B767 flight crew reported an unstable approach coupled with an EGWPS terrain warning and non-adherence to SOP's contributed to the crew descending below minimums on an RNAV approach in poor weather.
Synopsis
B767 flight crew reported an unstable approach coupled with an EGWPS terrain warning and non-adherence to SOP's contributed to the crew descending below minimums on an RNAV approach in poor weather.
Narrative
The flight was planned into ZZZ with weather conditions deteriorating throughout the flight. We were aware of the 5G NOTAM driving an RNAV approach as opposed to the ILS and briefed our contingency plans of a divert to ZZZ1; weather required for the approaches; and we involved our dispatcher well prior to TOD. We began the approach but updated weather indicated the airport was below minimums; so we coordinated to hold. While in holding; Company advised that another flight landed successfully; and with updated weather we had the visibility required to begin the approach. ATC amended our holding altitude from 5;000 feet to 7;000 feet but we forgot to put our new cruise altitude in the FMC like we did before attempting the first approach. We received vectors to intercept the final approach course and commenced the approach but didn't recognize our lack of vertical guidance due to not entering a new cruise altitude. The aircraft appeared to be flying the approach in LNAV/VNAV passing the final approach point; but began a descent rate approaching 1;500 fpm that wasn't recognized. The Relief Pilot and Pilot Flying (PF) began looking for approach lights as we approached minimums and said they had the approach lights in sight and so we continued the approach; still descending faster than planned. All of us were looking for the runway environment. At about the same time the PF and Relief Pilot saw 4 reds on the PAPI we received an EGPWS terrain warning. I incorrectly called for a Go Around instead of CFIT Recovery; and during the maneuver the pitch attitude became excessive and we received a low airspeed caution as it decreased to around 105 knots. We completed the maneuver; sorted through the distraction of low fuel cautions due to our 10;000 lbs. of fuel sloshing during the go around; and diverted to ZZZ1.In hindsight; the error chain began when we were given holding instructions that included a climb from 5;000 feet to the holding altitude of 7;000 feet. The PF selected FLCH for the climb but neither the PF nor I updated the cruise page; possibly because a climb into holding in the terminal area is not a normal occurrence. We had ample time to update the FMC but both crew and Relief Pilot were trying to build SA on if the weather was improving; if another airplane successfully landed; how much fuel we had to hold; etc. Had I taken the time to update the FMC altitude after building the hold; we would have had vertical guidance. Once we left the hold I should have looked for the VNAV path indicator in addition to energy state and configuration. Once we passed the Final Approach Point I focused more on our height above minimums and scanning the runway environment instead of backing up the PF with flight path monitoring. The end result was flight path management degraded to the point of an EGPWS warning.
Second reporter narrative
Following holding; Crew flew RNAV into ZZZ. The crew made common errors on the approach and ultimately descended inappropriately below the MDA using faulty visual cues. Immediately following the Captain stating they had visual cues and was proceeding visually; I noticed four RED PAPI lights and alerted the crew. The subsequent Go-Around resulted in a 'Caution Terrain' and then 'Whoop-Whoop; PULL-UP' I suspect the descent had inadvertently been continued during the go-around; which caused the GPWS Caution/Warning. Then; the Crew misapplied established procedures on the subsequent go around; which resulted in excessively slow airspeed. I had to Intervene during both the RNAV approach and subsequent Go-Around to ensure safety.Crew should have realized there was not a proper vertical path and either modified descent rate or discontinued the approach. Also; crew should have had the Situational Awareness to know that they were still several miles from approximate VDP; and use that information when deciding to proceed below the MDA. During the Go-Around; the First Officer (FO) became task saturated with non-critical items (FMS; ATC Communication; etc;) and failed to monitor Flight Path adequately and perform Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties correctly. This greatly affected the Safety of Flight during the Go-Around.
More incidents for this aircraft family →
Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.