A321 flight crew reported multiple bird strikes on take-off and subsequent ECAM messages indicating nacelle and cowl damage to the #1 engine. The flight crew coordinated a fly by of the Tower to check the landing gear condition and then returned for a safe landing.
Synopsis
A321 flight crew reported multiple bird strikes on take-off and subsequent ECAM messages indicating nacelle and cowl damage to the #1 engine. The flight crew coordinated a fly by of the Tower to check the landing gear condition and then returned for a safe landing.
Narrative
Due to heavy weight our take-off performance data was MAX TOGA; config 2 and APU on. Prior to push back we discussed the procedures for an APU on take-off as it is a supplementary procedure in the AOM. We were cleared for take-off on XXL ZZZ. Shortly after lift-off and prior to gear up selection I noticed a couple of blurs outside my window pass beneath the aircraft; passing right to left. Immediately thereafter we heard several thuds and immediate vibration that seemed to be coming from the vicinity of the radome and/or the nose gear. After a brief consultation with the Captain; we elected to hold off gear up selection as gear integrity was in doubt and climb performance was satisfactory. No ECAMS. Upon thrust reduction; altitude CLB thrust was selected and flaps one selected and speed intervention of 200 kts. A bird strike was reported to Tower and we were switched over to Departure. Noise from the gear down and the vibration was incredibly loud and made communication very difficult even with headsets on. We advised ATC and asked to return to the airport. ATC told us to expect XXC and asked for souls on board as well as fuel load. We still suspected issues with our gear and possible radome damage so we requested a low approach so ATC could inspect gear/aircraft for abnormalities. The Captain continued to fly and I set up the FMGC for an ILS XXC and entered relevant data into the approach page. Passengers and Flight Attendants (FAs) were briefed as to our situation and intentions. During downwind we received an ECAM for ENG 1 FIRE DET LOOP B. No ECAM action items. The only anomaly on the Engine Warning Display (EWD) for ENG 1 was High N1 Vibrations. The Captain reduced thrust on the number one engine and did not see any appreciable reduction - we assumed we had cowling damage not necessarily engine damage. We performed the low approach on XXC between 1200 ft. and 1000 ft. Tower reported no anomalies seen through binoculars from the Tower and gave us positive confirmation that we had hit some mallard ducks on take-off. We climbed out to 3000 ft. and then requested a long downwind vector to return to land in ZZZ. Complicating our situation was a squall line incoming to ZZZ that would have complicated extended holding. That coupled with increased turbulence/high winds and the continued high vibration/noise we decided to make a return earlier rather than later. During the second downwind we got HYD G RSV LO LVL. ECAM actions were run and this required turning off the Power Transfer Unit (PTU) as well as the G ENG 1 pump. A subsequent ELEC GEN 1 Fault led us to turn off the left gen. We still had the APU running from the take-off configuration and since we had elected to keep it running all busses were powered. Some more spurious ECAMs came up causing distractions; Fire DET Faults and HYD. I don't remember the exact ones. No ECAM actions associated with them. I set up the FMGC for another ILS to XXC and performed a non-normal landing distance assessment. I came up with approx 8500 ft. and XXC has an LDA of 10500 ft. I then ran the overweight landing checklist and it was agreed that we would do the approach with CONFIG 3 rather than FULL as without the system we were going to have issues if the gear was raised on a go-around. I should have redone the landing assessment as the change in configuration would have changed the assessment to approx 9500 ft. I think at this point we both thought XXL was still closed for inspection and never thought to ask if the longer runway was available. We reviewed the status page and the list of inoperative items. The Captain asked me to have the QRH handy in case of the need for an evacuation checklist after landing. We communicated to ATC that due to the loss of hydraulics we were unsure of our ability to taxi (steer) off the runway after landing and indicated it would be a full stop landing. A descent and before landing checklist was actioned. We executed the ILS landing and I gave the Captain continuous descent rates through 500 ft. as due to weight we were descending on the glide at around 900 ft/minute. Touchdown occurred with less than 300 ft/minute indicated. We brought the airplane to a full stop abeam taxiway. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) vehicles were present and we asked them to inspect both engines; wing surfaces and brakes for signs of damage/fire. The left wheel assembly was over 500 degrees celsius and brake fans were selected on. ARFF indicated some damage to ENG 1 and possibly some wing damage but brakes and landing gear looked fine. Due to damage to engine 1 we elected to shut down both engines and request a tow off. We left spoilers and flaps in their landing configuration as we felt retracting them might cause further damage. Due to the relative urgency to get the airplane back on the ground we never ran the non-normal landing procedures from the pages nor any ECAM follow ups but all relevant details and briefings that stem from that were discussed and actioned as best as possible. There was obviously a lot of pressure/stress for us to get the airplane back down quickly and not to do extended troubleshooting or extra follow up checklists. As a result we never got the chance to formally notify the company. But FAs/passengers/ATC were all fully aware of our situation and intentions. High noise and vibration made communication very difficult. Coupled with rapidly approaching poor weather we elected to get the airplane on the ground quickly. This time pressure did not allow us to run all available follow up procedures from the pages. However; I think all big picture procedures were completed satisfactorily and taking extra time to do 'tidy-up' work would have decreased safety margins rather than enhance them. Bird strike the root cause.
Second reporter narrative
Our flight departed ZZZ at night on Runway XXL. We planned a TOGA take-off with APU on config 2. We encountered large multiple bird strikes just after rotation. Both the First Officer (FO) and I saw them just under the nose of the aircraft. We felt big thuds and started feeling some aircraft vibration. I decided to keep the gear down as both the First Officer and I suspected we had potential damage to the nose gear/strut assembly. I instructed the FO to advise ATC and request a return to the field. I wanted to minimize flap configuration changes and keep the landing gear down and I made a decision to stay at approximately 200 kts. with the gear down and fly with flaps 1. First ECAM we became aware of was an eng 1 fire detection B loop fault. Engine vibration on the left side was over 9 units. Right side was normal. Suspected engine cowl damage at this time. On downwind I tried reducing thrust on #1 engine to see if the vibration would disappear but it didn't seem to affect it so I decided to keep the engine running at normal power as it was producing usable thrust with us at max weight and the landing gear down. We were unsure at this time if both engines were affected. Once we were established on downwind I made a quick interphone call to Flight Attendants (FAs) to give them a brief on our situation and told them to prepare the cabin for a landing in approximately 10 minutes with a possibly low flyby first. I then briefed the passengers telling them what happened and what to expect on our return to the field. I told them for now we expect a normal landing and there would be safety vehicles standing by. It was very hard to converse with my FO even with headsets on interphone and volume full as noise with the gear down and aircraft vibration was extremely loud. I decided to do a flyby to have Tower check gear. Did that at 1200 ft. then 1000 ft. MSL. Tower inspected us with binoculars and said landing gear appeared intact. With that information I decided to climb back up to 3000 ft. and come around for a landing. At some point on downwind we experienced a HYD G Reservoir Low Level ECAM in addition to a GEN 1 fault. With the heavy aircraft vibration and at near max take-off weight I decided we needed to accomplish the important items and land. I told the FO to complete the ECAMs; checklists while I flew and handle the radios. The pumps were turned off by the First Officer as part of the checklist as well as the ENG 1 generator and Power Transfer Unit (PTU). At this time we still suspected possible damage to the nose landing gear with a possible glancing blow at the left engine cowling - possibly flapping in the air stream. We really didn't know for sure what was affected at this time. I made another call to all FAs and told them that we were going to land soon and asked how things were going in the cabin. I did one more brief PA to the passengers telling them we were coming back to land and again I expected the landing to be normal. On the second downwind we started getting light to occasional moderate turbulence from approaching squall line and it appeared to the West on our weather radar. My FO and I discussed our overweight condition and I asked the FO to brief me on all the items affected by the loss of the hydraulic system and anything else pertinent for the landing. I told Approach that in the event of a missed approach I would fly straight out to 3000 ft. The FO read the checklist and told me a config 3 landing was preferred with loss of hydraulics. I was also concerned about our severe overweight condition and possibly losing the #1 engine and having to do a potential go-around. We were over max weight with no auto brakes and alternate braking. Our landing speed was calculated at 161. However I bumped the approach 3 kts. up to 164 because of aircraft vibration for a buffer. My FO did a very quick landing calculation with the hydraulics inop and determined the landing distance available was approximately 8500 ft. with a landing distance available of 10540 ft. on Runway XXC. Upon a normal landing I remained stopped on the runway approximately near the taxiway while safety vehicles inspected our airplane. I instructed the passengers to remain in their seats after coming to a full stop. After everything was determined secure by safety personnel we asked Company for a tow tug to tow us into the gate and have Company meet the passengers. We were towed into the gate and the passengers deplaned. I wrote up in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) the associated mechanical issues and the bird strike.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.