Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported a failure to use SOPs during push back and brake release. The Captain and First Officer failed to communicate and released brakes while the ground crew was still under the aircraft. There were no injuries or equipment contact.
Synopsis
Air carrier Captain and First Officer reported a failure to use SOPs during push back and brake release. The Captain and First Officer failed to communicate and released brakes while the ground crew was still under the aircraft. There were no injuries or equipment contact.
Narrative
During push-back at ZZZ at XA:28 local time; the new ATIS stated conditions codes 5;5;5 100% wet for our departure runway. The Performance Data indicated dry conditions; so I (First Officer) contacted Operations to have them change the condition code to wet during push back. I also started the #1 engine; then requested a new performance data through ACARS. As the ground crew stopped the push back; the new performance data printed out and I began inputting the data into the FMS. Simultaneously; the Captain conducted a control check (as I monitored) and called for 'flaps 2; taxi' to begin movement. I looked at the EICAS verified steering was disengaged and the Flaps were set to 2. I looked up and didn't see any ground crews. I then said; 'flaps set; steering engaged.' The Captain then began to taxi forward. That's when I noticed the tug and ground crews directly under the airplane walking back. I immediately yelled 'STOP; STOP; STOP' and applied brakes. The aircraft moved forward about 3-5 ft. before coming to a complete stop with equipment and personnel directly under the aircraft. The Captain acknowledged and set the parking brake. No ground personnel or equipment contacted the airplane. We then received a salute from ground personnel as they departed the area of operations. The Captain and I discussed the situation and continued the rest of the flight without incident. This event occurred early in the morning when both crew members were tired. Airfield conditions called for new performance data which caused a slight distraction for both crew members. The Captain has just over 80 hours as pilot in command (PIC) following a long break from the company. Distraction with the performance data; inexperience; and lack of situational awareness caused the Captain to lose focus and forget to wait for ground personnel to leave the area before conducting the control check and calling for taxi. As the First Officer (FO); I should have been more situational aware of what the Captain was doing and the location of ground personnel. Ensure Captains are adequately trained; comfortable; and ready prior to being released from IOE. After flying with the Captain for the entire sequence; it is my opinion that the Captain needed more time to develop flows; understand procedure; and become operationally proficient before being released to the line.
Second reporter narrative
VFR conditions; ATIS reporting wet runway conditions. Communication with Operations to change to wet for correct performance data numbers. Performance numbers came out during push causing a distraction. After engine start and tow-bar release aircraft moved approximately two feet before CRM and stopped the plane without contact; damage or injury. Stopped reviewed performance data; ran/ reran all flows and checklist at a thorough pace and continued. Early start in the dark; operations and communication with operations to correct the field conditions leading to an unnecessary interruption/ distraction causing an input change to the FMS that would have been best accomplished at the gate in the normal routine manner.Communication with Operations to ensure field conditions that the performance data will be calculated on the latest ATIS or official weather. This should be accomplished after obtaining weather information during the normal preflight sequence; especially in changing weather conditions. With the discovery of any unusual information the parking brake should be set; verify ground crew position and both pilots agree on the change. This is how I will approach this or a similar situation in the future.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.