Air carrier Captain reported the First Officer overshot final approach after the aircraft had gotten into an undesired energy state; resulting in a go around. Captain stated they should have intervened sooner to prevent the situation from happening.

Date: 2022-08 · Aircraft: Commercial Fixed Wing · Phase: approach

Anomalies: conflict-ground-conflict|less-severe|conflict-airborne-conflict|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported the First Officer overshot final approach after the aircraft had gotten into an undesired energy state; resulting in a go around. Captain stated they should have intervened sooner to prevent the situation from happening.

Narrative

Finishing up the last leg on a three day. I am flying with the former instructor from our training center who; flies to a high degree proficiency. We started off at ZZZ and headed to Dallas. We were vectored off the JFRYE Arrival before we got to JFRYE. We were eventually vectored toward WENOP; which is located on the RNP W Runway 13L. Aircraft were being vectored for visuals 13L/R. We had the ILS Y 13L left in the box. It was apparent to me that Approach was keeping us a bit fast to make space for the visuals to 13 left. The First Officer mentioned the energy management and we both knew we needed to slow. As I went to key the MIC to request a slow; the Controller cleared us to slow to 180 knots; direct NNATE and cleared us for the visual 13R. I mentioned that we would need the landing gear. He called for the gear; the gear was dropped; the aircraft was slowing. At that point I was confident that if the correct inputs were made to the aircraft; we could reach NNATE at the correct altitude and airspeed for stabilized approach. In hindsight; I needed to be forceful here; and have the First Officer bring the nose up and configure completely; in order to hit NNATE at an acceptable airspeed; allowing us to be eventually configured by 1000 feet above the ground. Instead of making that critical process happen; I allowed descending deceleration; which caused an undesired energy state over the point of NNATE. We overshot 13L. We initially got a TA that turned into an RA. We followed the RA commands. We went around. We were vectored for a left downwind for a visual to 13L. On downwind the Approach Controller asked the reason for our go-around. I replied 'energy management'. He mentioned something to the effect that he would keep us slower this time. We were cleared for the Visual 13L. We switched Tower when directed. On our initial check-in with Tower; Tower told us to 'continue' for 13L. At 700 feet on final approach; Tower directed an aircraft to lineup and wait on our runway. Tower then directed us to go around. We went around again. We were vectored for a left downwind again. We were cleared for the Visual for 13L again. We landed. We went to the gate. I've been kicking myself about this event; and frankly I'm embarrassed. The fault of this event doesn't not lie on the Approach Controller necessarily; the unintentional fault is mine. I have seen this energy management scenario played out before in Dallas. The 13L/R visual; may need direct action from time to time. I have the experience. I know what needs to happen. I am the Captain. There were many things that I could've done to prevent this event from happening. I cannot let expectation bias get in the way of what needs to happen to prevent an undesirable aircraft state; regardless how good the Pilot I'm flying with; has performed in the past three days. The First Officer; who is exceptional; was unprepared to deal with the 'dump' that happens from time to time in Dallas. It turns out; he has never seen one before. I should've been much more forceful and intervened sooner; and slowed us down much much further out. I could have had him drop the gear much sooner. I should've had him go around immediately as soon as I saw the undesired energy state; even before NNATE.I recognize what's at stake here. I need to remember that there are a lot of newer Pilots hitting our line now; and what is common knowledge for me; may not be common for them. The unintentional fault of this event is mine. I should have been much more forceful and intervened sooner; and slowed us down much much further out. I could have had him drop the gear much sooner. I should have had him go around immediately as soon as I saw the undesired energy state; even before NNATE.

Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.