Technician reported incorrect procedures were followed during induction for service of tooling that required lithium batteries and were not designated as dangerous goods for transport on aircraft.

Date: 2022-05 · Aircraft: No Aircraft

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-less-severe|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-far|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

Technician reported incorrect procedures were followed during induction for service of tooling that required lithium batteries and were not designated as dangerous goods for transport on aircraft.

Narrative

It was brought to my attention that Job Card #XXXXXXX and Job Card #YYYYYYY had their contents swapped and modified out in the field. I inducted both Job Cards as new tooling. Job Card #XXXXXXX recently came due for calibration so [it] was returned to the calibration shop. For this Job Card; this was the first calibration since it was newly inducted into the system. In the process of doing a visual inspection prior to sending it to the vendor; it was discovered that someone combined parts of this kit with the other Job Card mentioned above. Whoever did the swapping was unqualified and did not follow our Calibration SOP nor our General Maintenance Manual for tooling. What was on the box did not match what was in [the System]. In addition; when they changed items around; they left the Maintenance and Engineering # the same; which was classified as NON-DG; but a lithium battery pack was added to the contents. No documentation was done in the changing of these kits. I have researched and cannot find out WHO went into [the System] and changed the contents. Of course; the last person that made this kit serviceable was me and they left my name and number on the calibration of this kit. In my research I have found so many errors that I am unable to mention all of them.After the research I have done; I have SEVERAL MAJOR concerns:Lithium Batteries. We use Maintenance and Engineering numbers to alert the presence of lithium batteries; which make that specific tool DG. If someone is able to change kit contents and add batteries to a kit without changing the Maintenance and Engineering number; then lithium batteries will be put in the belly of aircraft. DG tooling has made it very difficult to move tooling around quickly. This has created an atmosphere where people are trying to skirt around making tools DG even when they have lithium batteries.The Tooling Department seems to be losing the control strings on the kit management of our tooling. There is no visibility on WHO can go into [the System] and modify kit contents. The control strings are being loosened at the same time that there is NO TRANSPARENCY! Still; there is a lack of understanding of the importance of proper procedures when it comes to tooling and test equipment. I am using my A&P License to verify and certify test equipment; just like base / line mechanics are signing off aircraft log books. DG is here to stay and we should not be trying to MANIPULATE batteries into kits. If a tester has to have a battery to operate then it is DG! END OF STORY![A suggestion is to provide] education on tooling and test equipment. It has to start with Management in Maintenance and the Inspection departments. Again; I think a yearly CBT for all of Maintenance and Inspection and Tooling departments. Giving them the awareness of what goes into the certification and calibration of aircraft tooling. Give the Tooling Department back their control and allow them to police who is able to modify kit contents.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.