A319 flight crew reported a trailing edge flaps fail ECAM on approach and elected to make a go around to run the QRH procedures. The flight crew successfully cleared the fault and returned to the approach and made a landing at destination airport.
Synopsis
A319 flight crew reported a trailing edge flaps fail ECAM on approach and elected to make a go around to run the QRH procedures. The flight crew successfully cleared the fault and returned to the approach and made a landing at destination airport.
Narrative
This was a scheduled IOE flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ for my Captain upgrade. I was listed as the First Officer even though I was flying in the left seat and acting as Captain. During this flight we planned to do a Flaps 3 landing into ZZZ for training. We had a 45 minute delay out of ZZZ1 due to a low green hydraulic fluid indication on the systems page. ZZZ1 has contract maintenance and the maintainer had to be called to report to the airport. Once the maintainer arrived 45 minutes after the initial call he serviced the green hydraulic system and we boarded the aircraft. The rest of the departure from ZZZ1 was uneventful. We had an uneventful arrival into ZZZ; briefed the Flaps 3 landing; and configured the GPWS and FMGC for the Flaps 3 landing. We were vectored for a visual approach to Runway to Runway XXR; which we would back up with the ILS for XXR. Once we were cleared the approach we were told to maintain 170 kts. to ZZZZZ and call Tower. At this point on the approach I disconnected the autopilot and had the LCA lower the Flaps from 1 to 2. While descending on the glide slope and about a mile prior to ZZZZZ I called for Flaps 3 at which time we received an ECAM for F/CTL Flaps Fault and the flaps remained at setting 2 with the flap lever set to setting 3. We made the decision to execute a go-around; [request priority handling] with Tower and get vectors to run the ECAM. At this point I decided to go to TOGA to put the aircraft in go-around mode; we still had not extended the gear and the flaps were stuck at setting 2. The acceleration in TOGA and my lack of following the command bars quickly enough caused an overspeed of 5 kts of the flaps before I was able to increase the pitch into the command bars and manually reduce the thrust. Tower gave us a climb to 9;000 ft. and a vector eastbound as I corrected the airspeed. On the vector eastbound I continued to fly the aircraft. Upon leveling at 9;000 ft.; I re-engaged the auto thrust to maintain 170 kts and also re-engaged the autopilot. I retained control of the aircraft and took over radios while the LCA ran the ECAM. The first part of the ECAM has us return the Flap lever to the previous setting at which time the entire ECAM disappeared not allowing us to complete the rest of the ECAM. After the ECAM had disappeared I transferred the aircraft to the LCA so that I could brief the flight attendants and then the passengers. I gave a briefing to the flight attendants. Once I had completed my briefings I opened the Flight Manual to F/CTL FLAPS FAULT since we no longer had the ECAM to reference. At step 2 of the procedure we returned the flap lever to position 3; which had caused the original ECAM. This time we were able to extend the flaps to position 3 without an ECAM. We both agreed that we could land on the original Runway of XXR with a Flap 3 configuration and relayed this to approach. We also told them that we had fixed our flight control issue; but did not attempt to cancel the [priority handling request]. We were vectored back to Runway XXR for an uneventful landing. Upon landing emergency vehicles were standing by; but no inspection was required and we were given instructions to taxi to Gate XX. We had also coordinated with dispatch to contact maintenance and see if they wanted us to leave the flaps at setting 3 after landing and into the Gate for an inspection. They told us to do exactly that; so after Landing flows were completed with the exception of bringing the flaps up. I taxied the aircraft to the Gate and maintenance was waiting to debrief us. I also completed a debrief with the flight attendants to make sure they were comfortable with how they were kept informed during the event; they said they were. At this point the LCA and I agreed that because of all of these events that we were unable to continue with the remaining two legs of the trip and we needed to debrief the incident. We called the Chief pilot and we were re-assigned to a deadhead back to ZZZ2 later inthe day.
Second reporter narrative
Pilot in left seat was receiving initial Captain IOE with LCA in the right seat. A flaps 3 approach was briefed and set up for due to training requirements. Student Captain was established on final at Flaps 2 and selected speed 170; on course and glide slope. Student called for Flaps 3 and I moved the lever to Flaps 3. Immediately we got a F/ CTL FLAPS FAULT ECAM. I asked the Student Captain if he would like to abandon the approach to deal with the ECAM later and he said yes. I told the Controller that we would like to abandon the approach; and we were given instructions to track the localizer and climb to 9;000 ft. The altitude was reset and the Student Captain instead of calling for Open Climb taking the thrust levers to TOGA to begin the no longer used 'soft go around' procedure. Go Around call outs were not made. Thrust levers were pulled back from TOGA; but the aircraft accelerated quickly in the Flaps 2; gear up configuration and the Student Captain failed to follow Flight Director guidance. In retrospect as an LCA I should have taken the aircraft; but I instead chose to give verbal instruction to the Student. Student reacted slowly to the instruction and the flaps 2 limit speed was exceeded by about 5 kts. Student began to fly the aircraft by taking the auto thrust off and manually manipulating the thrust levers. At 9;000 ft. the aircraft was stabilized and auto thrust restored. A [request for priority handling] was made. ATC gave us vectors and the ECAM was started by the LCA. As soon as the flaps lever was returned to 2; the ECAM went away. Dispatch was notified. At first the crew considered a Flaps 2 landing; but the QRH directed returning the flap lever to 3 and this time the flaps went to 3. Student Captain completed a normal Flaps 3 landing.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.