A319 flight crew reported receiving anti ice caution messages on initial climb; followed by increasing divergence of Captain's and First Officer's altimeter indications. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed.
Synopsis
A319 flight crew reported receiving anti ice caution messages on initial climb; followed by increasing divergence of Captain's and First Officer's altimeter indications. Flight crew returned to departure airport and landed.
Narrative
We departed ZZZ on Aircraft X to ZZZ1 and at approximately 1;500 ft. AFL we received an ECAM caution message ANTI ICE CAPT L STAT and ANTI ICE CAPT R STAT. First Officer (FO) was pilot flying (PF). After aircraft was in clean configuration; I assigned FO the aircraft and radios while I ran QRC; ECAM; QRH; and follow up actions. I selected AIR DATA SWITCH to CAPT 3 per ECAM. The Captain; FO; and STBY airspeed and altitude indications appeared accurate. I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and explained the circumstances. Maintenance Control ran a real-time diagnostic query on the system and advised me that the aircraft was reporting a faulty PROBE HEAT COMPUTER #1. During our discussion regarding continuation of the flight to ZZZ1; the Captain and FO altimeters started to diverge. When the difference reached 300 ft. between Captain and FO altimeters; I directed the FO to advise ATC we were not RVSM capable. At this point the Captain altimeter read 30;300 ft.; the STBY altimeter read 29;700 ft.; and the FO altimeter read 30;000 ft. I was still connected on communications and advised Maintenance Control of our diverging altimeter discrepancy. Maintenance Control performed another query and advised us the aircraft was reporting a failure of both CAPT STATIC PORTS; and then recommended we return to ZZZ; and Dispatch and I agreed. We considered the FO instruments to be the most reliable and relied primarily on them. I coordinated our return to ZZZ; reviewed the QRH NON-ROUTINE LANDING CONSIDERATIONS; briefed Flight Attendants (FA's) and passengers; and ran the QRH procedure for OVERWEIGHT LANDING. We [requested priority handling] with ATC and the FO made a perfectly soft landing. We exited the runway and ZZZ COMMAND checked the aircraft then advised us everything appeared normal; then followed us to the gate. Aircraft Maintenance Logbook entries were made for the mechanical discrepancy and overweight landing.
Second reporter narrative
Shortly after thrust reduction on our initial climb off of Runway XXL at ZZZ; we received a Master Caution for CAPT 1 and 2 STATIC PORT ANTI ICE INOP. I maintained aircraft control while the Captain worked the ECAM action and follow up QRH procedures. I continued flying the SID while the Captain contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch. As we were approaching FL300; I noticed a disparity between the Captain's and First Officer's (FO's) altimeters of greater than 200 ft. Upon reaching FL300; the Captain and I agreed we needed to descend out of RVSM airspace. Maintenance Control; Dispatch; the Captain and I all agreed we needed to return to ZZZ. I informed ATC of our altimeter error; the need to descend out of RVSM airspace and the need to return to ZZZ. While on recovery to ZZZ; we discovered that we would be landing over weight and [requested priority handling] with ZZZ Approach. We ran all applicable checklist and informed the flight attendants and passengers of our situation. I flew the recovery via the ZZZZZ2 arrival to the ILS XXR and landed in accordance with our overweight landing checklist. Fire and rescue met us after we taxied clear; informed us that our brake temperatures were acceptable and followed us to the gate.It appeared that a computer failure of the Captain's 1 and 2 static port anti ice failed after passing 1;500 ft. AGL. We were carrying approximately 26;000 pounds of fuel plus a fully loaded aircraft of passengers and cargo which lead to the overweight landing. It was just the timing of the failure that lead us the recover so soon after takeoff.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.