Flight crew reported an air start cart supply hose was ingested by the starting engine while at the gate.
Synopsis
Flight crew reported an air start cart supply hose was ingested by the starting engine while at the gate.
Narrative
Our aircraft had MEL maintenance deferrals for inoperable APU and inoperable interphone communications to ground ramp personnel. I personally coordinated to use hand signals for a pneumatic ground cart engine start for both left engine 1 and right engine 2. Slippery contaminated ramp conditions warranted use of both engines for taxi to avoid asymmetric thrust complications. Cross bleed engine start requires asymmetric thrust also; so we could avoid this by starting both engines. After engine start; I signaled for disconnect of all ground equipment. At our scheduled block out time; I (and my FO (First Officer)) noticed a jostling of the aircraft that was commonly felt during nose wheel strut attachment to the tug vehicle. We eventually learned and believe that this jostling was actually FOD (a yellow green high pressure air cart hose) being ingested into our Left Engine 1.When ground ramp personnel were disconnecting ground equipment; I believe the high pressure air cart hose was not properly secured and; while ground ramp personnel were distracted handling and disconnecting other equipment; this hose was sucked into the idling Left Engine 1. This event was either not observed by ground personnel or not reported. One or more passengers apparently saw the hose ingestion; but did not bring this to flight attendant or pilot crew attention until after we heard compressor stalls; rejected takeoff; and were in the process of an investigatory engine run up. I shut down the left engine upon hearing about the hose and carefully taxied to our gate. Also note that we performed deicing and anti icing of the aircraft before our takeoff attempt and nothing unusual was observed or reported by deice personnel. Lastly; note that our icing condition procedures require engine vibration verification at 54 percent thrust before takeoff. When we did this procedure; the FOD had not yet caused any anomalies and engine instruments were all nominal. Only after attempting higher thrust setting did compressor stalls occur.I cannot speculate on whether the darkened predawn lighting prevented ground or deice personnel from seeing the hose and damaged left engine; but I am concerned that a partial or missing hose was not observed on the ground air cart. The ground engine start procedure recommends starting the right engine only; then cross bleed starting the Left Engine; but heeding this recommendation does not adequately address or mitigate the anomalies of slippery and contaminated ramp conditions. Perhaps a more detailed procedure could mitigate FOD concerns during a ground cart pneumatic start of the left engine.
Second reporter narrative
Captain and First Officer discussed deferred items on the ride from the hotel to the airport. Items discussed included deferred APU; deferred flight deck to ramp comms. Ground Crew had a pneumatic ground cart start hooked up. Ground crew also had a heat cart for cabin heat. While setting up the aircraft the Captain and forward Flight Attendant both observed a ramp member throwing bags down the stairs. The Captain went to the jet bridge and discussed what he observed with the ground crew member. I did not observe this conversation. While briefing the flight/day it was determined we would start both engines due to a slippery and contaminated (snow and ice) ramp. Captain went to the ramp and discussed hand signals and plan of action with ground crew. I did not observe this conversation. We configured the aircraft for pneumatic cart start using the QRH ENGINE GROUND PNEUMATIC START. Using hand signals through the process; we were cleared to started engines. After starting we reconfigured the aircraft back to the normal (after start) configuration.We felt a shutter before push back. It was discussed and suspected to be the tow bar/tug on the nose gear. We pushed back shortly thereafter. Taxied to deice. Took type 1 and 4. Taxied to runway. Lined up on Runway XXL; ran engines through 40% N1; ops checked good; normal operating range. Ran engines to 54% N1 per SOPM (COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS | ENGINE RUN-UP; when icing conditions exist). Ops check good; normal operating range; vibration check good. Highest vibration indication was 0.7 momentarily; falling to 0.6. Advanced throttles. Started roll. Near (estimated) 70% N1 we observed multiple compressor stalls. Discontinued takeoff (RTO). The discontinue was performed before pilot flying's (PF's) check thrust call. I believe the discontinue was performed before auto-throttles engaging. Exited the runway. Requested area for run-up. No further compressor stalls observed. Shortly thereafter we received a call from one of the Flight Attendants (forward I believe). Passenger reported to the FA they saw a hose ingested into the engine. We then shutdown the effected engine. Taxied to the gate and observed the ramp littered with FOD (shredded heat cart hose and possibly pieces of the coupler). Coordinated with ops and was assigned a new gate. We began the process of deplaning passengers. Once at the gate I performed an external inspection and observed the left or number one engine had damage and evidence of FOD ingestion. Shortly thereafter a ZZZ Airport employee brought a Ziploc bag with pieces of FOD that appeared to be hose from the heat cart.Heat cart air hose not properly secured. Ground crew cleared aircraft to start without ensuring the area clear. Without the ability to visually inspect the area around the engine intake with 100% certainty we rely on ground crew to inspect the area and confirm it is clear. I believe that this mistake could have been mitigated with ground crew being more attentive. I've never done the job on the ramp; so I cannot speak to the training or the culture around ZZZ's crew. However; I have to believe that training covers the importance of the area directly around the engine being clear of debris; FOD and equipment.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.