A330 Captain reported concerns over loss of crew coordination and situational awareness during a rejected take off event.
Synopsis
A330 Captain reported concerns over loss of crew coordination and situational awareness during a rejected take off event.
Narrative
This was my first Take-Off (TO) as Second in Command (SIC) Pilot Flying (PF) for OE (Operating Experience). I set TO power and then took my hands off the thrust levers but [the Check Airmen] motioned for me to keep my hands on the thrust levers saying keep your hands on the thrust levers. A severe vibration developed at 80 kts. where upon I looked over to [the Check Airmen]; but got no response. [The Check Airmen] did not respond by taking control of the thrust levers or side stick and did not say 'I have control' which I expected him to do. He did not enunciate a Go or No Go decision. The severe vibration presented uncertainty as to aircraft suitability for flight and having my hands still on the thrust levers I closed the thrust levers and the TO was rejected. It seems that [the Check Airmen] experienced a startle effect rendering him momentarily incapacitated leaving me in the absence to make a timely decision. [Company] SOP calls for the Pilot in Command (PIC) to keep his hands on the thrust levers once power is set for every take-off. His directive for me to keep the thrust levers was a violation of SOP. This caused confusion and a breakdown of crew coordination due to his CRM failure while in command which introduced a potential hazard. The cause of the vibration was determined to be a nose wheel shimmy by the check airman. He falsely accused me of having full side stick elevator down deflection claiming he saw this. If this were true then why didn't he say something sooner? I am still awaiting the data to see the actual side stick movements. The fact is that I had only applied slight down stick as Airbus recommends for the A-330. To continue a take-off while experiencing a severe vibration in the high speed regime could have introduced other potential emergencies such as if a nose wheel tire blew and flew off the nose gear? Then we would have had a real priority situation. What if that vibration didn't resolve and continued into the high speed regime? The take-off was rejected in the low speed regime at a safe speed.[The Check Airmen's] insistence on unusual procedures apart and in contravention to [company] A-330 procedures became a concern to me and seems to have the potential to introduce hazards. In addition and most concerning is his lack of crew coordination and lack of effective crew resource management skills. Later after the brakes had cooled for an hour [the Check Airmen] made the take-off. Upon block in to ZZZ1 two mechanics came forward to the cockpit to ask about the vibration and asked whether there was a write up in the log book. [The Check Airmen] was not in the cockpit so I referred them to him. When [the Check Airmen] returned to the cockpit; I mentioned the mechanics concerns and asked whether we needed a log book write up for the vibration and the reject but he did not respond with an answer. No log book write up was made and I do not know what was looked at other than the standard preflight checks. I have brought some of these concerns up to [another Captain] throughout OE as they were occurring. I have similar complaints from [four other people] who share the same experiences; verbal abuse and intimidation; non-standard procedures against SOP and nonstandard phraseology from [the Check Airmen]. All four of us have had the same or similar bad experiences in CRM and non-standard procedures enforced. All feel frustration from intimidation and very poor to nonexistent CRM. I sincerely suggest that all first officers mentioned be interviewed and surveyed concerning his check airman qualities; his verbal intimidation and abuse; his lack of responding to critical queries and teaching nonstandard procedures.
Second reporter narrative
[Narrative contained no additional information.]
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.