MDT ON VECTOR FOR VISUAL APCH GOT TCASII RA AND RESPONDED WITH CLB FROM ASSIGNED ALT. ATC UPSET.

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APCHING THE WHITE PLAINS AREA OVER THE SPARTA VOR; TURNING TO THE BREZY INTXN ALONG VICTOR 39; 2 TERRAIN WARNINGS WERE GIVEN BY THE GND PROX WARNING SYS AT OUR ASSIGNED ALT OF 3000 FT MSL; FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER TERRAIN WARNING XING THE W BANK OF THE HUDSON RIVER. AFTER BREZY; ATC ASSIGNED US A HDG OF 090 DEGS AND AN ALTIMETER OF 30.26. THE FO FOUND THE ALTIMETER SETTING TOO LOW SINCE THE ATIS AND PREVIOUS SETTINGS WERE HIGHER. (HPN ATIS: BETTER THAN 5000 AND 5; TEMP 20; DEWPOINT 01; WINDS 320 AT 12 GUSTING 22; ALTIMETER 30.65; VISUAL 34; NOTAMS: TAXIWAY F CLOSED; MEN AND EQUIP ADJACENT OF THE TERMINAL.) WE HEARD THAT THE CTLR WAS TENSE AND HAD PROBLEMS WITH SEVERAL ACFT TO LINE THEM UP ON THE R DOWNWIND. NORMALLY WE CROSS THE HUDSON OVER THE BRIDGE FOR A L BASE ENTRY. ATC ADVISED ALL ACFT IN FRONT OF US TO ENTER R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 34; CONTACT TWR ON DOWNWIND. XING THE HUDSON RIVER THE TCASII GAVE US 2 TA'S ON TFC; 1 AT 11 O'CLOCK; 700 FT BELOW US AND ANOTHER AT 2 O'CLOCK; 1200 FT BELOW US; BOTH XING OUR FLT PATH. WE ADVISED ATC OF OUR TCASII TFC; WHO ADVISED US HE HAD NO TFC AND THEY PROBABLY HAD NO TRANSPONDER ON. ON THE 090 DEG HDG ATC ASKED US IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT WHICH WE CONFIRMED. ATC ASSIGNED US A HDG OF 110 DEGS. ON THIS HDG ATC ASKED US AGAIN IF WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. WE ADVISED HIM WE DID. HE CLRED US FOR THE R DOWNWIND FOLLOWED BY CROSS THE SHORELINE E AND RETURN IN; CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 34. AT THAT TIME WE HAD AN RA OF 'CLB; CLB NOW.' I PULLED THE ACFT UP TO THE GREEN BAR ON THE TCASII AND APPLIED FULL PWR. I ALLOWED THE CLB WHEN THE TCASII ADVISED US 'MONITOR VERT SPD.' WE PASSED 3500 FT AT THE TOP OF THE CLB WHEN I SETTLE THE ACFT SLOWLY BACK TO 3000 FT. NEITHER THE FO NOR MYSELF EVER SAW THE OTHER ACFT. APPARENTLY DURING THIS TIME THE FO HAD SWITCHED OVER TO TWR AS MOST ACFT IN FRONT OF US WERE INSTRUCTED. TWR CLRED US TO LAND. WE FOUND IT STRANGE THAT WE ENTER THE ATA; CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND INSTRUCTED TO LEAVE THE ATA AGAIN ALL THEWAY TO 6 MI OUT AND RETURN TO LAND. WHERE THE OTHER ACFT CAME FROM WE DO NOT KNOW. IF HE TOOK OFF FROM HPN IS UNKNOWN OR IF HE APPLIED THE NOISE ABATEMENT PROC. WHEN XING THE SHORELINE TWR ADVISED US TO SWITCH BACK TO APCH SINCE WE WERE NOT TOLD TO SWITCH TO TWR. WE SWITCHED BACK AND ATC ASKED WHY WE SWITCHED AND THE CLB FOR TFC; ALTHOUGH WE HAD ADVISED THE TWR OF THE RA. ATC WANTED TO KNOW IF WE HAD SEEN THE TFC. WE ADVISED HIM NO WE DID NOT AND HE ASKED US IF WE COULD CALL HIM ON THE LANDLINE AND WANTED TO GIVE US A TELEPHONE NUMBER. I ADVISED THE FO TO HAVE THEM GIVE IT TO THE TWR SINCE WE GOT TOO BUSY WITH THE FINAL APCH AND CHKLISTS. HE ADVISED HE WOULD AND CONTACT TWR. TWR CLRED US AGAIN FOR LNDG WHICH WENT UNEVENTFULLY. GND CTL GAVE US THE TELEPHONE NUMBER AND WHEN WE WERE CLR OF THE RWY WAITING FOR A PARKING SPOT ON THE RAMP; I CALLED AND TALKED TO A CTLR; NOT THE ONE WHO HANDLED US. HE WAS CONCERNED WHY WE PULLED UP AND IF IT WAS A VISUAL. I ADVISED HIM THAT WE HAD AN RA WITH NO SIGHTING OF THE TFC. THE RA HAD NO PREVIOUS TA NOR ANY OTHER WARNING. THEN HE ASKED WHY WE SWITCHED OVER. I TOLD HIM THAT WE FELT THAT THAT WAS WHAT HE WANTED US TO DO ON DOWNWIND SINCE EVERY ACFT HAD BEEN TOLD TO DO THAT. WE THOUGHT THAT HE TOLD US THE SAME. I ADVISED HIM THAT THE SWITCH OVER WAS MADE DURING THE RA. FREQUENTLY WE HAVE TERRAIN WARNING AND TA'S IN THE WHITE PLAINS AREA AFTER XING THE SPARTA VOR. THE AREA IS OVER SATURATED WITH VFR ACFT UNDER FLYING THE TCA OF NY. THE APCH PROCS CHANGE EVERY SO OFTEN WITH PROCS TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE WE ARE USED TO OR THE ONES PUBLISHED AS NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS OR DEP PROCS; BUT IT SEEMS ONLY THE AIRLINE TFC IN AND OUT OF WHITE PLAINS HAS TO COMPLY WITH THESE PROCS. I PERSONALLY FEEL THAT THE WHITE PLAINS AREA IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN DCA. AT LEAST DCA MAINTAINS THE SAME PROCS AND ARR/DEP PATHS AT ALL TIMES. SECOND I FEEL THAT THE 3000 FT MSL IS TOO LOW AFTER SPARTA VOR. WITH THE TERRAIN WARNING GOING ON A LOT OF ATTN IS GETTINGDRAWN BACK INTO THE COCKPIT WHICH WITH ALL THE TFC SHOULD BE OUTSIDE. EVEN 3500 FT WOULD BE BETTER. AT LEAST WE WOULD BE IN THE TCA; HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH TERRAIN WARNINGS OR THE TFC UNDER FLYING THE TCA.