Embraer 550 Captain reported a faulty ground cooling fan caused multiple systems failures and complicated several flight legs. Maintenance continued to suggest to just power down the aircraft and power back up again to rest the fault; which the Captain was dissatisfied with.

Narrative

We were returning from our tech-stop in ZZZZ on our way back from a two week spin. Prior to our trip we had just come out of our 750 hour annual inspection with multiple flight control issues post inspection. Due to these issues we conducted multiple test flights where the aircraft often started in a 'no-dispatch' mode and we would have to cancel the flight. The issues were eventually traced to an apparently bad ground cooling fan that may have blown out due to maintenance conditions during the 750 [hour] inspection. Given these issues we had cancelled/pushed our trip multiple times and our principal had booked alternate lift. In an attempt to isolate the issue and get a different set of eyes on the aircraft; we were able to dispatch and fly one leg to a different service center. Upon landing at the new service center the fan was replaced; the flight control rigging was checked; and we were dispatched for another flight. We managed to fly three successful test legs post this and; with some trepidation; decided we would do the trip. Our first three legs were uneventful and the aircraft sat on the ground in the for approximately two weeks prior to it's next departure. Upon startup after the break for our first of three legs home we noticed that the electronic circuit breaker for fan that was causing all the original issues had popped. We called our Maintenance team and they advised us to attempt one reset of the breaker. We performed the breaker reset and; unlike in previous instances; the reset was successful and we elected to dispatch. After dispatch we had a two our leg too our tech-stop (Fuel and Customs) and inflight the three pilots discussed how best to handle the tech stop given the issues. I; as PIC (Pilot in Command) on this trip; was worried that if we took the airplane to a cold; and dark state it was likely that we may have the same issue recur on the next start and offered that we should plan to leave the aircraft powered on with the APU during our entire stop. The two other crew members agreed with my judgement. Upon descent into ZZZZ we received a AUX TK PRESS FAIL CAS message that is a known; spurious inflight issue in our aircraft type. Usually this resets on the ground so we; as per manufacture procedure; overwrote the checklist and continued the arrival normally. The OEM's procedures for this spurious CAS is; if the CAS message does not self extinguish upon landing; or perform a power down reset of the aircraft. After landed we noted that the system had extinguished the CAS message as expected and we decided to continue with our original plan of not powering down the aircraft. The tech stop was performed normally and without issue. Upon initial climb out of ZZZZ we received the same CAS message as on descent. Given the OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) checklist procedure is only relevant to an 'On Ground' condition; and that the OEM Flight Operations Letters procedure was only relevant on descent the three crew again had a discussion. Our concern was that potentially; we would be unable to access the fuel in our auxiliary tanks during our long; ocean crossing. During the discussion it was noted that the AUX system's backup pumps were operational and that; as far as we could tell; the aircraft's bleed air pumping systems was operational as well despite the CAS message. We further noted that we had enough fuel in our main tanks alone to continue to our destination with legal reserves and since the final third of the flight was over land there were numerous other alternatives if weather conditions over the Atlantic was worse than predicted. We elected to continue. We had an uneventful Atlantic crossing [and] had no further issues until beginning our descent into our destination airport. Upon descending out of FL400 roughly over ZZZ and in IMC we received the following CAS messages: 'FLTCTRL NO DISPATCH'; 'SPOILER FAULT'; 'RUDDER FAULT'; and 'STEEP APPR NOT AVAIL' (in addition to the'FUEL AUXTK PRESS FAIL.' Additionally; I noted a red 'X' over our pitch trim indicator which indicated this system may also have had a fault. All messages other than the 'SPOILER FAULT' message were advisory messages with no associated checklists. As such we ran the 'SPOILER FAULT' checklist. We pulled up the flight control synoptic page and identified the right; outboard multi-function spoiler panel as the faulted panel. With this information in hand; I asked the third; Non-Flying Pilot look out the right windows over the wing while I attempted to exercise the spoilers. Pilot 3 confirmed that all our spoilers extended normally. As such; there were no special procedures required other than performance additives which were accomplished. As we crossed through 10;000 ft. and once we were over ZZZ1; I briefed the crew that my plan was to turn off the autopilot in an attempt to assess the trim-stability of the aircraft. I also noted that our flight control system is pitch stable so it was unlikely that I would notice any control difficulties until or aircraft entered approach and landing mode once the gear lever was elected down and the flaps were selected to a landing flap setting. I turned off the autopilot and; as expected; noted no difficulties in the controllability of the aircraft. I annunciated this to the rest of the crew and noted that I would turn the autopilot back on and leave the autopilot on; to retain the aircraft auto-pitch trim functionality down to our normal approach speed of Vref +5 (Vap.) hoping to avoid any potential pitch trim issues once the aircraft reverted to approach and landing control modes. I also advised that I would plan to slow down to these speeds earlier than usual and turn off the autopilot once the aircraft had slowed to Vap so that I could further assess controllability issues. I asked Pilot 3 to also sit in the main cabin during landing and to advise if the ground spoilers deployed normally on landing. We continued as briefed an experienced an uneventful 'normal' landing. Upon parking on the ramp I called Pilot 3 to the cockpit and asked if he had noticed any abnormalities on landing. He said that the Ground Spoilers had functioned normally. We had one more leg today and we were unsure of what to do. I elected to perform another flight control test. To do this the pilots simply cycle though the flight control limits as normal and look for any issues. Both left and right seat pilots cycled through their respective flight control tests one at a time. Pilot 3 noted that during the flight control tests the Right Outboard spoiler did not deploy normally in its capacity of a roll spoiler. With that we shut down the aircraft normally and called Maintenance. During the call it was advised that we attempt a normal power cycle of the aircraft and see if it recurred. If the issue cleared; and then after another full power-cycle the issue did not recur; we would dispatch us to our final destination and our Maintenance team would look at the aircraft on landing. The power cycle cleared the issue; we fueled up; performed a crew swap; and dispatched to our final destination with no further issues. This is not the first time we have had issues with our airplane and; anecdotally; this is far from the first time our fleet has had minor but unpleasant flight control issues. Most often these occur on startup and prevent dispatch; I don't know of too many issues in the fleet occurring inflight; but the OEM's handling of these issues has been lackluster. The general advice is to 'power cycle the aircraft and if it clears; don't worry about it.' This response does not inspire confidence. I believe the OEM is overlooking the root cause of the issue; which is low quality components received from their subcontractors. Due to the ongoing parts and labor shortage I believe the OEM is electing to keep the fleet in the air and trying to avoid an expensive AD/SB issuance. This however is a false saving as itpushes the cost of equipment failure to the operators vs the OEM. While I do not believe safety of flight is compromised at all; the amount of money operators are spending on supplemental lift because the OEM is unwilling or unable to fix the root cause of these issues is painful and dramatically affects the long term safety of aircraft operations. Pilots end up grounded-out; spend less time staying current and flying their aircraft; operators allocate expenses to supplemental lift rather than safe operations of their aircraft; and the OEM continues to turn a blind eye to a glaring issue in the fleet.