Air carrier flight crew reported both engine thrust reversers failed to operate during the landing roll out. The pilots reported using full braking to stop the aircraft and brake temperatures rose into the caution range.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported both engine thrust reversers failed to operate during the landing roll out. The pilots reported using full braking to stop the aircraft and brake temperatures rose into the caution range.
Narrative
ZZZ was using only Runway XX because the normal Runways (XXL/XXR) were both closed. Winds were approximately 210 @ 26 gust 31 (so we had a pretty good right crosswind upon landing). After touchdown I tried to deploy the thrust reversers and was unsuccessful. TR1's trigger moved and TR2's would not budge. I attempted to deploy TR's a few times unsuccessfully and then tried to deploy just TR1. We never received any reverse thrust. In the process I applied maximum braking due to the shorter runway. After vacating the runway I commented to the First Officer that the LHOB (Left Hand Outboard) brake was heating up pretty quickly and reaching a temperature that I don't remember ever seeing in my almost 15 years of flying this airplane. Shortly after that comment we received a BRK OVERHEAT EICAS message. I called for the QRH which directed us to stop and apply chocks and release all brake pressure. The ZZZ airport rescue and firefighting (ARFF) was notified through Ground Control and soon met our aircraft. We started the APU and stopped both engines so that the ARFF could verbally discuss through my window their observations and we could request the assistance we required. They then chocked the airplane and we released the parking brake. The brakes then quickly started cooling. In the interim; I called Maintenance and after reporting the indicated brake temperatures we were informed that it was safe for us to continue our taxi to our arrival gate. The ARFF team followed us to our gate and we parked safely and deplaned the passengers through the normal jetway door.
Second reporter narrative
I was the First Officer (FO) and pilot monitoring (PM) from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. During our preparation for the arrival into ZZZ; we received digital ATIS which stated that Runway XX was in use. Aware that this runway is relatively short; along with the wind condition at ZZZ that favored XXR (210 @ 26g31) we queried ATC to inquire as to whether or not XXR would open before we landed. They responded that it was not likely. We planned for and executed an arrival; approach; and landing on XX; using an appropriate speed correction factor due to the gusting winds. During the turn when we were vectored to intercept the localizer for XX; the Autopilot disengaged. This was uncommanded and the associated EICAS caution message 'AUTOPILOT FAIL' was displayed. We identified and cancelled it; but the message cleared before we could run the associated QRH procedure. The Captain reengaged the Autopilot and we continued the approach. Autopilot was disengaged at the '1000; configured' callout. Airspeed fluctuations of +/-10 kts. occurred while on final; but were immediately corrected for by the pilot flying (PF). We continued the approach and landed. Upon landing; the thrust reversers did not deploy. I stated 'No reverse' which the Captain corroborated while trying to deploy them. Maximum manual braking was applied and the aircraft slowed to a safe taxi speed and we exited the runway. This aircraft did not have auto brakes installed. At this point the Captain stated that the TR1 trigger did deploy while TR2 trigger would not deploy. Neither TR deployed during the landing roll despite an attempt to deploy both TRs; and a subsequent attempt to deploy TR1 only. During my performance of the after landing flow; the Captain and I both noticed that the brake temperatures were high and climbing; specifically the LHOB brake temp which was the hottest and was quickly approaching the top of the displayed temperature range. He stated that he had never seen brake temperatures that high in his entire flying career. We continued to watch the LHOB brake temp climb to the top of the displayed range on the Multi-function Flight Display (MFD); and the 'BRK OVERHEAT' EICAS Caution message was displayed.We identified and cancelled; and started the associated QRH procedure. The QRH procedure stated to stop the aircraft; place chocks on the wheels; and to disengage the parking brake. We requested assistance from ZZZ Ground Control; which resulted in the dispatch of airport rescue and fire-fighting (ARFF) vehicles and personnel to our location where we had stopped on the taxiway. The APU was started; both engines were shut down; and chocks were inserted by ARFF personnel; and the parking brake was disengaged in accordance with the QRH procedure. We coordinated with ARFF response via radio. They asked us if it would be necessary to spray down the LH brake assembly with water to help cool it down; to which I responded that we would discuss with Maintenance and respond accordingly. At this time the brake temperatures where trending down. We elected not to spray down the brakes with water; considering that the temperatures had cooled somewhat at that time. While waiting for the brakes to cool; we communicated via intercom with the flight attendants and asked them to discretely inspect for smoke or fumes from the LH brake assembly. They reported that they did not see any indications of smoke or fire. While waiting for the brakes to cool; the Captain made an announcement to the passengers; informed dispatch via ACARS; and contacted Maintenance via telephone and asked how to proceed. They informed him that once the message had extinguished; we were able to taxi to the gate safely. The message had extinguished earlier once the brake temperature had cooled to an in-range display value; and we informed ground and ARFF personnel that we would be starting an engine and taxiing to the gate. ARFF personnel removed the chocks; we started engine 1; and ARFF vehicles followed us as we taxied to the gate. We deplaned normally through the forward passenger door at the gate without further incident.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.