Air Carrier flight crew reported a fume event during boarding. The Captain elected to execute a gate evacuation into the passenger terminal and requested ARFF equipment.
Synopsis
Air Carrier flight crew reported a fume event during boarding. The Captain elected to execute a gate evacuation into the passenger terminal and requested ARFF equipment.
Narrative
I arrived at the aircraft having received an add-on turn to ZZZ1 after completing my scheduled three-day. The F/O (First Officer) and Flight Attendants were already there; and the APU was being used to provide expedited cooling; since the aircraft had previously been sitting without any cooling and was quite warm. I briefed the Flight Attendants and began my preflight preparations in the cockpit. Once the aircraft had cooled to an acceptable temperature; boarding commenced.During boarding; with both pilots in our seats; we heard the characteristic sound of the aircraft busses becoming unpowered. Since I had noted a normal load on the APU generator during my flow; I dismissed the first thought that the ground power had been turned off or disconnected; and the F/O and I began to assess what had happened to cause the generator to stop powering the busses.Immediately after; I noted a strong odor; the F/O confirmed that he was smelling something as well. It didn't smell quite like burned rubber from the smoke of an aircraft having touched down; and it was sufficiently intense and immediate that it seemed unlikely that it was coming from the bar-be-queue I'd purchased but hadn't yet opened. I would characterize it as similar to something burned or charred.As we were discussing the odor; the A-F/A (Flight Attendant) informed us that she had smoke in the cabin and we need to get people out. Her input provided clarity that the problem was beyond an APU generator failure; and that what we smelled isn't limited to the flight deck. I replied; directing her to start the evacuation; and she immediately began yelling the commands to evacuate the aircraft through the forward entry door.I shut down the APU and; as a precaution; discharged its fire bottle; then notified ZZZ Ground to roll the fire trucks; and told ZZZ Ops that we were evacuating into the terminal. During this; the F/O left the flight deck to assist in the evacuation. By the time I had finished these calls; the aircraft was empty and the fumes were dissipating. I went through the cabin with a flashlight to ensure that no one was still on board; and then met the crew in the jetway where we quickly discussed what we had all seen. The A-F/A reported strong fumes and a visible haze in the cabin. The other two F/A reported having smelled the fumes; but from their boarding positions they didn't observe any haze; they noted that given the lighting in the cabin; the A-F/A was in the best position to observe that. I went outside and updated the Fire Chief; an Airfield Ops Representative; Mechanics; and Company Supervisors on the situation. I then called the Operations Control Center Chief Pilot; and related the series of events to him; our Flight's Dispatcher; and the Regional Supervisor.Following this conversation; I met again with the crew in the jetway. We debriefed what had happened in greater detail; and discussed if it would be appropriate for us to continue on duty or not. While everyone felt physically capable of going to another aircraft and performing routine crew duties; given the delayed effects of a stressful incident; I was of the opinion that the safest course of action would be that the flight be re-crewed for all five of us. I asked each crew member's opinion; and all were agreeable to this course. I notified the operations chief pilot; and the A-F/A notified the Inflight Manager on Call.I am very appreciative for the quick response from the ZZZ Fire Department.I am most appreciative for the quick; clear; decisive communication from our A-F/A. While the F/O and I were assessing what we had on the flight deck; she gave us exactly the input we needed to understand the situation in the cabin. As I told her; her actions were the ideal textbook example of doing what needed to be done; without hesitation. She is the hero of our crew -- thoroughly professional; absolutely competent; recognizing the need for the evacuation; communicating to us exactly what we needed to know in clear; concise; and direct terms; and then accomplishing the evacuation even with the main lighting out; emergency exit lights on; and smoke and fumes in the cabin. Everything you hope to have in an A-Flight Attendant when the situation turns bad; we had in her. Marvelously; superbly well done!Additional thoughts after reflecting on the incident:I shut off the APU immediately; then considered the need to discharge the fire bottle. No bell or red lights indicated a fire; but given the fumes at the same time as the generator failed; I assessed that an APU fire was possible; and so using the fire handle and fire bottle seemed like a sensible precaution. (Or; did an auto-shutdown cause the generator loss? I didn't consider that possibility until hours afterwards.) With no red light on; I had to unlock the fire handle before I could pull it. As a data point; the first switch I tried to use to unlock the handles was the fire warning horn cutout switch on the fire protection panel... which (of course) completely failed to accomplish the desired result. I use that cutout switch occasionally to silence the bell during the fire test; even in the simulator I almost never have to use the unlock buttons under the handle; so when I recognized the need to unlock the fire handle; my mind went to a rarely used switch on the panel; but sent my hand to the wrong one. Thankfully; the fire test works quite well in unlocking the handles; and I knew exactly which switch I needed for that task when the first switch didn't work. Personal lesson learned; go immediately to the switch you're familiar with; because that one is least likely to be mistaken for something else when under stress.Evacuating passengers into a jetway filled with passengers moving toward the aircraft to board; isn't a scenario that's typically briefed. The A-F/A noted that once off the aircraft; some passengers were congregating in the jetway immediately outside the forward entry door. She related that as she was giving commands to the passengers in the aircraft; she had to 'make up new commands' to the passengers outside the aircraft to direct them to go back into the terminal in order to resolve the situation. I heard her giving those commands related to moving up the jetway into the terminal; and only considered later when she mentioned it that these weren't 'in the book.' The fact that her delivery was as clear and authoritative to the passengers outside as it was to those inside probably explains why those commands didn't stand out as extemporaneous; and is a credit to her exemplary control over the situation.Calling both Ground and Ops; I didn't have the flight number at hand (recently rerouted into it); but both were able to work with aircraft number and gate number; which I did have at hand. Both agencies understood the information I was passing to them and did not attempt to 'play 20 questions' for more information than I had time to pass.Interestingly; when we debriefed 20 or 30 minutes after the evacuation; the A-F/A didn't recall at all what she had told us about her observations from the cabin when she first told us about the smoke and fumes. I thanked her for her really excellent communication; and she couldn't recall what she had said. To my mind; this drives home the reality of the effects of stress; and that not asking the crew to continue on duty was the best course of action.
Second reporter narrative
I arrived at the aircraft and Flight Attendants were already there. The aircraft was incredibly hot; and the ground air conditioning was not adequate. I elected to discontinue ground air use by turning it off myself and then starting the APU. The Captain arrived and began briefing the Flight Attendants; while I began my preflight preparations in the cockpit. Once the aircraft had cooled to an acceptable temperature; boarding commenced. During boarding; with both pilots in our seats; we heard the characteristic sound of the aircraft busses becoming unpowered. I had noted a normal load on the APU generator during the start; so I ignored the first thought that the ground power had been turned off or disconnected. The Captain and I began to assess what had happened to cause the generator to stop powering the busses. Almost immediately; the Captain noticed a strong odor and I confirmed that I also smelled something as well. It was sufficiently intense and immediate that it seemed unlikely that it was coming from the food the Captain had brought into the cockpit. I would characterize it as something burned or charred. As we were discussing the odor; the A Flight Attendant (A FA) informed us that she had smoke in the cabin and that we should evacuate. Her input provided clarity that the problem was beyond an APU generator failure; and that what we smelled was not limited to the flight deck. At that moment; the Captain directed the A F/A to start the evacuation; and she immediately began yelling the commands to evacuate the aircraft through the forward entry door. The Captain shut down the APU and; as a precaution; discharged its fire bottle. He then notified ZZZ Ground to roll the fire trucks; and told ZZZ Ops that we were evacuating into the terminal. During this time; I left the flight deck to assist in the evacuation. By the time the Captain had finished the radio calls; the aircraft was empty and the fumes were dissipating. He went through with a flashlight to ensure that no one was still on board; and then met the crew in the jetway where we quickly discussed what we had all seen. The A F/A reported strong fumes and a visible haze in the cabin. The other two F/A's reported having smelled the fumes; but from their boarding positions they didn't observe any haze. They noted that given the lighting in the cabin; the A F/A was in the best position to observe that. The Captain went outside and updated the Fire Chief; an Airfield Ops representative; Mechanics; and Company Supervisors on the situation. He then called the Company Operations Center Chief Pilot; and relayed the series of events to him; our flight's Dispatcher; and the Regional Supervisor. Following these conversations; the crew met again in the jetway. We debriefed what had happened in greater detail and discussed if it would be appropriate for us to continue on-duty or not. The crew agreed that everyone felt physically capable of going to another aircraft and performing routine crew duties. More importantly; given the delayed effects of a stressful incident; they were unsure of their efficiency if another emergency arose or their effectiveness in normal duties that might be adversely affected. I believed that fatigue combined with the evacuation and the emergency put me in a compromised state. The safest course of action for me was to discontinue my duty for the day. The Captain asked each crew member's opinion; and all were agreeable to a similar decision for themselves. The Captain notified the Company Chief Pilot; and the A F/A notified the Company Operations Manager on Call. I am very appreciative for the quick response from the ZZZ Fire Department. I am most appreciative for the quick; clear; decisive communication from our A F/A. While the Captain and I were assessing what we had on the flight deck; she gave us exactly the input we needed to understand the situation in the cabin. Her actions were the ideal textbook example of what needed to be done; withouthesitation. She was the standout of excellence in our crew -- thoroughly professional; absolutely competent; recognizing the need for the evacuation; communicating to us exactly what we needed to know in clear; concise; and direct terms; and then accomplishing the evacuation even with the main lighting out; emergency exit lights on; and smoke and fumes in the cabin. Everything you hope to have in an A Flight Attendant when the situation turns bad; we had in her. I completely agree with the Captain's decision to treat the APU as a potential fire source and fire the extinguisher bottle. There were far more indications of a 'potential' fire absent the actual warning bell. I found it prudent of him to execute that course of action.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.