ZJX Front Line Manager reported losing radios two days in a row and attributed the outages to work being done in the area by a utility company.
Synopsis
ZJX Front Line Manager reported losing radios two days in a row and attributed the outages to work being done in the area by a utility company.
Narrative
On Date at approximately XA00L; the EC7 rag site experienced a power outage which caused the frequencies (135.75; 133.32; 128.05; and 125.17) to go out (main/stby/buec (Backup Emergency Communications System) as well as the guard frequencies at those affected sectors. This was during a very busy traffic volume time. The following is the narrative I wrote up for my report:On Date around XA00L I was at the Gulf OS desk working on the physicals and updating web scheduler with the dates/times/controller's physical. Name was working on R14/88 and yelled over to me that she had lost all of her frequencies. As I was walking over; Name 1 was working on R15/77 and stated the same thing. They both told me that they were not able to switch over to standby or buec frequencies. I called the SOC to report the outage and they were already aware of it and stated it was a problem at the RAG site (EC7). I had the controllers try anything they can think of; ie VTABS (Voice Training and Backup Systems); try other headset jacks; guard frequencies etc and nothing was working.I paged back Name 2; Name 3; and Name 4 from their breaks to help assist the area. Name 5 came over to help assist us and stated that they were able to hail several of our aircraft on their guard frequencies. When Name 2 came back; he went and sat with Name 6 in the south area on R75/D75. Name 4 sat on D14/88 and Name 3 sat at D15/77. I had Name 2 call the D-sides on 14 and 15 to coordinate with those sectors as to which aircraft R75 was able to reach and to give crossing restrictions to. During paging back the controllers and assigning duties; we had also stopped all aircraft coming from TPA complex; MCO complex; as well as ZMA. Name 4 was also working with the R17 Controller from the central area to give the crossing restriction for aircraft landing TPA complex; and Name 1 and Name 3 were working with Name 7 (R78) and Name 8 (R87) to give the crossing restrictions to aircraft coming from those sectors landing TPA and MCO complex.Name 9 was also assisting us and once we realized that it was the EC7 rag site that was affected; he suggested that Name 1 try to hail an aircraft on the Name 2 (77) sector frequency (125.37). Once we established that even the low flying aircraft; around 11;000-15;000 ft heading to TPA complex were able to hear us on that frequency we then proceeded to help out R14/88. Once we established that frequency 134.4 was not being used by any other sector; we proceeded to try that frequency. 134.4 worked for the majority of the airspace for R14/88 and continued to use that. Once everything was figured out and everything was under control; we proceeded to open TPA/MCO back up for departures with the previously stated MIT (Miles In Trail); as well as ZMA. The whole situation lasted approximately 20-30 minutes. Everyone in the Gulf; Central; and South areas did a spectacular job working together and thinking outside of the box to help. During all this; the R16 sector lost their frequencies as well as they were at the same RAG site; but were able to utilize the R86 frequency. During this time; Sector 14 (Cedar Key) also experienced a LOSS (Lack of Standard Separation). Both aircraft responded to a TCAS-RA. The closest the got was about 4.1 miles and 900 ft approximately. I do not have the call signs or the time it happened.The SOC informed me that this issue happened because of the Utility company in the area of the rag site doing some work which caused the power outage. There needs to be some very important talks with that company and ensure they understand the implications of their actions and to ensure it never happens again.
Second reporter narrative
For the second day in a row. the EC7 rag site went out causing frequency outage for Cedar Key; Darbs; Ocala; and Mayo sectors. The following is my writeup I submitted to the facility:On Date 1 at approximately XB00L we again lost the EC7 rag site. I was at the OS desk looking at the Gulf schedule for the following day and getting everything situated for the morning shift (ie look who needs to sign the OT list; ELMS; training etc.). Name 10 was on R14/88 when he said he lost his frequencies. Name 11 was on R15/77 and lost 133.32 frequency as well. As soon as they told me they lost frequencies; I told Name 10 to turn on 134.4 and use that and for Name 11 to use 125.37. I then gave the south area OS; Name 12; a piece of paper for him to give to a south area Controller and transmit on guard frequency for any aircraft on 133.32 to change to 125.37 and if they were on 135.75 to change to 134.4.Name 7 came back from break and sat down on D14 and called TPA/MCO to ground stop all departures immediately; and ZMA to hold all aircraft. I called ZMA and gave them the updated frequencies to use for when we start taking aircraft again.Name 10 worked really well with an aircraft who came over on 134.4 to go back to 135.75 to hail aircraft on that frequency and change to 134.4.Once again the controllers working did an amazing job and since this is the second day in a row; we were more prepared for it and handled things a lot better. R15 was very slow during this time so I did not need to page anyone else back from break after Name 7 came back and only needed the one D-side for R14.This is a very huge issue being the second day in a row its happened. Luckily traffic was slow at this time; but when this happens we have no way to split off R88 or R77. If this happened a few hours earlier it would have been very bad. Luckily several people who worked this same outage on Date were also working today and already had the knowledge and experience to assist in the same manner we handled it the day prior.For the second day in a row the EC7 rag site went out due to the utility company working in the area. This is a major safety issue for the NAS and the company needs to be informed of the dangers of their actions and appropriate sanctions need to be issued to them.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.