UNAUTHORIZED RWY XING BY COMMUTER.

Date: 1991-10 · Aircraft: Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Anomalies: deviation-discrepancy-procedural-clearance|ground-incursion-runway

Synopsis

UNAUTHORIZED RWY XING BY COMMUTER.

Narrative

PROBLEM AROSE AS A RESULT OF RUSHING COCKPIT DUTIES IN AN EFFORT TO MEET OUR FLOW TIME FOR A FLT TO LAX. THE CAPT WITH WHOM I WAS FLYING TENDS TO RUSH HIS REQUESTS FOR CHKLISTS; AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE ALREADY BEHIND SCHEDULE ADDED TO THE PROBLEM. DURING OUR INBOUND LEG; THE CAPT ADVISED OUR GND CREW THAT WE NEEDED TO EXECUTE A 'QUICK TURN' SO THAT WE COULD MEET OUR FLOW TIME FOR A DEP TO LAX. THE ASSIGNED TIME WAS XA23 HRS; VOID IF NOT OFF BY XA25. THE PAX WERE BOARDED AT XA20. WHILE THE CAPT CHKED THE LOAD MANIFEST; I PERFORMED THE NECESSARY SAFETY BRIEFINGS REQUIRED BY COMPANY AND FAA. THE CAPT THEN PROCEEDED WITH THE ENG STARTS; AND CALLED FOR THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS. BEFORE CHKLIST COMPLETION; HE ASKED ME TO CONTACT GND CTL TO OBTAIN TAXI CLRNC. I DID AS HE ASKED; AND GND INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI TO RWY 4. I THEN ADVISED THE CAPT OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI TO RWY 4. HE RESPONDED WITH 'RWY 25?' I SAID; 'NEGATIVE; RWY 4.' WE BEGAN TO TAXI TOWARDS RWY 4 VIA TAXIWAY L. I PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE ENG START CHKLIST AND THE TAXI CHKLIST WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED THE ACFT. HE AGAIN ASKED ME 'RWY 25?' I RESPONDED AGAIN; 'NEGATIVE; 4' I PROCEEDED WITH THE CHKLIST AND WITH OBTAINING TKOF/LNDG PERFORMANCE DATA WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED AT WHAT I ADVISED WAS AN EXCESSIVELY HIGH TAXI SPD. I LOOKED UP FROM MY COCKPIT PREFLT DUTIES TO SEE OUR ACFT QUICKLY APCHING RWY 4; WHICH IF CROSSED WOULD CONTINUE TO RWY 25. I ADVISED THE CAPT TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4. HE AGAIN RESPONDED WITH 'NO; RWY 25.' I AGAIN SAID 'NEGATIVE! WE'RE ASSIGNED 4. HOLD SHORT!' HE STOPPED THE ACFT AND TWR ADVISED US TO EXECUTE A 180 DEG TURN AND CLRED US FOR TKOF ON RWY 4. FORTUNATELY THERE WAS NO TFC IN OUR AREA; SO NO POTENTIAL FOR ACCIDENT EXISTED. THIS IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A PROBLEM THAT MAY EASILY ARISE IF A CREW MEMBER IS PRESSURED INTO RUSHING THROUGH NORMAL DUTIES. THIS CAPT HAD DECIDED BEFORE ENG START THAT WE WOULD BE ASSIGNED RWY 25; SINCE THIS IS OUR MOST FREQUENTLY ASSIGNED DEP RWY. ALTHOUGH I TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED RWY 4; HE DID NOT HEAR IT THAT WAY. I WAS PRESSURED INTO COMPLETING 'IN THE COCKPIT DUTIES' WHILE ON THE TAXI OUT SO I DID NOT HAVE MY EYES OUTSIDE THE COCKPIT. I CONTACTED OUR CHIEF PLT AND DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH HIM. WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS THAT MAY ARISE WHEN CREWS 'RUSH.' HE ASSURED ME THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY PRESSURES IN THE COCKPIT THAT MAY LEAD TO MISTAKES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR SAYS HE TRIED EVERYTHING HE COULD THINK OF TO MAKE PIC UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WERE ASSIGNED RWY 4 AND SHOULD HOLD SHORT OF THAT RWY. COULD NOT JUMP ON BRAKES AS R SEAT CANNOT TAKE OVER BRAKES WITHOUT L SEAT RELEASING THEM. AS THEY LEFT GATE AREA THE RPTR KNEW THAT PIC HAD CONFUSED RWY ASSIGNMENT AND SO ASKED GND CTLR TO VERIFY RWY 4. GND CTLR REPEATED RWY 4; BUT THE PIC STILL HAD RWY 25 MINDSET. SAYS THAT THIS CAPT DOES NOT LISTEN EFFECTIVELY AND TENDS TO RUSH THINGS TOO MUCH; BUT HAS SHOWN SOME IMPROVEMENT SINCE THIS INCIDENT.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.