SA 227 flight crew reported confusion and communications issues resulted in an attempted takeoff with the landing gear control handle in the up position. The nose landing gear retracted; resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Synopsis
SA 227 flight crew reported confusion and communications issues resulted in an attempted takeoff with the landing gear control handle in the up position. The nose landing gear retracted; resulting in a rejected takeoff.
Narrative
On DATE; crew scheduling contacted me requesting that I fly Aircraft X that evening due to crew fatigue. The previous crew had experienced a series of mechanical problems throughout the day; and I was to be the relief captain. Knowing this; I arrived at the gate approximately 15-20 minutes before scheduled show time to determine the status of the aircraft; and how repairs were proceeding. Mechanics were working on repairing the hydraulic systems on Aircraft X after a complete hydraulic failure earlier that day. Aircraft X was also being looked at for a pressurization issue. Maintenance believed the hydraulic issue was a simpler problem that could be resolved more expeditiously to minimize potential delay; and they told me it would take 45-60 minutes to complete. When I was notified that the repairs were completed; I returned to the aircraft with the First Officer; and I told him to coordinate with the ramp crew so that I could taxi Aircraft X from the auxiliary parking space to [gate]. I ensured that the hydraulic system was producing pressure via the hydraulic pressure gauge and the lack of annunciation on the annunciator panel. The nose wheel steering system (NWS) was not operating when I attempted to turn out of the parking space; so I shut down and NAME came over to the plane. After various tests and checks to determine the cause of inoperative NWS; and coordinating with NAME1 and NAME2; we determined that it would be best to defer maintenance on the NWS per the MEL procedure; and continue the flight without it. From this point; everything seemed to be returning to normal. I taxied Aircraft X to [gate]; the First Officer and I prepared it for passengers; and we boarded after being fueled. Engine start; taxi; pre-takeoff checks were all normal. During takeoff; after standard call outs; at approximately 100-102 KIAS; prior to our V1/Rotate speed of 106 KIAS; I noticed the taxi light located on the nose gear strut turn off; and the nose subsequently fell to the ground. I immediately and continuously held full aft yoke pressure to shift as much weight to the main gear struts as possible. The First Officer immediately requested priority handling and assisted me with holding the yoke aft. I then pulled both Stop and Feather controls simultaneously; and focused all of my effort to keep the plane on the runway center line using rudder only. I did not use any brakes. During this time I also clarified the nature of the situation with Tower; and requested priority vehicles to meet the plane. After rolling/sliding for approximately 10;000 feet; the First Officer and I looked out the flight deck windows to ensure that there was not a fire; and I asked the Tower if he could see any flames coming from our aircraft.When he answered in the negative. Leaving all exterior lights on; I instructed the First Officer to open the main cabin door; assist the passengers out of the aircraft; and take them to the grass on the East side of the runway. I made an announcement over the PA that we were deplaning; to follow the direction of the First Officer; and exit the plane via the main cabin door. I informed the Tower of all of these things; then assisted the remaining passengers out of the airplane. After ensuring everyone was unharmed; I returned to the aircraft to inform the tower that I was shutting down all remaining systems. I coordinated with company; emergency crews; and airport operations to manage the situation; and only returned to the aircraft a few minutes later to retrieve my jacket. There was an extremely simple step that could have prevented several of these issues along the way: thoroughly; diligently utilizing the acceptance/pre-flight checklist located in the aircraft to ensure the correct configuration of the flight deck. This was not done; and the pre-flight was accomplished by memory; without checklist verification or utilization. Because of this; the Gear Position Control lever was in the UP position throughout this entire chain of events; and was never corrected. It is almost certain to be the cause of the NWS issue; as well as the emergency on the runway. I can't speak for any other pilot; but I can say with absolute confidence that this critical step will never be missed by me again.
Second reporter narrative
I was the First Officer on Aircraft X. I was doing the external preflight and I did it without a checklist to speed the process along because the flight was delayed. My Captain did the interior preflight and I said we were good to go and he said we were good to go on his end and neither of us questioned each others work. Which resulted in us trying to depart the airport with the landing gear lever in the up position. So a few knots shy of V1 the nose gear retracted. We pulled back on the yoke avoiding using brakes and slid to a stop. I requested priority handling while the Captain pulled the stop and feather for both engines. Once we came to a stop I started to deplane the passengers; while ZZZ fire showed up. Everyone onboard was deplaning safely without injuries. The suggested narrative would be that both crew members verified each others work with the checklist which would have resulted in us catching the landing gear being in the up position and we would have simply placed it in the down position. Avoiding the incident altogether.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.