B737 Captain reported multiple #1 Engine Oil Filter Bypass lights Illuminated in flight. The flight crew performed an inflight shut down of the #1 Engine and continued to landing.
Synopsis
B737 Captain reported multiple #1 Engine Oil Filter Bypass lights Illuminated in flight. The flight crew performed an inflight shut down of the #1 Engine and continued to landing.
Narrative
Aircraft X experienced multiple No. 1 Engine Oil Bypass Light illuminations; and concluded with an In-Flight Shut Down; [requesting priority handling]; and landing in ZZZ (planned destination) with flaps 15; followed by taxiing to the gate. This flight; its details; and all the events in managing the situation; was the subject of another report.One specific subject that needs highlighting; and its own report; was the decision not to prep for an evacuation; and exactly what 'Prepping for an Evacuation' meant for us as the Flight Crew; versus what it meant to the Purser and other Flight Attendants.During the flight in question; I gave three different briefings - the first after we had to operate Engine No. 1 at reduced power (so the flight attendants had an awareness an abnormality was occurring; but we were still continuing to ZZZ as planned); the second after the abnormality started trending worse (so it was increasingly possible we might divert with little notice or even [request priority handling]); and the third after the In-Flight Shut Down; which occurred during descent on the arrival into ZZZ.During this third briefing; I made the decision; and briefed the Purser; that they do not need to prepare the cabin for an evacuation. A single-engine flaps 15 landing was planned; and with approximately 7;200 ft. of calculated landing distance needed on a 12;000 ft. runway; it seemed like the appropriate decision. In reflecting upon FOM guidance after the event; I also feel not prepping for an evacuation complied with our manual's guidance. Per FOM X.XX.X; cabin preparation may not be required if aircraft control was expected to be maintained through alternate or redundant systems and procedures; and the situation was not expected to worsen. This applied to our flight. Also per the manual; even without prepping for an evacuation; the Flight Attendants should still modify their cabin service; review checklists; and be prepared for an unplanned evacuation if the situation worsens. FOM X.XX.Y continues to describe the types of situations that warrant prepping the cabin for an evacuation (bent/scraping of metal; fire; gear collapse; ditching; or crash). We obviously expected none of this to occur.After we parked at the gate; the Purser came up to the flight deck and expressed surprise that I did not have them prep for an evacuation. I explained why - we basically performed a normal landing at a faster than normal airspeed. She said that she thought 'Prepping for an Evacuation' would have changed her procedures from expecting a normal landing to reviewing evacuation procedures and checklists; and being ready at her jump seat to initiate or perform an evacuation if needed.Besides thinking that our flight attendants should ALWAYS be prepared at their jump seat to perform an unplanned evacuation at every landing; the disparity between what she thought 'Prep for an Evacuation' meant and what I thought it meant was stark and alarming. My guidance says it includes briefing of Passengers; ensuring everything is stowed; and expecting to use the Brace! Brace! Brace! command prior to touchdown; among other duties. She thought it simply meant being a little more mentally ready at her jump seat.I would not want to have my Flight Attendants think a mental review of evacuation procedures is adequate 'prep' when my guidance states the Passengers will be fully briefed and in the 'brace' position upon touchdown instead. Obviously; this was my experience with only one Flight Attendant. It is possible her view on communications of expectations; and her duties; in an urgent situation is not shared by every other Flight Attendant here. But it is certainly worth being sure that the Flight Attendant's manual and training matches ours in case she is not the only one.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.