EMB-145 Captain reported stiffness in the Rudder Pedals during preflight. After maintenance and another check after push back; the flight took off. After takeoff; Cabin Pressure was uncontrollable with loud noise from the forward doors. The flight crew requested vectors and performed an air turn back to land at departure airport.

Narrative

Plane swap upon arriving in ZZZ1 for the ZZZ/ZZZ2 crossover to end our 4-day trip. Show up at the plane and it has 3 major MELs applied (no Autopilot; Inoperative Gust Lock; Thrust Reverser 1 INOP along with no RVSM or CAT2 capability). We briefed the effects of the MELs on the flight using the MEL manual and the substantially increased workload that would be required. 2 MELs required visual check of full elevator and thrust lever actuation prior to each flight. Had ADS-B failure at the gate that Maintenance worked thru upon arrival so we conducted another setup check as CBs had been pulled. All was good and we finished the rest of the loading; weight and balance entries and continued on thru push; takeoff and descent. Nothing out of the ordinary besides the aforementioned MELs. Descent and approach went fairly normally until passing thru around 2;200 ft. MSL. At that point the First Officer (FO) asked me if I was on the rudders to which I replied no. He mentioned they felt stiff and there was very little movement even after applying much pressure. The wind was light and nearly down the runway; we still had positive control so we elected to land. Only had one reverser so we applied heavier brake pressure and rolled out a little longer than usual. I took control of the bottoms and left him the tops until clear of the runway where I had him conduct the after landing check. No Gust Lock meant he still had yoke control while I taxied to the gate. I noticed the rudder pedals would turn when applying tiller for turns. Still had positive control so we proceeded to the gate. Decided to shut down the aircraft and restart as sometimes this will clear abnormalities. Once re powered; we had an issue with the pressurization panel where it displayed an A005 message and I couldn't select a landing field elevation. Had to pull/reset some CBs for this one as well under Maintenance Control's guidance. The panel regained function and the setup process proceeded normally afterwards. I verified steering was disengaged and also had the rampers disconnect the tow bar so I could turn on the hydraulic pumps and feel out the rudders. They felt normal again so I turned them off and we continued. We got our PAX/bag numbers in ACARS. All was good so we closed up and got pushed out. Started both engines and did the dual engine after start check. Rudders again felt normal. Got taxi clearance to follow Airline Y out to XXR and had full control authority over the rudders still. Cleared for takeoff which went well. Light wind down the runway; rudders fine. On climb out; can't remember exactly the altitude; maybe around 2;000 ft. MSL; FO remarked the pressurization looked abnormal. Cabin Altitude was already slowly climbing while our delta p was fairly normal. We were climbing at 200 KIAS until clear of the airspace then I started accelerating while climbing at a much lower VS. We climbed up to our cleared altitude of 5;000 ft. MSL at around 1;500 FPM (speeding up to 240 KIAS) and got cleared further to 10;000 ft. At approximately 6;000 ft. MSL; I noted a motor-like sound along with a yoke vibration and asked the FO if he could here/feel them. He stated he could. My best description of the yoke vibration would be similar to a handheld massager on a low setting. High frequency; small movements. The FO at some point around here called the FA to inquire about the cabin and any unusual noises or events. She stated there was a substantial amount of air leakage from both doors and a lot of noise. She even stated daylight was visible. He informed her to remain seated and buckled. I was initially considering a return to field around this point. Cabin Altitude was still climbing moderately faster than normal. I further slowed the climb rate to 1;000 FPM and remarked to the FO that we continue slowly climbing to see what the pressurization was going to do. Nearing 10;000 ft. we were cleared up to 15;000 ft. Still keeping a close watch on cabin altitude and delta p; we climbed further. Both rates were higher than normal; the Cabin Altitude was off more than the delta p. To my recollection; the cabin altitude never got above 4000-4;500 ft. I still was trying to gather more data to confirm or deny a return to field. We were still on our departure clearance heading and climbing to altitude. Not long after; FMS 1 went completely blank and was soon followed by a Pack 2 Overheat EICAS Message. At this point I stated we would return to the field and asked the FO to request a descent back to 10;000 ft. The FO informed Departure we would be returning; requested the lower altitude and immediately began preparing for the return. He got in the messages to ATC; dispatch; the FA (via NTSB-R) and finally the PAX. Cruise and descent checks were conducted somewhere around here as well. We got vectors to return to the field and the FO started loading the ILS XXR approach and getting runway numbers for our landing. We noted the takeoff weight on the departure brief and again upon the initial decision to return. At first call; I decided to return and prep for an immediate landing since I wasn't sure if more would go wrong. We were approximately 1;900 pounds too heavy for landing at this point. I initially deployed the speed brakes to slow down and also to burn more gas. Leveled at 10;000 ft. for a minute or two then I requested 7;000 ft. We slowed to 210 kts. and selected flaps 9 still with the brakes out. I had the FO run the overweight landing checklist in preparation for the landing. I felt we had positive control of the aircraft; the Cabin Altitude was acceptable and we still had all other screens functioning so I decided to continue burning fuel to get under max landing weight. FO stated ACARS was giving bad landing data so we reverted to the 145XR data cards for speeds at 45;000 pounds as we were still heavy. Runway distance required based on overweight landing was sufficient for XXR. I requested 5;000 ft. MSL at this point to aid in the Cabin Altitude and to stay well clear of all ground obstacles. We dropped the landing gear while stowing the speed brakes and still at flaps 9. We spent about 15 minutes burning gas in this configuration while being vectored by approach. Approximately 300 pounds over maximum weight I asked the FO to inform Tower we were ready to proceed inbound. We got vectors to final and cleared for the approach. Approach check was run also. We followed SOP for the ILS approach and were configured and stable on the approach. Reaching roughly 2;400 ft. MSL; I noticed the rudders became stiff (just as they had for the FO previously) and they required an excessive amount of force just for an inch or two of travel. I relaxed the rudder pressure mostly at this time. Again; the wind was pretty much straight down the runway and very light so we still had good directional control. I elected to continue to landing which went otherwise well. I previously briefed the FO that I'd stay slightly below the glide and still try to land like we were overweight. Once again; we were down Reverser 1 so brake pressure was heavier than normal and I elected to leave the Reverser 2 out longer. Rudders again actuated during tiller operation. Cabin Altitude upon landing jumped up to approximately 1;100 ft. MSL. During taxi back; the FO noted that the yaw damper was engaged which was odd because neither of us had selected it and the Autopilot was never engaged on any of our 2 legs. We had missed that with everything going on so I'm not sure when that activated. It was deselected and taxi in and parking proceeded as before. We had probably 7 or so people comment while deplaning and those were all positive. The ones I remember were were in this vein; thanks for getting us back here safe; thanks for making good decisions; appreciate you not forcing anything. While I know the passengers were frustrated; we didn't hear any negative feedback from them. I immediately called Dispatch and was passed along to the Duty Manager(I believe) who conferenced me in to a call with several Company Representatives. I related what all transpired to the best of my knowledge then was passed to Maintenance when they were satisfied. I spent the next couple hours on the phone with Maintenance trying to describe all this and properly enter it all into the logbooks. To rewind a bit; while being vectored I requested that ZZZ Maintenance be notified so there wouldn't be so much of a delay upon landing. He did have me run the packs for a bit to test of few things while I was on with Maintenance. He told me to kill the packs after a few minutes. After finishing with Maintenance; I think roughly 3-3.5 hours after the event; I called the Safety Rep back. I spent the next hour plus on the phone with him relating this experience as well. It was very apparent the plane wouldn't be able to go out that day after speaking with Maintenance; Dispatch and Scheduling. With this in mind; I tried to get the Crew to coordinate for a room and ride so they wouldn't have to wait for me. That process took quite a while and I left the aircraft with my Crew. Contract Maintenance was on board and on a call with Company Maintenance so I left it in his hands.We had semi-jokingly discussed refusing the plane upon seeing all the MELs and other stickers in the plane. End of a 4-day when you're more depleted than the first day was a tough pill in this scenario. It was a high workload due to the MELs and we briefed it. I wrongly assumed nothing else would go wrong on these 2 legs. Honoring the old adage about hindsight; I should have refused the plane. It was at a hub where Maintenance potentially could have been utilized to clear some of those items. I didn't ask clarifying questions such as why it wasn't worked on in ZZZ1 or if it was slated for work in ZZZ2. I should have. Priority handling was not declared; maybe I should have. I elected not to have crash; fire and rescue meet us. Maybe I should have. I felt we could still safely fly; land and taxi the aircraft so I deferred on those. Perhaps MELs should have a heavier look so that so many compounding/aggravating MELs aren't present on a single plane like this. I feel this could be a great candidate for our new sessions in future.