ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH; solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down; and diverted to make a precautionary landing.
Synopsis
ERJ 170/175 Flight Crew reported Engine #2 vibrations in flight. The Flight Crew ran the checklist and QRH; solving the vibration problem. Engine #2 then failed. The Flight Crew performed an in flight shut down; and diverted to make a precautionary landing.
Narrative
Prior to departure; I discovered chips in the #13 and #15 N1 Fan Blade. This was written up following standard protocol. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and completed their procedures in order to return the aircraft to service. The flight continued as planned. In cruise an abnormal vibration was observed in the #2 Engine. This vibration was only an indication on the EICAS screen and was going from green to occasional yellow indication; but did not produce an EICAS Message/Caution/Warning. An exchange of flight controls occurred and the QRH procedure was followed for High Vibrations in the Engine. A few minutes after the QRH procedure was completed for Engine Vibration; a thud was heard from the right side of the airplane and N1 began decreasing. Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) then appeared to be increasing rapidly and was observed giving a Red indication. While I was watching the ITT rise; the Captain went right to securing the Engine; rather than running the QRC. We began a descent to a lower altitude; and controls were transferred over to the First Officer (FO). Following that; the Captain ran the QRH one engine inoperative approach and landing. In doing so; the QRC was missed for suspected engine damage. The QRH procedure was completed for single engine approach and landing. A diversion to ZZZ1 was decided and a landing was accomplished at the diversion airport without issue. Improper use of checklist. Speaking up when things appear to be done improperly is of upmost importance. Keep in mind standard procedure/protocol in emergencies. In post flight debriefing; it was decided that we actually should have suspected engine damage; rather than simply an engine failure. If something isn't completed in the proper order; I need to speak up. I should have said something and went back into querying about doing the QRC for suspected damage in flight
Second reporter narrative
While preparing for departure the First Officer (FO) noticed a few nicks on Engine 2 N1 blades. I entered a discrepancy in the Maintenance log; ZZZ line Maintenance repaired the aircraft and returned it to service. While enroute we got an abnormal vibration on Engine 2. I turned the flight controls over to the FO and ran QRH ENGINE ABNORMAL VIBRATION. This fixed the problem. I took the controls back and we continued the cruise uneventfully for about 15 minutes. After that time Engine 2 made a popping noise; N1 spooled down; and an amber FAIL icon displayed over the Engine 2 N1 gauge. I again turned the controls over to the FO. Since there was rotation in both N1 and N2; I incorrectly thought that there was no engine damage and consequentially did not run the ENGINE FIRE; SEVERE DAMAGE; OR SEPARATION QRC. I was instead looking for the ENGINE 2 FAIL QRH. As I was doing this; I noticed the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) rising rapidly to the Red Line; and went directly to securing the engine. I did this without running the QRH because of the time pressure that the rapidly rising ITT created.After securing the engine we [requested priority handling] and diverted to ZZZ1. During the descent I ran the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE APPROACH AND LANDING QRH. We asked for Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) to be available on landing to ensure the aircraft was safe to taxi to the gate. We landed uneventfully. After CFR verified the aircraft was safe to taxi; we proceeded to the gate and deplaned. There were no passenger injuries; and I did not observe any video being recorded. In hindsight; my assessment of severe engine damage was incorrect. Since I did not know why the engine shut down; I should have considered it severely damaged and run the ENGINE FIRE; SEVERE DAMAGE; SEPARATION QRC. Additionally; I allowed the rapidly rising ITT influence my decision making towards turning the engine off rapidly to avoid an exceedance when I should have slowed down; allowed the exceedance and run the QRC. This self-imposed time pressure caused me to secure the engine without verification. Running the QRC gets one into the normal engine failure procedures and cadence.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.