Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to MRY.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to MRY.
Narrative
After briefing a visual approach backed up by the LOC 28L; Approach assigned us the LOC 28L approach. I used the intermediate fixes to plan my descent. Visibility was reported at 10 SM. As we proceeded on the approach; visibility was reduced due to haze and glare from the sun. As we passed the FAP; I continued to look for the runway. At the same time I had rolled my vertical speed down to 1500 fpm as it appeared we were high. During this time we received an EGPWS 'CAUTION TERRAIN' prior to 1000 ft. AGL. I then disconnected the Autopilot and made a slight right deviation. We also confirmed visual separation and clearance from terrain; returned to the final approach course and glide path. The remainder of the approach and landing were normal with no further issue.Cause: The expectation of being able to maintain visual contact with the airport in VMC conditions. A higher than needed descent rate caused by the visual illusion. Inaccurate distance and altitude guidance (no snowflake) and improper calculations. A momentary loss of situational awareness.Suggestions: Confirm fixes inside FAP when loading an approach; to assist in altitude guidance. Maintain situational awareness and diligence in cross-checking information received. Proper planning and communication.
Second reporter narrative
On the LOC 28L approach in VMC; with the runway in sight; the aircraft was flown below the step down fix altitudes after the FAF; due to setting an inappropriately high vertical speed. This caused an EGPWS 'caution terrain' message; due to terrain on the approach course. This occurred prior to 1000HAT. After the caution; the Captain; who was pilot flying (PF); disconnected the Autopilot; reduced vertical speed; and made a slight right turn to provide more clearance. In accordance with the stabilized approach criteria; we continued to a successful landing. Cause: This event was caused by failure of both pilots to remember the step-down fixes and the altitudes associated during the approach. Contributing factors were the fact that the runway was in sight; leading to less vigilant cross-check of the IAP chart; and terrain obscuration due to a small cloud layer in the valley on the approach course.Suggestions: To avoid this in the future; I will always be sure to brief step down fixes after the FAF; and load them into the fix page; as they are not automatically loaded into the FMS. Additionally; if there is any terrain obscuration or visibility restrictions; I will plan to fly the full IAP; and not a visual backed up by said IAP.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.