CTLR RPTR WORKING AN EMER ACFT IS DISTR BY SUPVR.

Narrative

I WAS WORKING TCA WHICH WAS QUIET AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. LCL AND GND WERE BOTH BUSY. THE TMC IN THE TWR RECEIVED VIA LANDLINE A COORD FROM NEW YORK APCH REF AN SMA X 15 MI SW OF JFK WISHING TO RETURN TO FRG DUE TO AN INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT OF LOW OIL PRESSURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY I NOTICED THE ACFT GO INTO HDOF MODE FOR MY ACCEPTANCE. I MANUALLY ACCEPTED THE HDOF AT THE SAME TIME THE TMC VERBALLY INFORMED ME OF THE COORD FROM NEW YORK APCH. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY I RECEIVED INITIAL CALL UP FROM THE ACFT; AND NOTICED NEW YORK APCH HAD DSNDED THE ACFT TO 1500. THE ACFT REQUESTED DIRECT FRG A SATELLITE ARPT 15 MI E OF JFK WHERE THE ACFT WAS BASED. I THEN ASKED THE ACFT HOW HE PLANNED TO NAVIGATE; AND HIS RESPONSE WAS NOT POSITIVE. I SUGGESTED VECTORS DIRECT AND THE PLT READILY AGREED. THE SUPVR IN THE TWR CAB WAS DIRECTLY BEHIND ME AT THIS TIME; NOT MONITORING THE POS. HE IMMEDIATELY ORDERED ME TO ISSUE THE ACFT A 060 HDG; HIS REASONS BEING THAT JFK DEPS WOULD NOT HAVE TO BE STOPPED FOR SMA X FLT TO FRG. HE WAS COMPLETELY UNAWARE THE ACFT HAD REQUESTED VECTORS DIRECT. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS SUPVR HAS TAUGHT ME THAT HIS ORDERS ARE EASIER TO CARRY OUT THEN TO ARGUE AGAINST AND EVEN THOUGH THE SLIGHTLY OFF COURSE 060 HDG WOULD ADD 3 OR 4 MI TO SMA X TRIP; I ISSUED IT TO THE ACFT. AT THIS TIME; SMA X EXPERIENCED TOTAL LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE; I BEGAN TO SEARCH FOR A PLACE TO LAND. HIS RADAR TRACK WAS ERRATIC AND HE APPEARED TO BE HDG SEBOUND. A LATER CONVERSATION WITH THE PLT CONFIRMED THE SYNCRONICITY OF THE LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE AND MY OBSERVATION OF THE ERRATIC RADAR TRACK. APPARENTLY AT THIS POINT THE PLT ABANDONED THE ISSUED HDG AND BEGAN A CTLED GLIDE TOWARD FLOYD BENNETT FIELD DIRECTLY BENEATH HIS PRESENT POS. IN THE CAB; I NOTICED THE PLT HDG SEBOUND; AND ADJUSTED THE 060 HDG ACCORDINGLY; ISSUING A 030 HDG TO THE PLT. THE PLT THEN RESPONDED 'I'VE LOST ALL PRESSURE AND I'M GOING DOWN!' THIS WAS ALL OCCURRING DIRECTLY BENEATH THE STANDARD ARR COURSE FOR RWY 13L AT JFK; AND NEW YORK APCH DID NOT DISCONTINUE ARRS. SMA X BEGAN MAKING L TFC FOR FLOYD BENNETT FIELD; WHICH TOOK HIM DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO A WDB ON APCH. THE LCL CTLR OBSERVED THIS AND IMMEDIATELY CLBED THE WDB TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION. THE SUPVR BEHIND ME IGNORED MY STATEMENT THE PLANE (SMA X) WAS GOING DOWN; AND BEGAN SCREAMING AT ME ABOUT SMA X'S POS. I RAISED MY L HAND IN AN ATTEMPT TO HUSH THE SUPVR SO THAT I COULD HEAR SMA X'S NEXT XMISSION; WHICH I NEVER DID HEAR. THE SUPVR CONTINUED HIS RAMPAGE; EVEN THOUGH NOW HE WAS AWARE THE ACFT WAS MAKING AN EMER LNDG. THIS SUPVR OFTEN CARRIES ON WELL BEYOND THE PARAMETERS OF HIS JOB DESCRIPTION. IN THIS PARTICULAR EVENT; HIS CONTINUAL BANTERING ABOUT SMA X'S FLT TRACK (CAUSED BY HIS ATTEMPT TO CIRCLE BACK TO FLOYD BENNETT FIELD) PREVENTED ME FROM FURTHER COM WITH THE AIRPLANE. FLOYD BENNETT FIELD IS LOCATED 5 MI SW OF JFK; IS AN OPERATING HELIPORT FOR NYPD AVIATION AND USCG. THERE ARE RWYS AT THE FIELD THAT HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR YRS; DANGEROUSLY OVERGROWN AND IN BAD CONDITION. I AM AN EXPERIENCED PLT IN SIMILAR ACFT TO SMA X; AND EXTENSIVELY FAMILIAR WITH THIS AREA. I INTENDED TO INFORM SMA X OF THE CONDITION OF FLOYD BENNETT FIELD; THE RWY ALIGNMENTS; THE WIND; THE EXISTENCE OF THE NYPD AND NGCG UNITS AT THE FIELD; AND EVEN OFFER IMMEDIATE CLRNC TO JFK IF THE PLT FELT THIS WOULD BE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE CONSIDERING THE CONDITIONS OF FLOYD BENNETT FIELD. THE SUPVR BEGAN MAKING JUDGEMENTAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION; CALLING THE OP 'TERRIBLE' AND SCREAMING AT ME COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF THE SITUATION AS IT HAD NOW DEVELOPED.