Air carrier flight crew reported multiple EGPWS alerts on approach due to being low on profile and elected to continue the approach using VASI for visual reference.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported multiple EGPWS alerts on approach due to being low on profile and elected to continue the approach using VASI for visual reference.
Narrative
We were assigned 4000 ft. and then cleared for the visual approach to Runway 23 CRW. Established on downwind we maintained 4000 until we were north of the HVQ VOR so we could comply with the company 10-X page. The First Officer (FO) set the 2400 ft. FAF altitude and began to descend at 1000 fpm while still downwind. Approaching 3000 ft. a base turn was established. At this point we were going to intercept approximately 2-3 miles outside of the FAF. (This is a little lower than I like to be this far out so I was occasionally scanning the terrain map on the MFD) As we rolled wings level and just under approximately 2900 ft. we received 'terrain terrain' and immediately 'pull up'. It was still day VMC so the FO immediately disengaged the Autopilot and began a pitch up. I glanced at the MFD and didn't see any terrain or obstacles in our path. The 'pull up' alert stopped before we really had a climb established. At this point we were in a slight climb about 2700 ft. We were approaching the localizer course about 2-3 miles from the FAF the FO asked for a heading bug to intercept and started a very shallow descent to 2400 ft. Almost as soon as we began the descent we immediately received the 'pull up' alert. Once again the FO pitched up and the alert stopped immediately. Once established on the localizer the FO I assume was a little shaken at that point and we crossed the FAF about 300-400 ft. low. I reminded him a couple times to not lose any more altitude. We remained at this altitude until intercepting the VASI. The 1000 ft. call sounded twice in succession at about 2000 ft. MSL just prior to selection of flaps 45 due to the hilly terrain. Touchdown was uneventful. Had I been put in the situation again I would have called for a go-around once we dropped below FAF altitude. By that point the distraction from the two terrain alerts greatly diminished our situational awareness.My suggestion is not to descend lower than 2900-3000 ft. once north of HVQ VOR. Then to be established and intercept the glide slope at that altitude to avoid any risk of EGPWS alerts. Additionally it would add an extra step but tuning the HVQ VOR 090 radial on the pilot monitoring (PM) PFD as a reference for the MSA could add an additional layer of awareness.Altitude too low too far from the airport caused two GPWS alerts. Distraction from the alerts caused a reduction in situational awareness leading to a possibly unstable approach.
Second reporter narrative
On approach into CRW; we were cleared direct to the STILT intersection; the final approach fix for Runway 23; for a visual approach to Runway 23. Weather was relatively clear with winds out of approximately 290 gusting around 24 kts. if I remember correctly. ATC cleared us to descend to 4000 ft. We then reported the field in sight and were cleared for the visual to Runway 23. On the advice of Page 10-X in the company pages; I kept the aircraft at 4000 ft. as we turned downwind until abeam the airfield. Once we were north of the airport; I dialed in a descent to the final approach fix of 2400 ft.; and began a gradual descent of around 1000 ft. per minute. At approximately 3000 ft.; the EGPWS alert went off; telling us to pull up for terrain. Upon hearing the alert; Autopilot was immediately disconnected; the aircraft descent rate was arrested; and the aircraft leveled off. The EGPWS caught us off guard; but since the aircraft was not in any danger; the approach was continued. The approach was continued hand flown. At around 2500 ft. as we approached the base to final turn; the EGPWS went off again; telling us to pull up. The descent was again stopped and the aircraft leveled off briefly until the alert went away and the approach was again continued since the aircraft was again deemed not to be in danger. As we approached the STILT final approach fix; the descent was resumed. In either a subconscious attempt to regain the glide slope or perhaps distraction from the wind gusts and being alerted to the terrain twice; the aircraft descended below the Final approach fix altitude to approximately 300 ft. below the 2400 final approach fix altitude. The Captain acting as pilot monitoring alerted me that I was about 300 to 400 ft. low; and the descent was corrected and the aircraft continued using the VASI visual reference to the right of the runway. The approach continued and the aircraft configured for landing visually. The 1000 foot RA call out went off a few times despite the aircraft remaining on the VASI glidepath. If I recall correctly the aircraft was fully configured by the final 1000 foot call. The approach was continued and the aircraft landed without incident.In hindsight; we should have executed a go around being so low at the FAF. However the approach was continued. It would have been safer to go around; clean the aircraft up; and attempt the approach again. Should this happen in the future I will be sure to go around.In the future; should I find myself low like that again at the final approach fix; I will execute a go around. If at any point during the approach I am unsure; unstable; or not where I plan to be; I will go around. It would also be smart to plan to intercept the localizer at an altitude slightly higher than the FAF altitude to allow a buffer. Also in the future when going to CRW specifically; I will wait slightly longer to begin my descent and do so at a slower rate.The root cause was distraction from receiving two different EGPWS alerts and fighting with the wind gusts.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.