FLC UNAWARE OF DAMAGE TO PROP ON TKOF SYR; NOTICED AT ROC; CONTINUED OP TO ALB. PROP INSPECTED IN DAYLIGHT AND ACFT GNDED. CAPT LOST JOB ACCOUNT FLYING NON AIRWORTHY ACFT. TAXIWAY RWY EXCURSION.
Synopsis
FLC UNAWARE OF DAMAGE TO PROP ON TKOF SYR; NOTICED AT ROC; CONTINUED OP TO ALB. PROP INSPECTED IN DAYLIGHT AND ACFT GNDED. CAPT LOST JOB ACCOUNT FLYING NON AIRWORTHY ACFT. TAXIWAY RWY EXCURSION.
Narrative
WE HAD AN XA00 HR SHOW TIME FOR A XB00 DEP TO REPOS THE ACFT TO ROC FROM SYR; THEN AN XC00 DEP TIME FROM ROC TO ALB. WHEN WE SHOWED UP; THE AIRPLANE HAD JUST BEEN SIGNED OFF BY THE MECHS FOR A PREFLT INSPECTION. THE FO AND I WERE DOING THE PREFLT INSPECTION WHEN WE FIRST NOTICED NO CHARTS IN THE ACFT FOR VFR. THE FO WENT AND TOLD THE MECHS AND 1 OF THEM SAID; 'FXX YOU; IT'S NOT MY PROBLEM'. THEN AFTER STARTING THE ENGS; I NOTICED THAT THE 'R BLEED AIR FAIL LIGHT' WAS ILLUMINATED. SO I SHUT THEM DOWN AND GOT A MECH. THE FIRST THING HE DOES IS TAKE THE BULBS OUT OF THE LIGHT AND BREAK THEM; THEN HE TELLS ME TO MEL IT. THE WAY THAT THE MEL IS WRITTEN YOU HAVE TO MEL THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT. SO I STARTED UP AGAIN; THIS TIME WITH THE L BLEED AIR FAIL LIGHT ON. SO ANOTHER MECH CAME TO CHK IT OUT. HE SAID TO LEAVE IT AS IT WAS WRITTEN UP AND TO TAKE IT LIKE THAT. MISTAKE #1. THEN WHILE TAXIING OUT IN THE RAIN AND DARKNESS EXPECTING RWY 28; I WAS ADVISED THAT RWY 32 WAS AVAILABLE FROM 'A' FOR IMMEDIATE DEP. SINCE WE WERE RUNNING LATE WITH THE MAINT PROBLEMS WE DECIDED TO TAKE THE IMMEDIATE; WHICH REQUIRED A 90 DEG L TURN ONTO 'A' THEN A QUICK L 90 DEG TURN AGAIN ONTO THE RWY. I HAD JUST TURNED THE ACFT CTL OVER TO THE FO SINCE IT WAS TO BE HIS LEG TO FLY. TAXIWAY A PARALLELS RWY 28 AND AS WE TURNED ONTO 'A' ANOTHER ACFT WAS ABOUT TO FLARE TO LAND ON 28. SO I; AT THE REQUEST OF THE FO; TURNED THE TAXI LIGHT OUT. ALSO AS WE TURNED ONTO 'A' THE FO NOTICED AND ADVISED ME THAT HIS ATTITUDE INDICATOR HAD ROLLED TO A 10 DEG BANK TO THE R. SIMULTANEOUSLY; I HAD MY HEAD IN THE COCKPIT COMPLETING THE 'FINAL ITEMS' CHKLIST; WE WERE ALREADY CLRED FOR TKOF; WHEN I HEARD A POP AND LOOKED UP. THE FO (WITH 1500+ HRS OF NIGHT FLT EXPERIENCE) HAD APPARENTLY TAXIED OVER A RWY OR TAXIWAY LIGHT. HE HAD INITIALLY LINED UP WITH THE L EDGE LIGHTS THINKING IT WAS THE CENTERLINE LIGHTS. AT THAT TIME THE TWR ASKED IF WE WERE ROLLING YET. NOT THINKING OF PROP DAMAGE AND THINKING; SINCE THE TWR DIDN'T SEE US DO ANYTHING WRONG; WE DECIDED TO TKOF. OUR FLT TO ROC WENT UNEVENTFULLY FROM THAT POINT. MISTAKE #2. UPON LNDG AT ROC I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO INSPECT THE ACFT FOR DAMAGE. IT WAS STILL DARK AND RAINING AND WE WERE 20 MINS LATE WITH THE R ENG STILL TURNING; THE PAX COMING DOWN THE STAIRS; I WAS GETTING THE IFR CLRNC AND DOING THE WT AND BAL WHILE MONITORING GND OPS WHEN THE FO ADVISED ME THAT THE L PROP WAS DAMAGED. SO I ASKED HIM HOW BAD IT WAS AND HE SAID; BAD. I WAS READY TO SHUT DOWN AND CANCEL THE FLT WHEN THE FO CAME ON BOARD AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE OK TO TAKE THE ACFT ON THE NEXT LEG. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HIS 10 YRS EXPERIENCE AS AN A AND P MECH; I TOLD HIM TO GO OUT AND ROTATE THE PROPS' WORST BLADE DAMAGE FOR MY BEST VIEW FROM THE COCKPIT. HE DID SO; AND I PEERED THROUGH THE TINY OPENING INTO THE RAINY DARKNESS AT THE BACKSIDE OF A FEATHERED PROP WITH DAMAGE TO THE LEADING EDGE. IT DIDN'T LOOK THAT BAD AT THAT TIME; AND I WAS PRESSURED WITH MAKING A QUICK DECISION; TAKING INTO ACCOUNT HOW MUCH WE ALREADY LET SLIDE; THE COMPANY'S CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY STATUS; THE NEED FOR REVENUE; THE CONSEQUENCES OF MY DECISION; THE SAFETY; AND THE FACT THAT THE FLT WENT SMOOTH ON THE PREVIOUS LEG; AS FAR AS PROP IMBAL OR VIBRATIONS WAS CONCERNED. I DECIDED TO DEPART IN THE DARKNESS FOR THE DAYLIGHT AT ALB TO FURTHER INSPECT THE PROP AND TO GIVE MYSELF SOME TIME TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION. UPON LNDG AND ENG SHUTDOWN AT ALB; WE TOOK A BETTER LOOK AT THE PROP AND DECIDED TO IMMEDIATELY RPT THE WHOLE INCIDENT. MISTAKE #3; AND THE ONE THAT COST ME MY JOB; WAS THE DECISION TO CONTINUE FROM ROC TO ALB. IT WAS POOR JUDGEMENT AND NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY AND A BAD DECISION. IT IS MUCH BETTER TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY. I'M JUST GLAD NOBODY WAS HURT. WHEN THINGS GO WRONG YOU MUST STOP THE 'CHAIN' OF BAD EVENTS; AND THE SOONER THE BETTER. I STOPPED BEFORE AN ACCIDENT BUT TOO LATE TO SAVE MY JOB; HOPEFULLY SOON ENOUGH TO SAVE MY TICKET.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.