Air Carrier Flight Crew reported being notified by a Flight Attendant of a 'smelly odor' in the cabin. The Flight Crew requested priority handling to a suitable alternate where a safe landing was executed and medical evaluation was provided to crew members.
Synopsis
Air Carrier Flight Crew reported being notified by a Flight Attendant of a 'smelly odor' in the cabin. The Flight Crew requested priority handling to a suitable alternate where a safe landing was executed and medical evaluation was provided to crew members.
Narrative
Approximately 45 minutes after takeoff; the FA (Flight Attendant) called and informed us that she smelled a dirty sock smell and it was making her feel light headed and dizzy. She also informed us that another Flight Attendant was smelling and feeling the same thing. The Captain asked if they could swap places with the aft Flight Attendants to confirm what was happening. They did and confirmed what FA said. After a brief discussion it was best to divert back to ZZZ due to having better medical care; longer runways for an overweight landing; and better services for the passengers. We began the process of coordinating with ATC for a clearance and [requested priority handling] due to having incapacitated crew members. The QRC and QRH procedures were completed and we also descended to 10;000 ft. in case we would need to turn off both packs. Not long after we began the return; we were informed that the FA was being administered oxygen. Only the right pack was turned off. After a few minutes; the FA reported feeling better; but then later the symptoms returned and oxygen was administered again. We prepared for our arrival in to ZZZ. Things were uneventful other that a little more communication regarding the [event] and Operations.Once at the gate; emergency personnel boarded the aircraft and assessed the FA. They took her in to the terminal and then we began deplaning the passengers. Maintenance logs were filled out. Phone calls were made to the union; the Duty Officer; crew scheduling; and others. We decided to all be checked medically. All the Flight Attendants were transported by ambulance. The Captain drove me to the hospital where I was checked. Afterwards; I talked with scheduling about a hotel and what would happen next. I went to the hotel and got to my room around XA:00am.I did not recognize the event as one that required the use of a QRC or QRH procedure. It was only after we began to divert back to ZZZ that the Captain began to do the QRC. This delay possibly led to increased exposure to the fumes; but reduced the total time of the incident.In an incident like this; I think it would be most appropriate to isolate the crew from passengers. This would allow assessment to be completed more timely; and reduce the possibility of social media exposure. It would also allow crew members to make all the phone calls necessary to report the incident. The number of phone calls required to be made by the Captain was enormous. Having one incident response phone call would considerably reduce the stress of the situation and allow a more timely medical assessment of crew members. There was only one person performing assessments; and when the passengers saw that crew members were being assessed and wheeled out on gurneys; they became more agitated about what they could have been exposed to and requested assessment. I did my best to alleviate the work load of the Captain; but there was only so much I could do.Also; it can be daunting for a person to be in an unfamiliar city while experiencing a situation like this. It would be best to keep crew members together as best as possible; at least in the same hospital.One of the biggest recommendations I can make is to get rid of an outside contractor in coordinating medical care in emergency cases. The process was difficult; unnecessary; and extremely frustrating. I had people calling me during required rest times. I found out after I got home that they had not considered me cleared to travel until the case was closed (after I had deadheaded to ZZZ1; stayed the night; deadheaded to ZZZ2; and commuted home). Outside contractors are not familiar with our operation and did not work in my best interest.
Second reporter narrative
We received a call from forward Flight Attendants alerting us to a 'smelly socks' odor in the forward portion of the passenger cabin and saying that both were light headed. I asked that the aft Flight Attendants give a report on their condition as well as other passengers in the forward cabin. Aft attendants confirmed the smell forward but were unaffected while aft. Passengers forward also noted the smell and lightheadedness. Neither Captain nor FO (First Officer) noted any fumes or symptoms. We shortly received word that the 'A' Flight Attendant had to sit and go on oxygen. At this point; I determined that due to crew incapacitation we would need to return to a suitable field without any undue delay. We received clearance to proceed direct ZZZ from ATC. We [were given priority handling] and squawked XXXX. I chose ZZZ for the longer runway because we were 8000 lbs. above MLW and the more robust medical facilities there. We received clearance to descend to 10;000 ft. I did this to burn fuel off but primarily to ensure that if the fumes condition worsened we could depressurize the aircraft immediately. radar contact with Center. Right pack off per QRH smoke and fumes procedure. FAs (Flight Attendants) reported smell had abated and air was fresher. Landed ZZZI was distracted with safely diverting the aircraft in [the] airspace. It took about 20 minutes after the initial report and ten minutes after [we advised ATC] to start on the QRH procedure. The Aviate; Navigate; Communicate; Checklist guideline kept us from getting the right pack off in a timely manner. Immediate and timely execution of the smoke and fumes QRH procedure may have lessened to exposure to fumes experienced by those in the passenger cabin.Determining the severity of the situation was difficult. Ultimately; we made the decision to trust the concerns of our cabin crew despite not having any corroborating evidence. At the time of this writing; I still don't know whether Maintenance has determined a source of the fumes. The deciding factor was hearing that the 'A' had gone on O2 and had to sit. At that point; a crew member was incapacitated and we [had advised ATC].The decision to turn and descend in ETOPS airspace had to be weighed against the advantage of an immediate return and descent vs. positive deconfliction with other ETOPS aircraft. We opted to wait for clearance because we felt the situation in the cabin didn't warrant immediate turn and descent without ATC clearance.Advocate for the crew once blocked in. It was difficult to keep up with the myriad of calls; reports etc. after we reached the gate while simultaneously ensuring the crew were properly cared for. Medical support was great but it would be nice to have one crew member make all the arrangements for everyone so we could concentrate on other tasks. Setting up my medical care distracted me from necessary interaction with first responders; Maintenance; Dispatch; Operations etc.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.