ZDC Controller reported about a shift that was inundated with weather causing holding; reroutes and aircraft being vectored around holding traffic.

Narrative

Staffing numbers for the evening shift were four below the number; eight out of twelve; plus one Controller in Charge for the entire shift. Supervisor for the morning/day shift called me at XA:00L asking if I could come in for two hours of overtime at the beginning of the shift since the night shift had taken sick hits. I was originally scheduled to be in at XF:00L and agreed to come in at XD:00L. The other person scheduled for a XF:00 shift also came in at XD:00 for two hours of overtime. The day shift had also taken sick hits and was below the number. Nine out of twelve. One person changed their shift from XD:00L to XZ:00L and was held over one hour at the end of their shift for coverage. Two certified D-Sides from the morning shift were held over two hours. There was one Controller in Charge for the entire night shift starting at XD:30LThe warning areas along the east coast were all active. Within fifteen minutes of working Sector 50; every sector in the area had a D-Side staffing; except Sector 25 (Low sector). On a normal day. D-Sides are not staffing unless it is for training or currency time. During the position relief briefing; I was told that coordination sector to sector had occurred for AR (Atlantic Routes) traffic; single flow over CARPX intersection (190 miles offshore) due to weather and a rocket launch. If aircraft were not offshore capable; then there were to be routed inland; down J121. This coordination had been started early during the day shift; but no official routing was on the status board. Surrounding areas had been told about it. Northern sectors were not participating with the reroutes and aircraft were departing with normal AR routing. There was thirty miles in trail for PBI; MIA; and FLL for aircraft filed down J121 (inland). I had been working roughly ten minutes when the daytime Supervisor came into the area and announced the ZJX inland sectors (J47/J48) had shut off southbound traffic and to expect the same call to my area's south sectors (09/35). About five minutes later; ZJZ sectors J48 and J47 shut off southbound traffic and told to hold. Sector 09 exhausted holding fixes and altitudes available to them with warning area still after. They coordinated the last plane they could take with me at Sector 50. My sector quickly exhausted available holding fixes and altitudes; again with warning areas active to the east. I coordinated with the sector to the northeast side; how many planes I could take from them and hold any other Florida traffic. Sector 34 (sector below mine) shut off daily departures from another sector to the north and told to hold any Florida traffic. Sector 09 shut off northbound traffic from ZJX after roughly twenty to thirty minutes due to holding stacks using every altitude. Any aircraft within sector 09 northbound were vectored to avoid the holding stacks.; which would be coming into my sector and had to be vectored around my holding stacks as well. Any aircraft not going to Florida; either southbound or westbound; also had to be vectored around holding stacks in my sector. After about forty to forty-five minutes later; ZJX started taking southbound traffic; thirty miles in trail per airport. By this time; some aircraft I had been holding requested to divert to nearby airports (RDU or CHS). These required lengthy vectoring to get them lower. Warning areas (W122 and W386) went cold/inactive to accommodate holding for the sectors they were in. W122 is in Sector 09; and W386 is in the sector north of the one I was working; Sector 39. This happened about the time I was being relieved from the sector. AR traffic could still be routed single flow over the CARPX fix if they were able. I was relieved from the sector at about XE:05L. I took a thirty minute break and when I returned; I relieved the controller at Sector 09. There was no longer holding; there was still thirty miles in trail for inland (J121) traffic; very low volume and D-Sides had been released from positions.Earlier in the day; ZJX had shut off ZTL southbound traffic; which in turn; ZTL had shut off the western areas of ZDC. The event that occurred on the east coast could have been avoided. Communication between the Command Center; TMU; and the Centers needs to improve. Although sector to sector coordination is a valuable tool for Controllers; it should not have to be used throughout an entirety of a day; when there is an ongoing issue with the NAS. This event was a complete breakdown in communication when feasible plans could have been put in place to help the centers being inundated with traffic who have weather or low staffing. (Ground stops; SWAP routing; etc.)