ACR FLC SUSPECTS THEY MAY HAVE LANDED IN WX BELOW REQUIRED MINS AT LAX.
Synopsis
ACR FLC SUSPECTS THEY MAY HAVE LANDED IN WX BELOW REQUIRED MINS AT LAX.
Narrative
APCH CTL CLRED US FOR A CAT IIIA APCH WITH RPTED RVR 800 (MIN RVR 700). WHEN WELL INSIDE THE MARKER; TWR RPTED TOUCHDOWN RVR 600; MID 1400 AND I BELIEVE ROLLOUT WAS 1000. BECAUSE OF THE HIGH MID VALUE WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE APCH TO ALERT HEIGHT. AS I WAS NOT FLYING; MY DUTIES WERE PRIMARILY INSIDE THE COCKPIT; BUT AFTER CALLING 100 FT TO ALERT HEIGHT I GLANCED OUTSIDE AND HAD A CLR VIEW OF THE RWY THRESHOLD AND TOUCHDOWN ZONE LIGHTS. THE APCH LIGHT SYS HAD BEGUN TO COME INTO VIEW PRIOR TO THE 100 FT CALL. WHEN I CALLED 'ALERT HEIGHT' I WAS MILDLY SURPRISED THAT THE CAPT DID NOT EXECUTE A MISSED APCH; BUT SINCE WE HAD AN EXCELLENT VIEW OF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT; I DID NOT VOICE AN OBJECTION TO THE DECISION TO LAND. A CAT III APCH REQUIRES A MISSED APCH IF LNDG MINS ARE NOT RPTED PRIOR TO ALERT HEIGHT (REGARDLESS OF FLT VISIBILITY). AS I DO NOT RECALL HEARING THE TWR AMEND THE TOUCHDOWN RVR OF 600; THE STRONG POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT WE LANDED BELOW MINS. I HAVE GIVEN THIS INCIDENT A LOT OF THOUGHT AND BELIEVE THE MAIN REASON I DID NOT STRONGLY SUGGEST A MISSED APCH WAS MY SIGHTING OF THE RWY ENVIRONMENT. FOR THE 25 YRS I HAVE BEEN FLYING; SEEING THE RWY ENVIRONMENT ABOVE DECISION HEIGHT MEANT YOU COULD LAND. I NOW REALIZE THAT ALTHOUGH I KNEW THE RULES; I HAD NOT FIRMLY SHIFTED MENTAL GEARS INTO A MINDSET THAT REQUIRES A MISSED APCH IF MINS ARE NOT RPTED AND WITH NO CONSIDERATION OF WHAT YOU SEE OUT THE WINDOW. THE FACT THAT THIS WAS AN AUTOLAND APCH ALSO HAD AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON MY THINKING. 'THE FIELD IS ABOVE MINS; THE AIRPLANE WILL FLY AND LAND ITSELF WHAT CAN GO WRONG?' I ALWAYS TRY TO TAKE A MOMENT ON EVERY APCH A FEW MI OUT ON FINAL TO MENTALLY REVIEW MISSED APCH CRITERIA AND PROC. IN REVIEWING MY ACTIONS DURING THIS PARTICULAR APCH; I REALIZED I HAD NOT DONE THIS. FURTHER THOUGHT LEADS ME TO THE HUMBLING CONCLUSION THAT I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME ANOTHER VICTIM OF THE INSIDIOUS ABILITY OF A HIGHLY AUTOMATED AND RELIABLE SYS TO LULL ITS OPERATOR INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT A RPTED TWR VISIBILITY IS A COMPANY REQUIREMENT AND IS IN THE COMPANY OPS MANUAL. AS SUCH; IT WOULD BE A LIMITATION FOR THIS FLC.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.