ACR HAS VERY STIFF CTL MOVEMENT ON TKOF. ABORT.

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WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF CLOSE BEHIND AN LGT AND TOLD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT. THE FO; JUST BACK TO THE MLG AFTER FLYING THE WDB FOR THE LAST FEW MONTHS; INADVERTENTLY FORGOT TO SWITCH RADIOS FROM THE 'PA' POS. THE TWR REPEATED THE CLRNC AND I SWITCHED HIS RADIO FOR HIM AND ALSO TURNED ON THE FLOOD LIGHTS (A NEW PROC FOR HIM) WHICH HE HAD NOT YET GOTTEN TO. I THEN ARMED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE AUTO THROTTLES SWITCH. I ADVANCED THE THROTTLES; RELEASED THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING AND GRASPED THE FLT CTLS. THE YOKE WAS VERY STIFF. I IMMEDIATELY CLOSED THE THROTTLES AND APPLIED BRAKES AND ADVISED THE FO TO NOTIFY THE TWR THAT WE WERE ABORTING THE TKOF ON RWY 29R. AIRSPD DID NOT EXCEED 20 KTS AND WE MADE THE FIRST TURNOFF. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY TFC CONFLICTS AND WERE DIRECTED TO TAXI TO AN INNER POS ON OUR COMPANY RAMP; AND THEN TO A GATE. WE HAD NOT THEN ATTEMPTED ANY ANALYSIS OF OUR PROBLEM; AS THE RAMP AND TAXIWAYS WERE SOMEWHAT CONGESTED. MAINT PERSONNEL MET THE ACFT AND WE DETERMINED THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. THE SWITCH IS IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE AUTO THROTTLE AND IN CLOSE PROX. MAINT MADE A ROUTINE CHK; SIGNED OFF THE LOGBOOK AND WE DEPARTED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I BELIEVE A COMBINATION OF 'HURRY' (TKOF CLRNCS BTWN DEPARTING AND ARRIVING CLOSELY SPACED TFC); INEXPERIENCED COPLT AND MY ATTEMPTS TO HELP HIM ACCOMPLISH HIS DUTIES AS WELL AS MINE; SWITCHES THAT ARE IDENTICAL AND CLOSE TOGETHER; AND A GENERAL EXCESS OF TKOF CHKLIST DUTIES CONTRIBUTED TO MY MISTAKE. AFTER THE ABORTED TKOF; WE FEEL WE WOULD HAVE FOUND OUR ERROR AND AVOIDED THE CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT HAD THERE BEEN A HOLDING PAD FOR US TO RETURN TO DIAGNOSE THE PROBLEM.