monitoring requested an intermediate level off at 10;000 ft. and continued course. Captain gave First Officer radios and Pilot Flying duties shortly after leveling of at 10;000 ft.After the turn at ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ2; ZZZZZ1 SID; ATC gave vectors to remain in the local area. Aircraft was at 10;000 ft. MSL; 230 KIAS near location west of ZZZ. The crew ran the remainder of Quick Reference Handbook for 'Engine Limit or Surge or Stall' checklist and coordinated with local Maintenance and Maintenance Control/Dispatch; notified passengers and FM. Requesting priority handling by ATC and crew simultaneously when 20-25 minutes into flight the engine rolled back and failed. Crew ran the 'Engine Failure or Shutdown' checklist and the 'One Engine Inoperative Landing' checklist. Crew planned and executed an overweight; single engine; return to ZZZ. To land below max landing weight we would have needed to fly for roughly 2 more hours. A planned overweight visual approach to Runway YYL via vectors to a 10-mile final with 15-flaps was uneventful with a smooth landing. Crew taxied to Gate XX and shut down the remaining engine to wait for baggage/pallet carts to be moved and then tow-in.No sooner than we had parked; Crew Scheduling called me; notifying us that we would be leaving in roughly 65 minutes to ZZZ1. We decided that we needed to re-evaluate our fitness for duty and needed to speak to Union representation before proceeding any further. We then spoke to Maintenance Control over the phone and then hub maintenance at the aircraft to discuss the events. We had noticed that the Fuel Pump Package had been replaced that morning with an engine run accomplished. The number 2 HMU; Heat Exchanger and Fuel Pump were replaced following the engine failure in flight. A member of the Chief Pilot's office; and later the Chief Pilot; met us at the aircraft to check on us; coordinate with Company (scheduling; Chief Pilot; etc) and accomplish a [safety evaluation]. We reached a mutual conclusion it was not in the best interests of safety to fly as we were still processing the chain of events during the flight and the associated stress/workload.We accomplished a thorough debrief and reconstruction of the flight. Preflight: Both of us woke early due to the nature of the schedule. It was day 2 of the 4-day pairing; with an early show ZZZ2-ZZZ3 on day 1. Originally scheduled to fly ZZZ3-ZZZ; the pairing had been changed to a deadhead due to equipment substitution. The evening was relaxing and we were both asleep early. I slept from XA:00 pm until XJ:30am. In the morning I had a very long hold time with the Company's Agent on Demand before van pickup time at XM:02 AM. The flight plan was released while I was getting ready for the van ride. I knew we had a longer van ride; so I did not expect this to be a problem. We left the hotel on time and reviewed the flight plan en route. We were scheduled for a random southerly route ZZZ-ZZZ1 at FL300 due to significant impacts from turbulence and convective activity/SIGMETS; increasing the complexity. The Dispatcher had asked the Captain to call regarding this flight; which I did during the van ride. We both had significant distractions with thefunctioning of the weather app on our EFBs (this is an ongoing issue where it attempts to connect and then drops connectivity).On arriving at the airport; we had the additional task of [Covid procedures]. I went to the mission planning area while the First Officer went to the aircraft to begin the preflight to save time. The 45-minute report time was compressed; especially with the additional attention to weather/turbulence and verifying the random route points. Fortunately; we departed Gate XY; close to the satellite mission planning room; saving some time. There was some pressure from the Gate Agents for us to leave and then the ramp personnel were waiting for us to push. I used CRM and our company process approach to ensure everything was ready to go before releasing brakes. Taxi: We planned Runway ZZR for departure; and Ground Control changed us to ZZL. I called for the runway change procedure and we were split-task for a few minutes to update the required information. The remainder of the taxi out was uneventful.
Second reporter narrative
Captain [was] Pilot Flying (PF) [and] First Officer (FO) [was] Pilot Monitoring (PM). Takeoff roll on Runway XXL was uneventful. On climb out; PM noticed the autothrottle disengaged and re-engaged it. It happened a second time with the same results. The PF also reengaged the autothrottle at least once. After engaging the auto pilot around 5-6;000 ft. MSL; PF noticed excess yaw and disengaged autopilot. Both pilots noticed the #2 engine was at approximately 60% N1 with a white arc showing commanded vs actual thrust. There were no other engine indications or abnormalities; so the situation was difficult to detect. PF accomplished Immediate Action Items for Engine Limit; Surge or Stall (there were no additional items in QRC). PM told ATC about an engine malfunction in progress and requested an intermediate level off at 10;000 and continued course on ZZZZZ2; ZZZZZ1 SID. Shortly after the turn at ZZZZZ2; ATC gave vectors to remain in the local area. Aircraft was at 10;000 ft. MSL; 230 KIAS near location west of ZZZ. FO ran remainder of QRH while Captain coordinated with local Maintenance and Maintenance Control/Dispatch; notified passengers and FM. Then Captain gave FO radios and aircraft control while Captain continued coordination and checklists.[Priority handling requested] by ATC and crew simultaneously. Approximately 20-25 minutes into flight the engine rolled back and failed. Captain ran Engine or Failure or Shutdown Checklist and the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist. ATC provided vectors to a ten-mile final for a 15-flaps (165 KIAS) visual approach to Runway XYL. Approach and landing was uneventful with minimal forces during the overweight landing at approximately 170;000 lbs. Crew taxied to Gate XX and shut down the remaining engine to wait for baggage/pallet carts to be moved and then towed in. While we were waiting for the gate; 20 minutes after landing; we received an ACARS message that this aircraft would be a 'Quick Turn' going back to ZZZ1.No sooner than we had parked; Crew Scheduling called the Captain; notifying us that we would be leaving in less than three hours for the same flight. I spoke up and told scheduling I could not speak for the Captain; but I would have to re-evaluate my fitness for duty and needed to speak to my [Union] representation before proceeding any further. The Captain concurred.We then spoke to Maintenance Control over the phone and then Hub Maintenance at the aircraft to discuss the events. I had noticed that the Fuel Pump Package had been replaced that morning with an engine run accomplished. I verbalized this during mission planning and was surprised that the aircraft would be sent on an ETOPS flight without any maintenance verification or reliability check. Of note; the #2 HMU; Heat Exchanger and Fuel Pump were replaced following the engine failure in flight.A member of the Chief Pilot's office; and later the Chief Pilot; met us at the aircraft to check on us; coordinate with Company (scheduling; Chief Pilot; etc) and accomplish a human factors [evaluation]. We reached a mutual conclusion it was not in the best interests of safety to fly as we were still processing the chain of events during the flight and the associated stress/workload.The Captain and I accomplished a thorough debrief and reconstruction of the flight.Preflight: Both of us woke early due to the nature of the schedule. It was Day 2 of the 4-day pairing; with an early show ZZZ2-ZZZ3. Originally scheduled to fly ZZZ3-ZZZ; the pairing had been changed to a deadhead due to equipment substitution. The evening was relaxing and we were both asleep early; resulting in a very early wake-up (XA:30 AM for me). Personally; this was not an issue as I knew I would be flying a single leg with an early end to the duty day. However; I tried to rest as much as possible before van pickup time at XE:02 AM. I had some personal business to attend to; so I did not spend as much time on the flight as I normally do before leavingthe hotel room. I knew we had a longer van ride; so I did not expect this to be a problem.We left the hotel on time and reviewed the flight plan en route. We were scheduled for a random route ZZZ-ZZZ1 at FL300 due to significant impacts from turbulence and convective activity/SIGMETS; increasing the complexity. The Dispatcher had asked the Captain to call regarding this flight. We both had significant distractions with the functioning of the weather app on our EFBs (this is an ongoing issue where it attempts to connect and then drops connectivity). I was still updating the route while the Captain spoke with Dispatch; so he had to repeat the information to me later.On arriving at the airport; we had the additional task of [Covid Procedures]. The Captain went to the mission planning area while I went to the aircraft to being preflight to save time. The 45-minute report time was compressed; especially with the additional attention to weather [and] turbulence and verifying the random route points. Fortunately; we departed Gate XY; close to the satellite mission planning room; saving some time. There was some pressure from the Gate Agents for us to leave and then the ramp personnel were waiting for us to push. The Captain used CRM and our company process approach to ensure everything was ready to go before releasing brakes.Taxi: We planned runway XXR/F for departure; and ground control changed us to Runway XXL. The Captain called for the runway change procedure and we were split-task for a few minutes to update the required information. The remainder of the taxi out was uneventful.In-flight: As the PM (FO); I consciously observed a heightened awareness of the engine instruments on takeoff roll (more than usual). I did not notice the correlation to the auto throttle and the #2 N1; however; and neither of us noticed any other abnormalities in performance or indications. The autothrottle has disengaged in the past during takeoff or climb out; so this did not seem unusual at first. CRM: The Captain delegated tasks; but a couple of times we both answered or duplicated radio calls. We were methodical to ensure we were performing the appropriate checklists as this was an unusual situation. The term 'Engine Limit' as part of the title was not readily apparent as applicable; but we realized the first line in the Condition Statement is 'Engine Indications are abnormal'. We had already applied the Immediate Action items through our analysis and stabilization of the aircraft and the QRC does not call for any additional actions. We also determined that this checklist concluded at Step X with the engine at reduced thrust and coordination with Maintenance Control and Dispatch. In the checklist; communication errors and imperfect systems knowledge resulted in some confusion over brake setting for landing but was resolved. Finally; task management required split-task effort and re-brief; adding to the challenge; but we had plenty of time to verify all necessary items before entering the traffic pattern for landing at ZZZ.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.