Flight Crew reported a lack of consensus regarding MEL procedures used for deferring a Main Tank Float Valve that was malfunctioning. They asked for clarification before accepting the aircraft for ETOPS operations.

Date: 2022-07 · Aircraft: B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-mel-cdl|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-weight-and-balance|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-maintenance|ground-event-encounter-fuel-issue

Synopsis

Flight Crew reported a lack of consensus regarding MEL procedures used for deferring a Main Tank Float Valve that was malfunctioning. They asked for clarification before accepting the aircraft for ETOPS operations.

Narrative

When we arrived at the airport; we were immediately advised by the Operations Agent that the aircraft had been refused by the last Crew for an ETOPS flight; due to a long-standing fuel leak (as documented in the logbook from as far back as Date). Now the aircraft was 'stuck' and they were having trouble finding a Crew willing to take it back. Another carrier's maintenance was onboard the aircraft when we boarded; so there was a lot of information coming at me at one time. They tried to explain the situation to me as well. The aircraft had documentation showing that passengers had been upset to see fuel coming out of the right wing on taxi outs as well. I wasn't sure that we even had the correct MEL for the issue; and neither was the mechanic on the ground at ZZZ. My concern also involved the fact that there had also been issues with the quantity gauge for that tank; having been written up concurrently multiple times. This was coupled with having to evaluate our additional ETOPS considerations. I felt I had fully briefed myself locally by reviewing the MEL; previous write ups; discussing the issue with the mechanic on the ground; before I phoned my Dispatcher and Maintenance Control for more information. In addition; everyone had been told by Maintenance Control to fuel the main tanks to less than full; with a heavy load in the center tank. I don't know why they felt the MEL gave relief from that associated fuel limitation. The person at Maintenance Control was frustrated and annoyed for having apparently explained the situation to multiple people already. Of course; we had Operations; Ramp; Fueler; and Cabin Crew all wanting answers; while I was trying to get this resolved. Though grumpy; he managed to explain that they had troubleshot the problem down to a float valve in the right tank being inoperative and that's where the pressure refuel system deferral came from. We also discussed the system operation and consequences; as well as the planned fuel load; and my explaining that we could not have relief from the fuel limitation just from the current MEL and that the main tanks would need to be filled. I told my Dispatcher that I would like to discuss the situation with my First Officer (FO) and then call him back. We used company risk assessment tool to discuss the possible en route scenarios and agreed we could conduct the flight safely. I called to inform the Dispatcher that we would take the aircraft and that it required a new release for the current FOB; which was much higher than planned. There were so many people around wanting to be updated; I told him I would have to call him back later for the ETOPS briefing because my attention was needed everywhere else. I had to talk to the Maintenance on the ground who were working with the Fuelers. I had to brief the Fuelers. Advise the Ramp and Ops that we could begin loading. Most importantly; I wanted to give a thorough briefing to my Cabin Crew; who were rightly concerned about crossing the ocean with an aircraft that had been refused earlier with a fuel leak. I wanted to make sure they understood my decision and were comfortable with it. It put me well behind in my normal duties for setting up the flight. I still had to phone Dispatch for our ETOPS briefing. In my mind; by this point; I felt that I had reviewed the MEL and system exhaustively; but I missed the Flight Crew repetitive procedure requirement of the logbook entry for this flight; as well as the subsequent flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2.While it was my responsibility to comply with this; it would be helpful if when a Pilot talks to Maintenance Control regarding an MEL that requires such action; that the Controller reminds the Pilot of it. It would also be helpful if it specifically reminds the Pilot in the text of the MEL; of the requirement to make the notation in the logbook; instead of just being a notation in the table at the top of the MEL in the book.

Second reporter narrative

We arrived at the gate in ZZZ to find our aircraft had previously been refused by a crew for a fuel issue. The issue was the float switch was no longer working and the aircraft had to be fueled manually using the shut off valve. Previous Crews reported fuel overflow via the NACA vents after refueling. Another carrier's Maintenance was also there to conduct the PDSC (Pre Departure Service Check) and they explained they would need to cross feed fuel from the main tanks to the center tank to prevent overflow. The Captain and I talked about the limitation that we needed full fuel wing tanks if there was an excess of 1;000 pounds of fuel in the center tank; and as we could tell there was no reprieve from this limitation with the applicable MEL.When we first read the applied MEL XX-XY-YYY we had several questions to why that particular MEL was used so the Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control in a three-way call and Maintenance Control seemed very agitated when we asked the particulars of the MEL and the previous maintenance history of the aircraft. There had also been some confusion to what the actual status of the main tanks where; which lead to even more agitation from Maintenance Control. After we discussed that we could take the aircraft as-is; I coordinated to have the Fuelers come back out and fuel the main tanks; start the boarding process and talked to the Operations Agent to have a new Release printed. I then started the process of getting the aircraft ready for push. What we failed to realize (after the fact) was there was a repetitive logbook required for this MEL; which in our haste to get the aircraft off the gate and confusion of the event went unnoticed.First of all this aircraft should not have been in service; nor should it have been doing ETOPS flights. In a time when aircraft are still in excess at (Company); this aircraft should have been taken out of service days before and dealt with. Although airworthy with the applicable MEL; this led to unnecessary delays and creating a complete nightmare for the flight crews and ground support crews that had to deal with this unnecessary situation. A MEL is simply used to get an aircraft to a place where proper maintenance can be accomplished. Issues like this is simply setting crews up for failure as we were not the only crew to have missed the repetitive writeup after each fueling from what I've been told. The other issue is the repetitive writeup is simply a small block on the MEL with no other mention of it in the notes of the MEL; so it can easily go without notice. All this being said; we the flight crew should have taken the extra time to re-read the MEL before pushing an hour late to make sure we hadn't missed the repetitive writeup.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.