ERJ-170 flight crew reported receiving a master caution and EICAS message for HYD 2 LO PRESS. Rather than break off the approach to run multiple checklists in an area with thunderstorms the Captain elected to continue the approach and land.
Synopsis
ERJ-170 flight crew reported receiving a master caution and EICAS message for HYD 2 LO PRESS. Rather than break off the approach to run multiple checklists in an area with thunderstorms the Captain elected to continue the approach and land.
Narrative
At approximately 2;000 feet AGL on final to runway XXL in ZZZ; the master caution chimed and the EICAS indicated HYD 2 LO PRESS. Seconds later; the EICAS indicated HYD 2 LO QTY along with the associated messages. The aircraft was fully configured with flaps set at 5 and the gear already down and locked. A quick look at the hydraulic synoptic page confirmed system #2 quantity indicated zero. Realizing the QRH called for a lengthy checklist procedure and knowing the loss of inboard brakes; nose wheel steering; engine 2 thrust reverser; amongst other components; coupled with thunderstorms in the area; I was not enthusiastic about breaking off the landing only to run multiple checklists. I made the judgement call to land seeing as we were within 1;000 feet AGL at this point. I was aware of longer landing distance and what the QRH procedures entailed. My FO did an excellent job of quickly running through the appropriate checklists even though I chose not to 'run' the checklists formally. I knew the runway was plenty long enough (9;000 feet) and I landed the jet and managed to stop with plenty of runway left. In fact; I was able to exit the runway at the high speed taxiway. We were able to cross XXC on Taxiway 1; and I taxied up Taxiway 2 and; as luck would have it; only needed a 'half left' turn to get into [the gate]. As a result; I felt comfortable using differential braking and differential minimum thrust to get the jet to the gate; despite the loss of nose wheel steering. In essence; the consequence of going around; not being unable to have a normal gear retraction; weather in the area; being familiar with the loss of hydraulics; my FO (First Officer) ensuring a quick glance to run and review the actual QRH; already being configured; etc.;--all led me to make the call to land the jet. We simply did not have the luxury; in my opinion; of notifying the tower; the flight attendants; recalculating flaps full landing speeds; etc. Getting on the ground seemed the right call. It appeared on the post flight inspection that some brake line on the left main gear had given way though we were unable to know for sure if that was what did the trick. I notified maintenance control after deplaning without further issues. The jet was done for the night and maintenance control advised me that they would address the issue overnight.
Second reporter narrative
About 500 ft. on short final to ZZZ. HYD 2 Low Pressure EICAS. Identified; canceled; ran QRH. We discussed briefly not likely to have nose wheel steering or half the brakes. Runway available exceeded worse case. Landed. Captain taxied to gate using pedals and differential power.
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.