Pilot flying C-206 aircraft reported engine failure in flight and a subsequent off field landing.
Synopsis
Pilot flying C-206 aircraft reported engine failure in flight and a subsequent off field landing.
Narrative
Scenic flight operated under Part 135 in a Cessna 206 from ZZZ. Five souls onboard; Pilot and four passengers. The flight was entirely uneventful for the first 1.4 hours; from taxi through a tour of the Area1 and Area2 Wildernesses as well as over [the] National Park. Maximum altitude was approximately 8;000 MSL. The flight continued back to the Valley north of ZZZ1. Continues West to split Mountain and ZZZ2. Then southerly; west of [the] road in order to skirt ZZZ3 Class D (pilot was monitoring ZZZ3 Tower); to avoid a rain shower near ZZZ3; and to begin setting up for entering the pattern at ZZZ for landing. The pilot was performing a very gradual descent intending to level at pattern altitude of 4;000 MSL nearing ZZZ. Passing through roughly 4;500 MSL and about 3NM northwest of the [wildlife area] the aircraft engine sputtered briefly and stopped running (the propeller was windmilling; but no engine power). The pilot immediately switched fuel tanks; turned on the fuel boost pump; ensured the mixture was full rich; pushed the prop forward to assist with a restart and worked the throttle back and forth as several attempts were made to restart with the ignition switch. In addition; the pilot made a radio call and turned east away from the forested terrain towards farmland and picked a suitable field. The pilot landed the airplane in the wheatfield without incident. The pilot and all passengers were uninjured; the aircraft was undamaged and there was no damage to any property or persons on the ground. The pilot secured the airplane and escorted the passengers to the nearest where we were soon met by the Manager of the farm and then by FBO personnel and the [local Authorities]. The C-206 descent rate without power is high and there was almost no time at all to troubleshoot the engine failure before devoting 100% of focus on landing safely. As the pilot in question; I wonder if a less experienced pilot could have successfully landed under the same circumstances. Perhaps a higher minimum altitude AGL; or at least a greater emphasis on training loss of engine power scenarios.
Second reporter narrative
This is a follow up to a previous report about the same incident with more detail:Forced Landing Cessna 206; Aircraft X; Date. Carrying 4 Passengers on Part 135 Scenic from ZZZ.Engine loss of power at approximately XA00 local time near [coordinates]; altitude about 4;500 MSL and 1;200 AGL.Landed in an open field of spring wheat approximately [coordinates1]; elevation 3;007 ft. MSL. No injuries; no aircraft damage; no ground damage.INCIDENT PILOT underwent in-house Part 135 training conducted by Company at ZZZ. Ground training on Date and Date1. Flight training was in a Cessna 206 on Date2 for 1.9. Low approaches at ZZZ4. Then on Date2 for 1.3. Landing at ZZZ5. Then on Date3 for 1.1. Landing at ZZZ6 and ZZZ7. Then on Date4 for 0.7. Check-ride attempt - postponed for weather. Then on Date5 for 1.2. Check-ride and landing at ZZZ4. INCIDENT PILOT did not fly a Cessna 206 or a Part 135 flight until the incident day (26 days after the check-ride).On Date6 the INCIDENT PILOT was scheduled to fly a Part 91 student at XA30 then a Part 135 backcountry charter to ZZZ4 at XC00; followed by a Part 135 charter to drop off one Passenger at ZZZ8 departing ZZZ at XE00. The INCIDENT PILOT was told that Management had shifted both Part 135 flights to another pilot because he wanted the INCIDENT PILOT to go with someone experienced on the first Part 135 flight.In spite of that; the Part 135 scenic for Date; three days later; was left on the INCIDENT PILOT's schedule. No one talked to the INCIDENT PILOT in any kind of instructional; or supervisory way; from the check-ride on Date5; until well after the incident was concluded on Date.On the incident day the INCIDENT PILOT was scheduled for and flew three flights. The first two as a CFI under Part 91; the first of them scheduled at XA00(1.7 flight time); and the second scheduled at XC00 (1.4 flight time). The third flight was as a Part 135 Pilot Flying a two-hour long scenic flight set for a XE00 departure. The group of Passengers were to be divided between the two C-206's the company uses.The second instructional flight ended at approximately XD45. Pulling into parking on the ramp the INCIDENT PILOT could see Aircraft X (incident aircraft) still parked beside the fuel island with doors open. The airplane had been in that location available for the incident flight for well over an hour. In addition; the INCIDENT PILOT noticed the Passenger for the XE00 scenic waiting nearby. Finally; the INCIDENT PILOT also noted the second Cessna 206 Aircraft Y parked at the fuel pump behind Aircraft X and the scheduled pilot for that aircraft standing next to it. The INCIDENT PILOT secured the instructional airplane and detoured over to speak with the other Part 135 pilot. That other pilot said something like; 'Are you ready to do this?' To which the INCIDENT PILOT said something like; 'Is everything ready to go here?' He affirmed that it was; and then a conversation ensued about flying near each other (specifically not in close formation) because it was one large group split between the two planes. The other pilot suggested that the INCIDENT PILOT lead the way; to which he said something like; 'You've done these before; maybe you should lead.' The other pilot agreed; and the INCIDENT PILOT said something like. 'I'll hurry; but I've got to sign my student's log.' By the time the INCIDENT PILOT finished with the second student it was already after XE00. The INCIDENT PILOT looked over the release specifically studying the fuel load; weight and balance; passenger manifest; etc. and finding it in order signed the release. Checking the weather again and taking care of necessary business; when the INCIDENT PILOT made it outside; it was well after the XE00 departure time.The INCIDENT PILOT introduced himself to the passengers and led them to the planes. He briefed his passengers and checked with the line person several times about the readiness of the airplane and double checking the rear door and handle. Feeling rushed; knowing the incident airplane had been parked at the gas pump for a long time and relying on a military and Part 121 airline background the INCIDENT PILOT trusted the release and line person for the fuel load. Both airplanes started engines; but as soon as the INCIDENT PILOT started the engine. The checklist was interrupted when one of the passengers wanted out due to a claustrophobic/noise/heat discomfort. The INCIDENT PILOT shut down; let her out and guided her back to safety. The second airplane was waiting with a running engine. The INCIDENT PILOT felt pressure to get rolling and quickly started again and began to taxi after very quickly going through the checklist flow.Aircraft Y departed and moments later Aircraft X followed. The flight was completely uneventful for 1.8 hours. The flight went southeast from ZZZ to near the [landmark] in the Area1 Wilderness; turned north and travelled nearly to the River in [the] National Park. Maximum altitude was approximately 8;000 MSL. The flight continued back to the Valley north of ZZZ1. Continues West to split Mountain and ZZZ2. (passengers request). Then southerly; west of [the] road in order to skirt ZZZ3 Class D (Maximum altitude was approximately 8;000 MSL. The flight continued back to the Valley north of ZZZ1. Continues West to split Mountain and ZZZ2. Then southerly; west of [the] road in order to skirt ZZZ3 Class D (INCIDENT PILOT was monitoring ZZZ3 Tower); and to avoid a rain shower near ZZZ3; and to begin setting up for entering the pattern at ZZZ for landing.The INCIDENT PILOT was performing a very gradual descent intending to level at pattern altitude of 4;000 MSL nearing ZZZ. At about XA00 local; passing through roughly 4;500 MSL and about 3NM northwest of the [wildlife area] Area (near [coordinates] about 3;300 MSL elevation so about 1;200 AGL) the aircraft engine sputtered briefly and stopped running (the propeller was windmilling; but no engine power). The INCIDENT PILOT immediately switched fuel tanks; turned on the fuel boost pump; ensured the mixture was full rich; pushed the prop forward to assist with a restart and worked the throttle back and forth as necessary; making several attempts to restart including with the ignition switch. In addition; the INCIDENT PILOT made a radio call and turned east away from the forested terrain towards farmland and picked a suitable field. The INCIDENT PILOT landed the airplane in the wheatfield without incident (an open field of spring wheat approximately [coordinates1]; elevation 3;007 ft. MSL).The INCIDENT PILOT and all passengers were uninjured; the aircraft was undamaged and there was no damage to any property or persons on the ground. The INCIDENT PILOT secured the airplane and escorted the passengers to the nearest road where we were soon met by the Manager of the farm and then by FBO personnel and the [local Authorities].The C-206 descent rate without power is high and there was almost no time at all to troubleshoot the engine failure before devoting 100% of focus on landing safely.Take aways so far: As the INCIDENT PILOT...1) I wonder if a less experienced pilot could have successfully landed under the same circumstances. Perhaps a higher minimum altitude AGL; or at least a greater emphasis on training loss of engine power scenarios.2) While my initial Part 135 training was adequate; I do feel that not flying those airplanes or doing that mission for nearly a month and then not receiving any instruction; supervision; or help at all on my very first Part 135 flight was inadequate.3) I felt rushed to get in the air; because of the tightness of the schedule; further exacerbated by another pilot and passengers waiting on me while I shut down and then restarted. In doing so I had trusted that the Company was taking care of the airplane; passengers; and paperwork for me to include loading the fuel on board that the release stated. I ran through my pre-takeoff checklist so quickly that it is possible had I taken more time and given it more thought; I would have questioned the readings on the fuel gauges.4) We often talk about how unreliable older Cessna fuel gauges are and because of that I trusted the release and the Company and the ramp person more - that's a bad deal. All Part 135 airplanes should have accurate and reliable fuel gauges.5) The company policy; as I understand it; is to only burn out of the left tank. This seems problematic to me. Switching tanks every 30 minutes would make fuel awareness all the better.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.