GA SMA MADE A GAR FOR TFC STILL ON THE RWY AS HE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD. TFC WAS AT LEAST 4000 FT DOWN THE RWY.
Synopsis
GA SMA MADE A GAR FOR TFC STILL ON THE RWY AS HE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD. TFC WAS AT LEAST 4000 FT DOWN THE RWY.
Narrative
WHILE ON VFR APCH TO RWY 9; TWR ADVISED I HAD TFC 1000 FT BELOW AND 1 1/2 MI AT 12 O'CLOCK. REQUESTED I SLOW TO 120 KTS FOR SPACING. AFTER SLOWING I VISUALLY IDENTED TFC (AN SMA TWIN). I WAS CLRED TO LAND #2 BEHIND THE TWIN. AS THE APCH CONTINUED; I BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT THE TWIN HAVING TIME TO CLR RWY. THE TWIN TOUCHED DOWN WHEN I WAS ABOUT 1-1 1/2 MI FROM THRESHOLD. AS I PERFORMED LNDG CHK; I HEARD TWR INSTRUCT THE TWIN TO CONTINUE DOWN THE RWY AND TURN OFF ABEAM THE TWR. I NOTICED THE TWR WAS ABOUT 2/3 DOWN RWY 9 AND REALIZED IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE TAXI TIME FOR THE TWIN. AS I CROSSED THE RWY THRESHOLD THE TWIN WAS STILL ON THE RWY. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL THOUSAND FT SEPARATED ME AND THE OTHER ACFT ON THE RWY; I HAD NO WAY OF DETERMINING IF THE ACFT COULD CLR THE RWY OR IF I COULD STOP IN THE EVENT OF PROBLEMS OR BRAKE FAILURE. I DETERMINED AN UNSAFE CONDITION EXISTED WITH POTENTIAL CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES AND DECLARED A MISSED APCH. TWR ASKED WHAT MY PROBLEM WAS AND I STATED THE RWY WAS NOT CLR. TWR GAVE ME INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE R TFC ANC CLRED ME TO LAND. UPON CLRING THE RWY I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL THE TWR FROM THE FBO. UPON CONTACTING THE TWR I WAS ASKED FOR MY NAME ADDRESS AND CERTIFICATE NUMBER. WHEN I ASKED WHY I WAS TOLD I HAD COMMITTED AN 'UNSAFE ACT' AND THE CTLR WOULD DETERMINE 'WHETHER TO TAKE THE MATTER FURTHER.' I STATED THE RWY WAS NOT CLR AND IN MY OPINION CONSTITUTED A HAZARD IF I CONTINUED THE LNDG. THE CTLR STATED IT IS ACCEPTED PRACTICE AT DANNELLY FIELD TO LAND ACFT ON THE RWY SO LONG AS 4000 FT SEPARATED THE ACFT. I STATED I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING HIS LCL PRACTICES AND WOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED MY ACFT TO A LNDG SO LONG AS ANOTHER ACFT WAS ON THE RWY. THE CTLR; ORDERED ARPT SECURITY TO DETAIN ME FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION. I CALLED THE TWR AND ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE TWR SUPVR. I EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND REITERATED THAT I THOUGHT THE CTLR HAD ALLOWED A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS SITUATION TO DEVELOP BY CLRING ME TO LAND WITH ANOTHER ACFT BLOCKING THE RWY. AS PIC; I IDENTED A HAZARDOUS SITUATION AND TOOK STEPS TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF MY ACFT. THE TWR SUPVR EXPLAINED IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON TO LAND ACFT ON RWY 9 WHILE OTHERS WERE ROLLING OUT SO LONG AS 4000 FT OF RWY SEPARATED THE ACFT. I STATED AGAIN THAT AS PLT I WAS NOT TOLD NOR HAD ANY WAY OF KNOWING THIS WAS THE PRACTICE. I ALSO STATED THAT 4000 FT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT DISTANCE TO STOP MY ACFT IN THE EVENT OF BRAKE FAILURE AND I WOULD NEVER COMMIT TO A LNDG WITH ANOTHER ACFT ONLY 4000 FT DOWN THE RWY. I BELIEVE THAT NOT ONLY DID THE CTLR EXERCISE POOR JUDGEMENT IN SPACING; HE FURTHER COMPOUNDED THE SITUATION BY THREATENING TO CITE ME FOR 'UNSAFE ACTS.' CTLR'S ACTION IN NOTIFYING SECURITY AND HAVING ME TAKEN TO THE ARPT CHIEF OF POLICE OFFICE WAS TOTALLY UNGROUNDED AND AN ABUSE OF HIS AUTHORITY. IF HIS GOAL WAS TO IMPRESS UPON ME HIS PROFESSIONALISM AND DEDICATION TO SAFETY; HIS ACTIONS INDICATED A HVY HANDED FAA ATTITUDE TOWARDS A QUESTIONABLE SITUATION. IN VIEW OF DISASTERS CONCERNING RECENT COLLISION OF ACFT ON THE RWY; I WONDER IF THESE LCL PRACTICES OF MIN RWY SEPARATION MIGHT BE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.