Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation and terrain warning from ATC while on final approach. Automation dependency; distractions; and possible non-SOP's were to blame. Corrections were made and a visual landing accomplished.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation and terrain warning from ATC while on final approach. Automation dependency; distractions; and possible non-SOP's were to blame. Corrections were made and a visual landing accomplished.
Narrative
We were given a clearance of a vector and 1;600 ft. until established on the ILS Runway XX into ZZZ. We were descending in Vertical Speed mode to try and get down. We intercepted the localizer and the F/O (First Officer) said setting zeros. I did not look to ensure we had intercepted the glideslope. It wasn't until the F/O called for Flaps 30 that I looked and noticed that we had indeed not intercepted the glideslope and descended below it; still in Vertical Speed mode. I immediately took the aircraft disconnected the autopilot and leveled us at around a thousand feet and gave the aircraft back to the F/O. It was at that time; Approach gave us a Low Altitude Alert and asked if we had the field. I responded with a yes. They then cleared us for the visual; so the F/O and I maintained altitude until recapturing the glideslope and continued without incident.Better Pilot Monitoring. Also I think the setting zeros after glideslope intercept should be examined as a Company procedure. Had we still had 1;600 ft. set in the window; the aircraft would have captured that instead.
Second reporter narrative
ATC held us high for traffic well past our descent point. Final vectors were tight to the final approach fix. We were cleared maintain 1;600 ft. until established; cleared ILS Runway XX. F/O (First Officer) was high approaching FAF; while configuring; set a vertical speed to catch the glideslope. As F/O intercepted the LOC course we continued to descend under the glideslope at a rate that would not allow the glideslope to be captured. During this time F/O finalized configuration for landing and called VOR/LOC captured and stated setting 0's. Aircraft had not captured glide slope and continued to descend. At approximately 1;100 ft.; Captain announced; 'We are low.' Automation was disabled and aircraft leveled at 1;000 ft. to 1;100 ft. During this time ATC called out a low altitude alert; which was acknowledged. We were subsequently cleared the visual and maintained 1;000 ft. until glideslope intercept. After glideslope intercept landing was accomplished without further incident.F/O could have configured earlier in order to slow things down and not be task saturated during the approach course intercept. F/O could have been more diligent on validating the FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciators) to ensure they are what is expected. Leaving FAF altitude in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) window would have prevented descent before glideslope capture. PM (Pilot Monitoring) could have warned earlier and validated FMAs.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.