EMB 145 flight crew reported they received a Ground Proximity Warning while conducting a go around possibly due to '...Go Around button application prior to thrust lever advancement.'
Synopsis
EMB 145 flight crew reported they received a Ground Proximity Warning while conducting a go around possibly due to '...Go Around button application prior to thrust lever advancement.'
Narrative
My First Officer (FO) was flying the ZZZ1-ZZZ leg. FO was cleared for the ILS XXR due to low level mist. As I am a high minimums Captain; our ILS minimums were 300 ft. The FO opted to fly the approach to minimums with the autopilot engaged. At minimums I called 'Go Missed' and the FO responded 'Check Thrust. Flaps 9' with positive application of Go Around Thrust. I reached for the flaps and selected Flaps 9. Shortly thereafter we were presented with the audible warning 'Too low. Flaps'. The FO immediately disconnected the autopilot and swiftly applied nose up pitch to initiate go around climb. After this point the go around was executed as per SOP and another approach was made for a successful landing.Due to the short duration of the event it's difficult to know the exact causes of our error. However; I believe the GPWS warning was a result of late TOGA button application. In the future; I will verify GA mode and command bar change prior to changing any flap settings as pilot monitoring. During our debrief; I stressed the importance of correct pitch change prior to thrust application. Especially in close proximity to the ground. Additionally; although the FO thoroughly briefed the go around procedure during the approach brief; we did not discuss his plan for autopilot usage on the approach. In the future; especially on low approaches; I will be sure to brief the threats involved with autopilot coupled go arounds and the importance of Go Around button application prior to thrust lever advancement. Lastly; I believe it's worth noting that this was the FOs first go around at minimums in a part 121 jet operation. I believe the high workload environment coupled with the FOs experience level led to the resulting error. In the future; I will discuss approach and go around experience in real IMC conditions during the approach brief to trap any potential confusion with the go around procedure. Notwithstanding the aforementioned errors; I believe the FOs reduction in automation level and ultimate recovery of aircraft state was timely; professional and safe. No time was wasted to react to the GPWS warning.
Second reporter narrative
I was pilot flying into ZZZ approach XXR. The weather was low visibility ceilings of 300 ft. My Captain was high minimums; so we would be right at the threshold of seeing the runway. I flew the approach with autopilot engaged and flaps 45. At minimums the Captain called for the missed approach; I hit TOGA buttons and advanced the thrust and called for flaps 9 as trained. I saw the flight director pitch up correctly but the command bars/autopilot did not follow the pitch up attitude right away. We heard an aural 'too low' warning at which point I disconnected autopilot and manually pitched the aircraft up. We continued the missed approach with standard call outs and Tower assigned instructions. We asked for another approach into ZZZ with the runway lights turned up to maximum intensity. I disconnected autopilot a couple hundred ft. above minimums on my second attempt and we had the lights in runway lights in sight and made a landing without incident. This was my first go around with autopilot engaged and it didn't react as quickly as expected. After briefing it on the ground the Captain thinks maybe my application of the TOGA buttons might have coincided with advancing the thrust levers. We did both see the flight director pitch up as expected. Although I briefed the approach I didn't touch on my plan for using autopilot until I had runway in sight and that I would continue with a missed with autopilot engaged. In the future I would brief my plan and also how I would immediately disengage the autopilot if it did something unexpected or was slow to react to the go around/missed approach.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.