A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS alert while on approach.
Synopsis
A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS alert while on approach.
Narrative
While being vectored on the left downwind Runway XX ZZZ we called the field insight and we're cleared for the visual. I set the altitude to 1600 ft. planning to join final just outside ZZZZZ. The visibility was being reported 10 SM and the cloud layer at maybe 10000 ft. I had briefed the visual; backed up with the ILS. I was delaying the base turn; kind of self vectoring; with the plan to capture the LOC before the GS. I think I had initiated the base turn and was thinking that I was uncomfortable with the descent rate. I didn't want to divert my attention away from the level off (i.e. by reaching up/looking up to manage the Flight Control Unit (FCU) as we were rapidly approaching 1600 ft.; I disconnected the Autopilot to manually fly the level off. In these moments we got the EGPWS Caution/Warnings. The EGPWS recovery actions & callouts did not come from my lips. We did initiate a climb to about 2500 ft.; the warning stopped. The Captain said that we were within about 800 ft. to the ground.In truth I really wasn't familiar with ZZZ; and at night. The conditions were VMC & beautiful which played its part in luring me away from a more thorough briefing of the chart (i.e. MSA; potential terrain & obstacles.) We were descending to the previously assigned altitude; when we were cleared for the visual approach. I prematurely set and continued descending to 1600 ft.Always thoroughly brief the charts even in VMC and especially at night. Maybe tell the controller something like; 'I'm really not that familiar with this area. Could we get vectors to join final outside (ZZZZZ)'; then you won't be spending as much attention 'looking over your shoulder' to keep the field in sight amongst all the city lights. I also feel I should spend more personal time studying and practicing actions and callouts for maneuvers outside of my annual Recurrent Training.
Second reporter narrative
Conditions were nighttime VMC with a full moon and partly cloudy skies; the First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying (PF); and I was the pilot monitoring (PM). The FO briefed the approach approximately 80 miles prior to top of descent as a visual backed up by the ILS. He used the briefing guide and covered every step. We were at approximately 3000 ft. MSL being vectored on downwind to Runway XX. The Approach Controller advised us the airport was at 9 o'clock and 5 miles. I confirmed with the FO that he saw the field; we discussed the location of the rotating beacon and the ramp lighting; and the red airport lighting that was visible. I then advised Approach Control that we had the field in sight. We were cleared the visual approach to Runway XX and instructed to contact the Tower. I had to look at the Jeppesen app for the Tower frequency; then tuned the radio; and then advised Tower we were on a left downwind for a visual approach to Runway XX. The FO requested that I extend the FMS course off of ZZZZZ (FAF); which we confirmed and was executed. My attention was divided from inside the aircraft doing PM duties to outside the aircraft watching the runway because it was on my side of the aircraft. After extending off the FAF; I was looking out the left side of the aircraft and told the FO he should start his turn to base; and he started a turn. At some point; the FO had reached up and dialed the FAF altitude; 1600 ft.; into the Flight Management Panel (FMP) and pulled the knob for an open descent. I did not confirm the FMP altitude change and did not realize he had done it. I heard the radio altimeter auto callout of 'one-thousand' then the EGPWS triggered a 'caution terrain' verbal cue; and the FO didn't immediately respond verbally or physically. I told him he needed to level off or climb to stop the caution; and he needed to do that immediately. Approximately 2 seconds later we received a 'pull up' warning from the GPWS. The FO had disconnected the Autopilot; but still didn't respond aggressively enough so I pulled back on my stick to point the nose of the aircraft up and start a climb. The aircraft climbed above 2500 ft. and the caution/warning stopped. At that point the Flight Director had reverted to a basic mode of climb at 1600 ft. per minute because we were above the altitude in the FMP; however the FO leveled off at approximately 2500 ft. MSL and was not following Flight Director commands. Since there is no published missed approach procedure for a visual approach; I felt staying within the expected visual approach pattern and altitude was the safest course of action; and we were now stable at a safe pattern altitude on a base leg. We were about 6 miles from the runway; well into our base turn; but still offset from the runway about 30 degrees; with the FO heading the aircraft at the runway threshold rather than on an intercept angle. I asked him if he still saw the runway while pointing it out; and he responded 'yes.' I advised him he needed to turn right to intercept a normal final approach course above 1000 ft. AFL. The FO changed his heading to an appropriate base leg heading. Now that we were close in to the field; I reached up and selected 2000 ft. in the altitude window and advised him I was pulling the altitude knob for an open descent so the aircraft could stabilize at an appropriate altitude for the base leg. At some point the FO had reached up and turned the Autopilot back on; but he didn't verbalize it so I don't know exactly when. After the aircraft stabilized at 2000 ft. on base leg; I had to prompt him if he was ready for the gear and flaps; and he then followed SOPs to configure and call for the before landing checklist. The FO made an appropriate heading correction to intercept the final approach course and turned the Autopilot back off. He was currently on the correct 300 ft. per 1 mile glide path and the localizer had not captured yet. He was going to be high at the intercept point if he didn't descend; so I told him I was selecting a VVI of 700 down to keep him on G/S. He intercepted final approach course on glideslope; and at 1000 ft. AFL he was fully configured and stable; so I allowed him to continue. After landing we taxied to the gate and ran all the normal flows and checklists. After the shutdown checklist was complete; I stated 'Let's talk about the approach.' He asked; 'Was the GPWS warning caused by my descent rate?' I said 'No; it was because you were too close to the ground.' I advised him the GPWS 'warning' was because he ignored the 'caution terrain' and he was about 800 ft. above the ground at the lowest point; and that was scary that we could get in that position. I stated we should not have descended out of our last assigned altitude until on a 3-to-1 glide path. During our conversation; I realized he had little awareness of the terrain to the southeast of the field. I explained the terrain rose rapidly there; and we were 5 miles south of the airport in a descent to 1600 MSL; with terrain ranging from 1565 to 2103 ft. in that area; including some towers. I referenced the engine out procedure for Runway XY and explained we were flying through that same corridor. He didn't seem to understand the 300 ft. per mile guideline as a minimum altitude during an approach. He appeared to be under the impression that we could just fly a 1000 ft. box traffic pattern on an extended downwind and that would keep us clear of terrain. During his approach brief he stated 'there are no 10-7 page restrictions for our runway.' Before his brief I had reviewed the 10-7 special engine out procedure for Runway XY for general terrain awareness; but I didn't question his comment or expand upon it during the brief because I didn't know we would be vectored over it. I wish I had included that in my comments just in case. I openly admit that I had expectation bias that he was very experienced because of his seniority; and the fact that he appeared to be a 50+ year old pilot with 15+ year's experience flying. At the time of the GPWS event; I could see the ground and see the runway; and I evaluated the situation that after climbing to clear the conflict; we had time to stabilize and reconsider if it was safe to continue; so we continued without assistance from ATC. However; in hindsight; at the first 'caution; terrain' I should have said 'terrain; climb now; TOGA' to force him back into SOPs; if he didn't respond immediately then I should have said 'my aircraft' and kept it until he was back in the green section of the TEM (Threat and Error Management) model. FO violation of SOP for both pilots confirming altitude in FMP when the FO set a lower altitude but didn't ask me to confirm (and I was unaware). FO started descent when already below 3-to-1 glide path ratio. Lack of visual approach guidance in the Jeppesen Company pages when there is terrain in the area. Lack of standard Company 'escape' phraseology for executing the GPWS procedure. Changes to callouts in multiple other parts of SOP just adds confusion; and the FO stated that was one of his threats during his departure briefing.Unlike windshear; there is no concise standard callout the PM can use to tell the PF to perform the GPWS actions; and we need a standard trigger callout--'escape' would work fine and keep it simple. If the FO had followed FOM guidance to not descend below a 3-to-1 glide ratio; I don't think we would have got a GPWS warning; however there is not enough information published in the Jeppesen pages to make certain. The ZZZ charts are not to scale; so there is no precise way to know where the terrain is; and we were vectored below the MSA and navigating with visual reference to the ground at night. The category D circling minimums are 1180 ft. MSL for all runways; so the visual pattern needs to be tight to stay away from the terrain; but there isn't any information stating that. Company should add visual pattern guidance for all airports that have a10-7 engine out page for any runway; similar to the guidance for visual approaches at ZZZ1. An alternative to drawing a visual pattern diagram would be a 10-7 page comment that states 'Visual approach pattern must remain within X miles of the runway and above XXXX ft. MSL until established on a 3-to-1 final approach glidepath.' I believe night visual approaches should be prohibited at all fields with terrain/engine-out procedures until further guidance is published.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.