Air carrier First Officer reported an engine failure in oceanic airspace. The crew and company dispatcher decided on an alternate airport and proceeded to a safe landing.

Narrative

When the event occurred the Captain and I had been at rest in the crew rest seats for 20-30 minutes. I was resting in seat 1A; the seat has a curtain around it. I awoke because felt the airframe jostle side to side; and heard some noises that sounded to me like a compressor stall. As I was collecting myself a Flight Attendant came through the curtain and alerted me that they needed me up front. She said we had lost an engine. When I arrived at the cockpit door I saw the Captain just shutting the door behind her as she entered the flight deck. I got in front of the beverage cart at that time and knocked twice before I was let in. When I arrived inside the flight deck; the Captain was already seated in the left seat. One of the relief First Officers was seated in the right seat; and the other relief First Officer was standing involved with reading a checklist aloud. I took a seat in the jump seat aft of the control stand; and pulled the paper Quick Reference Handbook from the First Officers side to follow along; as my iPad was still in the mount on the First Officers side window. The state of the aircraft at this moment was 5 miles right of track and descending at drift down speed to FL 250; with the autopilot on; auto-throttles off; right thrust lever at idle and right fuel control switch cutoff. A SELCAL came in through HF. I don't recall who answered it or what was said; I was still trying to get caught up with the situation.I noticed at this moment the Right EGT gauge was in the red and had a red box around the digits; and the N1 indication was blanked; this N1 condition is indicative of engine severe damage. It was my understanding that the Captain was going back over the Quick Reference Handbook checklists at this point to make sure everything was done; and was trying to determine what type of engine problem we had. I voiced my diagnosis of severe damage and drew the Captain's attention to the Blank N1 indicator as support. In the sequence of the memory items the engine severe damage memory items the engine fire handle is to be pulled.The Captain made sure we were all in agreement that the condition we were experiencing was engine severe damage and that the fire handle was going to be pulled sealing the fate that we would not be getting that engine back during this flight. We were all in agreement; and the right engine fire handle was pulled. At the end of the memory items review from the Quick Reference Handbook made the sitting First Officer aware of the fact that my iPad was still in the mount and advised me I could go ahead and grab it. I began to look for traffic outside; I put on a headset and began listening in; and I heard that we were in contact on HF; I heard multiple aircraft on guard offering to relay for us. I took another look at all of the panels at this point to determine if maybe something was missed; and I didn't find that there was anything missed; as I went through the Quick Reference Handbook and non-normal checklists on my iPad in silence.I began looking at my iPad for our position and route information and for alternates. We were near but just prior to our CP-2 flight planned critical point with planned alternates of ZZZZ2 and ZZZZ3. However; ZZZZ1 was determined to be the nearest airport. It was not listed in the flight plan as an alternate; and I was not sitting in a position where I could help checking the Alternate page or determining the times to our considerations; or pulling ATIS reports or using any ACARS functions; so I elected to check the flight plan. ZZZZ1 weather TAFs were listed in the flight plan. Although the flight plan TAF information was not as desirable as more recent weather reports; at the time it stated probability of fog and mist; ZZZZ2 was predicted to be windy with rain showers; and ZZZZ3 was predicted calm and clear. The Captain coordinated with dispatch by sat-phone; and the Dispatcher agreed that ZZZZ1 was a great option; due to weather; time; distance; and support on the ground. I believe at this point the Captain programmed the FMC to take us to ZZZZ1; which was nearly along our current course; and informed ATC of our intentions to go to ZZZZ1. ATIS weather was requested. The Printer was very active with messages from the dispatcher; including weather and landing data for ZZZZ1. The First Officer that was standing in the back near me determined the landing distance using the hyperlinks in the engine severe damage checklist which takes you directly to the inflight performance charts located in our flight manual; and informed the rest of the crew. I checked the OFP (Operational Flight Plan) for NOTAMs at ZZZZ1; but ZZZZ1 airport was not listed in the NOTAMs section; one of the other First Officers pulled the NOTAMs through [the electronic flight bag]; and indicated that they had been reviewed and no NOTAMs would affect us 'except maybe one'; but I forget what he said that was; and it didn't end up affecting us. At this point we had about an hour and twenty minutes; by my recollection; to landing. We split tasks amongst the crew; each of us scanning the panels; monitoring the flight path; and reviewing charts; reviewing all information from the printer; the captain gave the Flight Attendants a TEST brief; and made a PA to the passengers at some point during this portion of the time. I tried to help set up for the approach by monitoring the ATIS frequency for the moment that would come into listening range; and tuning and setting my radio up for identifying the ILS approach frequency. The First Officer seated in the right seat needed a bathroom break at this point and I got in the seat for a moment; I made some radio responses during this time. Upon his return the other First Officer may have went to the restroom; but I don't recall for sure. Very shortly after the bathroom run or runs; the crew decided to put the most experienced First Officer in the right seat for the remainder of the flight. At some point closer to the shoreline the captain elected to continue descent to FL200. I can't recall if this was in response to the minor airframe vibration we experienced or if that was unrelated; but the Captain was able to alleviate the vibration by with speed control.I monitored the rest of the flight from the jump seat aft of the center console. Nothing of significance arose during the remainder of the flight; the brakes did get warm (up to 5 on the Brake Temperature Monitoring System) during taxi in. Firefighters followed us into the gate and were also monitoring our aircraft using infrared technology. Upon arrival to the gate emergency personnel came to the flight deck and we discussed the brake temperatures and right engine temperatures; it was stated that they were decreasing and at a safe level. The crew and all personnel on the ground determined it would be safe to disembark the aircraft. One First Officer put on a hat and jacket to greet the passengers upon disembarkation. I worked on organizing and retaining all documents for the Captain and securing the aircraft with as much of the termination checklist as I could run under the circumstances. No injuries were reported.