ZJX Controllers reported weather related issues that they deal with whenever there is weather in the area.
Synopsis
ZJX Controllers reported weather related issues that they deal with whenever there is weather in the area.
Narrative
This was peak volume and complexity when the entire center was reeling with the effects of the weather system over Miami. Brewton was asked to descend all aircraft out of the central area to help them. During this time I heard at least 3 controllers from as many areas yelling for somebody to shut it down or ground stop everybody.I took the h/o on Aircraft X landing ECP at 250. He checked in and between his radio and our radios I thought he said (call sign 2). That's how I answered him. Meanwhile the sector under me is coordinating for higher for Aircraft Y. I ran the route and approved higher. (Apparently the controller said FL240 but I just said higher was good and left the data block without a T altitude; showing him climbing to 300.) I then tried to descend Aircraft X but repeatedly called him (what Controller thought the callsign was; but was incorrect) because that's what I thought his call sign was. Simultaneously Brewton and CEW lost their radios. I lost my mains; the secondaries were unselectable. BUECS (Back Up Emergency Communication System) worked but we're of a diminished quality. Around this time a D side showed up. He corrected me from (incorrect call sign) to (correct call sign). Once in communications I immediately descended him from 250 to 240. All this time I thought Aircraft Y was climbing to 300. They were head on with less than 20 NM. I turned Aircraft Y north initially. Then turned him more but did not realize he was a tanker and that slow to turn. I realized it was not working halfway through the next transmission and tried to turn Aircraft X into the active airspace as part of a traffic alert because I observed no target there. He seemingly ignored that call and came back later with 'responding to an RA'. About the same time Aircraft Y also responded to an RA. He had accepted the turns north prior at least.Staffing. If all the sectors open had help that would be the absolute minimum. To my knowledge everybody at work was plugged in and the whole building was freaking out. When I am hearing people yelling and pleading for help and everybody is plugged in; is it on the controller to still ask for help at this point? If everybody is drowning; I don't feel like that's my call to make. Me getting a D side would mean someone lost a D side.Lack of planning and management. First thing in the morning we went from cranking people going to MIA to get 30 MIT to immediately holding. Then it just progressively got worse from there. We all knew where the weather was going to be. Why was there no better plan in place to mitigate this disaster? It is inexplicable.Don't know what happened with the radios at the CEW site but that certainly didn't help.I didn't know the call sign. Probably relatively new. There has been a massive proliferation of new call signs within the last 5 years or so. That has real effects. Why does everybody with an airplane get a call sign?The coordination off VSCS (Voice Switch and Control System) obviously should have been better. They were in just as bad shape and were scrambling like I was and their radios had crapped out also. I left the data block at 300 because that's what I thought he was doing. I think he did initially say 240 but when I removed the 'T' and ran the route I said something to the effect of he's good for higher.
Second reporter narrative
I was D-side at 86. I would estimate that there were more than 30 tracks within our airspace. Miami stopped taking handoffs from all sectors except Cigar. This caused us to spin aircraft with no notice; and one of them entered ZMA sector 64 without a point-out. In my opinion; the volume of aircraft was too much for anyone of any skill level to keep track of; and the abrupt notification of the airspace shut-off by ZMA caused the airspace violation. Shortly before that; I was at D33 where I notified Atlanta Center that we could no longer accept southbound aircraft due to ZMA no longer accepting handoffs. The Hampton sector remarked that 'if you won't take my handoffs; I won't take yours' which compounded the issue for our entire area from the ZTL boundary to the ZMA boundary. An aircraft landing in Madison; WI was placed into hold at OTK; and several others landing hundreds of miles away were inconvenienced by ZTL's baseless refusal to take handoffs on aircraft who had done nothing wrong and had no weather in the way of their route. At least one of the aircraft placed into hold entered ZTL's airspace when being spun back to hold at OTK. The volume was too much across the entire area. ZMA was dealing with WX and volume; so it seemed they were justified in shutting the door on ZJX; however; Atlanta Center really seemed to have no reason other than spitefulness when they shut the door on our handoffs. The causative factor for the entire day's worth of disastrous and unsafe traffic situations was an embarrassing failure by the ATSCC to regulate traffic in a timely manner with TMI's; ground stops/delays; etc. Instead they relied on a weather forecast that showed the weather 'breaking up' and based their rationale for pumping nonsensical traffic volume through the southeast on that erroneous forecast.The ATSCC actually doing their job and putting out flow for a gigantic squall line that parked itself over the Florida peninsula for an entire day would be a great start. ZTL could also help us out instead of refusing to take handoffs with zero rationale.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.