Air Carrier Captain reported a major failure by all ground staff to recognize the dangerous conditions posed by the transport of Dry Ice without adequate ventilation due to inaccurate Final Release documents. Documents were updated and flight continued to destination safely.

Narrative

Unsafe loading with Dry Ice; lack of communication between Maintenance Control; Dispatch and Loading Supervisors allowing personnel on board an aircraft loaded with Dry-Ice and NO ventilation due to a directive my Maintenance Control to render the APU inoperative. Dispatch failed to warn the crew of the hazard as well as ground staff failing to take precautions thus allowing personnel on the aircraft without proper ventilation with Dry-Ice loaded.Company failed to comply with Dry Ice safety procedures; Maintenance Control issues a deferral to render the APU inoperative; and Dispatch provided a flight release with perishables allowances with a deferred APU. Ground staff loaded the aircraft without any external air or operating APU with 'AT LEAST TWO PACKS OPERATING' as required in accordance with FOM Page X.X.YY. Maintenance Control directed the APU be deferred and rendered inoperative without any consideration of perishables onboard and the requirements of the 'GREEN SHEET' which requires the flight crew to 'ENSURE SUFFICENT VENTILATION conditions during flight and ground time (e.g. APU OPERATION).' Ground staff and Dispatch failed to comply with FOM Page X.X.ZZ by informing the flight crew about 'SAFEGUARDS THAT MUST BE USED' as it pertains to the inoperative APU and 'DRY ICE' being loaded requiring special ventilation be provided for during loading and all ground times. Instead the Dispatcher accepted a Deferral by Maintenance Control on the flight release listed as 'DDG 36-XX-XX APY BLEED AIR ISOLATION VALVE'. Upon arrival the crew was unaware of the conditions related to the inoperative APU noting that the aircraft was loaded and closed up with no APU or Packs running. A discussion occurred with the Duty Pilot regarding the APU inoperative while flying into ZZZZ and assurances were given adequate ground equipment were available for our arrival and no other limitations on those operations existed. After this discussion it was brought to our attention that the aircraft was loaded with Dry-Ice and it was expressed to Maintenance that we need to immediately get ventilation on the aircraft. Maintenance elected to clear the deferral of the APU bleed valve. The performed a ground test and found the APU bleed valve; and supply to be working normally...Which begged the question why it was deferred in the first place and especially in light of the hazardous cargo being carried with very specific ventilation requirements. Maintenance cleared the deferral and the flight crew received the logbook for review at XA51Z and Departed at XA:59Z. There appeared a greater emphasis by Maintenance; Dispatch and Loading to move the jet without recognizing the dangerous conditions posed by the HAZARDOUS CARGO loaded on the jet.Maintenance must notify the Cargo loading when a deferral impacts the ability to carry hazardous cargo as was the case in this situation. Dispatch failed to flag the deferral despite its annotation of perishables and additional fuel allowances on the flight plan and its release. There was a major failure by all ground staff to recognize the dangerous conditions posed by several tons of Dry-Ice loaded on the aircraft without ANY open cargo doors and NO VENTILATION provided to remove the deadly CO2 Gas.