PA-28 student and instructor reported a propeller strike as they attempted a last second go-around after realizing the landing gear was not extended during a power off 180 landing attempt.
Synopsis
PA-28 student and instructor reported a propeller strike as they attempted a last second go-around after realizing the landing gear was not extended during a power off 180 landing attempt.
Narrative
Practicing power off 180's with Instructor at ZZZ. I did a GUMPS shock midfield; but failed to extend the gear. Once power was set to idle the gear unsafe horn came on; after doing various other power off maneuvers at altitude; my brain ignored the warning horn and I became hyper focused on speed and my landing point. Flew the approach and upon entering into ground effect I noticed something was wrong as the wheels should be touching. I looked down and the horn came back into focus and I caught the error. Immediately added power to initiate a go-around and upon doing so the prop stuck the runway. I was midfield and committed to the go-around at that point and began the climb. I was shaken up so I handed the controls over to my Instructor. The airplane did not indicate any adverse effects; no vibrations and the climb was normal.I have a lot of time in the Arrow and always go a GUMPS check once on downwind and a secondary gear check on final; my failure to comply with my own personal procedure led to this happening. Also I noticed a better glide and that should have been another indication that something was wrong.For the future; I will be sure to continue utilizing a GUMPS check and secondary gear checks as well as adding a third while crossing the threshold and not tuning the gear unsafe horn out. Also I need to be more mindful of becoming hyper complacent in airplanes that I am comfortable with; as well as being impulsive during times of high workloads. For a future abnormal procedure where a landing is aborted in a high stress environment; I need to focus on flying the airplane. I was able to focus to initiate the go around and the climb; but I felt the need to transfer controls after I began to think about what just happened rather than flying the airplane. Lastly; and most importantly I need to be mindful of becoming hyper focused on a few items and be more Thorough with checklist items and keep a good scan going throughout every maneuver.Airplane is grounded and has been reported.
Second reporter narrative
My student and I experienced a propeller strike on the runway due to failure to extend the landing gear while practicing power off 180 degree landings.This was the second commercial maneuver training flight in 2 days in the same aircraft with the same student; an instrument rated private pilot (I trained him for his private certificate) who has about 100 recent hours in the same aircraft type. Both days we did commercial steep turns; steep spirals; emergency descents; and power off 180 degree landings; in that order; at a non-towered airport which is familiar to both of us. Our plan for this flight was to do the same; including the power off landings at the same airport; and then to introduce pylon 8's. The weather was completely benign: clear with minimal surface winds.We were on our third power off 180 in a row. On the first we extended the gear before entering the downwind leg as we arrived from the practice area. On the second we extended the gear on downwind while calling out our GUMPS checklist. Both were uneventful. On the third I verbally prompted him to do the GUMPS checklist on downwind and I saw him begin the checklist actions; but I did not verify that he had completed the checklist; and specifically I did not verify that the gear was down.Abeam the touchdown point we reduced power to idle and turned toward the touchdown point. In retrospect; the gear warning was activated at this point but we both tuned it out (see below). Our descent rate was not as great as it had been on previous attempts; though I dismissed it at the time. As we turned on our very abbreviated final leg we were still higher than on previous attempts; again I didn't connect the dots. We let it float and then struck the runway past our intended landing point; still fast. I felt ground contact but thought we had touched down on the landing gear: I did not realize that the gear had not been extended. My student applied takeoff power and initiated a go-around. He said he thought the propeller may have struck the runway. I wasn't even thinking about the possibility that the gear had not been extended; I thought he feared that we had touched down nose low on the landing gear and had struck the propeller in that way; and I said I didn't think that was the case; because we really were not in a nose low attitude at touchdown.We climbed out; with me taking the controls on climbout at the student's request. The aircraft seemed to perform normally and the engine ran normally. We elected to return to our home airport. I was still not aware that the gear had not been extended; but enroute my student said he was pretty sure that when he initiated the go-around the gear handle was already up. Now knowing that we may have contacted the runway with some part of the aircraft; possibly the propeller; I elected to continue to the home base. The trip home was uneventful. At shutdown we saw that the outer 3-4' of each propeller blade was folded back on itself. The aircraft was otherwise intact.This incident was caused by my student's failure to extend the landing gear; and by my failure to ensure that the landing gear had been extended. This means that neither he nor I followed the GUMPS checklist that I had verbally prompted; and we both ignored visual and aural gear up warnings.In addition to failing to verify that the checklist had been done; not just called for; I ignored clues which should have prompted me to call for a go-around well before we turned final. When we reduced power to idle; the gear warning light and sound were activated. We both ignored it (see below). And on this third power off 180; our descent rate was not nearly as great as it had been on the previous ones. We had excess altitude and airspeed when compared to the other times we had done the maneuver; but I didn't draw the proper conclusion.The nature of this particular maneuver. In a power off 180 degree landing things happen fast. The final leg is so short that there really isn't time to do my normal final checklist: 'mixture rich; prop full forward; 3 green lights.' This means that those things absolutely have to be done before beginning the maneuver; and the GUMPS checklist does cover these items. In briefing the maneuver the before the previous day's flight we had discussed that we will do this as a gear down maneuver; because we don't want to have to mess with landing gear during the maneuver precisely because things happen so fast. And yet we didn't confirm that the gear was down.I should not have had my student do power off 180's in a retractable gear aircraft while remaining in the pattern. We did this maneuver 3 times in a row; the last two within the pattern. That was a bad choice on my part. If we do GUMPS midfield downwind; as is our routine; it's entirely possible that the gear would not be down by the time we reach the intended touchdown point; at which point the power is reduced to idle and things begin to happen fast. And to make matters worse; in this particular aircraft the right main gear sometimes takes much longer than the left to extend. We really needed to have the gear down; and confirmed down; by the time we began the downwind leg so as not to have to wait for the gear to extend.We had just been doing steep spirals; which are done in clean configuration with the power at idle. Because the gear is up at a low power setting; the gear warning light and audible warning are activated throughout the maneuver; and we began to tune out those warnings while doing that maneuver. When the same warnings were activated when we reduced power to idle on this third power off 180--which should have prompted us to check the gear--we tuned it out again.Complacency. I know this student very well; and honestly he is the most careful pilot I know. He is an excellent pilot. I trust him; and I think he trusts me as well. We were doing maneuvers we had done the day before and had already done successfully this very day; and we both let our guard down: neither of us completed the GUMPS checklist (despite saying 'GUMPS' out loud). It's his job to do the checklist items; but it's mine to make sure that they got done; and I failed to do that.Neither weather nor fatigue was a factor.Things I will do differently:Whether a written checklist or a verbal one; never stop at just saying the items. I must verify; every time; that they were actually done; not just said. Don't do power off 180's repeatedly in the traffic pattern in a retractable gear aircraft; because there's not enough time to make sure the gear is down before the maneuver begins if the gear extension starts midfield downwind. I suppose the exception is that if terrain etc allows; you could just leave the gear down if remaining in the pattern. Because of terrain off the departure end of the runway at this particular airport; that was not an option for us.Keep hand on gear handle until I see three green lights; and train students to do the same. This is not how I was trained; and has not been my habit; but I will now make it my habit.Don't blow off warning light/sounds or other cues (in this case; a suspiciously low descent rate) that things aren't as they should be.Finally; my decision to return to home base instead of landing at the airport we were at could be questioned. Had I felt that there had been a prop strike; I should absolutely have landed at the airport we were at; because the engine and/or propeller could have failed catastrophically. But; believe it or not; I still wasn't thinking we had touched down with the gear up. We were well enroute when I understood that the gear had probably not been extended when we touched down; and so; with no unusual vibrations and no apparent loss of power; I elected to continue to return to home base.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.