B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists; then checked the autobrake system; which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.
Synopsis
B737 flight crew reported anti skid system failure after selecting gear up. The flight crew ran the QRH and checklists; then checked the autobrake system; which also failed. The flight crew continued to destination airport.
Narrative
Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1; THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ; First Officer (FO) requested gear up and I noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminated. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position; the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise; the auto brakes were selected to 1; 2; and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away. Previous write-ups from today and Day 0 confirmed that this was a chronic issue with the auto brakes but did not reference the anti-skid system being inop. The previous write up from today also referenced a transducer #2 fault.The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of another transducer fault or a possible ANTI SKID failure; as a crew we discussed our options with an ANTI SKID failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather; long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing.Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system is not working given the recent history of write ups along with the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating now. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. My additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned; we would be prepared. Further; with the two previous write ups including a transducer fault; it was a distinct possibility that the anti skid system was INOP.With the possibility of hot brakes; blown tires and a loss of directional control after landing without anti skid; it was decided that we would [request priority handling]; continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants including Purser Person A were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing.At 45 minutes prior to landing; I made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing as a precaution.FO and I reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing; the non-normal landing distance chart; an early stable approach; Captain PA announcements; touching down in the touchdown zone; manual speed brake deployment; use of max reverse thrust longer than normal; braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up. FO did a great job managing the threats; slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing; I made the PA; brace; brace; brace. FO flew a stable descent and touched down on center line and in the touch down zone where I manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected; and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. I assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the Runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA; remain seated; remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looks normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking.The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly; execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training.After we parked; Maintenance reviewed the faults and again came up with a transducer #2 fault. They assured me anti skid was indeed operative and decided to MEL the auto brake system for our next flight from ZZZ-ZZZ2 without any lengthy investigative work on the ANTI SKID INOP issues. I agreed to take the aircraft with the auto brakes MELed. On the next flight; once again the ANTI SKID INOP light was extinguished on departure but illuminated again when the gear was requested up and extinguished when the gear handle was placed to off. On this flight we suspected the anti skid was working after the assurance from ZZZ Maintenance and continued with the AUTO BRAKE DISARM MEL. Landing in ZZZ2 was uneventful. However; I believe this aircraft needs a more thorough review for ANTI SKID INOP issues given the two write ups today for ANTI SKID INOP light illuminating after takeoff.Finally; the FOM was referenced for required reports but we never did call the Chief Pilot before continuing our next flight from ZZZ to ZZZ2 due to time. However; we self-assessed as a crew and both felt comfortable continuing our day and final leg of the trip.
Second reporter narrative
Prior to takeoff in ZZZ1; THE ANTI SKID INOP light was not illuminated. After takeoff from Runway XXR in ZZZ1; pilot flying (PF) requested gear up and pilot monitoring (PM) noticed the ANTI SKID INOP light illuminate. Once the after takeoff checklist was called and the gear handle was placed to the off position; the anti-skid light extinguished. At cruise; the auto brakes were selected to 1; 2; and 3 to check for proper operation due to previous write ups and the AUTO BRAKE DISARM light illuminated and did not go away.The QRH was referenced regarding both ANTI SKID INOP and AUTO BRAKE DISARM. With the possibility of a possible ANTI SKID failure; as a crew we discussed our options with an anti skid failure and felt continuing to ZZZ was okay with good weather; long runways and a lighter weight and speed on landing.Dispatch and Maintenance Control were contacted to discuss the possibility of an anti skid system failure. Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain that there is a distinct possibility that the anti skid system could be INOP. We decided the ANTI SKID INOP QRH took precedent over the AUTO BRAKE DISARM QRH and planned for the possibility of an ANTI SKID INOP with no auto brakes on landing. Additional thoughts were that if the gear handle was placed to the down position on arrival and the ANTI SKID INOP light returned; we would be prepared.With the possibility of hot brakes; blown tires and a loss of control without anti skid; it was decided that we would [request priority handling]; continue to ZZZ and request to land on the longest Runway XX in ZZZ. The flight attendants were then brought into the loop and were given information and a briefing. At this point we had 90 minutes until landing and we discussed that we would prepare the cabin for a [priority] landing and possible evacuation when we had 45 minutes prior to landing. At 45 minutes prior to landing; the Captain made a PA to the passengers explaining the mechanical issue we were experiencing and that the flight attendants would be preparing the cabin for a [priority] landing in addition to assuring them that we fully expected this landing to be normal but we are going to prepare for a [priority] landing.PF and PM reviewed the ANTI SKID INOP QRH and performed a thorough threat briefing to include a flaps 40 landing; the non-normal landing distance chart; an early stable approach; PA announcements; touching down in the touchdown zone; manual speed brake deployment; use of max reverse thrust longer than normal; braking according to the QRH and the possibility of blown tires and directional control issues if the main wheels lock up.Aircraft was slowed and became stable early for the approach. At 500 ft. and approximately 30 seconds prior to landing; the Captain made the PA brace; brace; brace. A stable descent resulted in a touch down on center line and in the touch down zone where the Captain manually deployed the speed brakes. Maximum reverse thrust was selected and light steady braking was used after the nose wheel touched down. The Captain assumed command of the aircraft at about 80 kts. and kept maximum reverse thrust in until around 40-50 kts. We vacated the runway at XX and taxied on to X where the PA; remain seated; remain seated was made. Airport Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) responders met the aircraft and confirmed all looked normal and would follow us to the gate and check the brake temps after we parked. Brake temps were confirmed all normal after parking.The entire crew did an outstanding job preparing and executing on this situation. In the end we were able to manage the threats properly; execute a safe operation by minimizing any errors and prepared for the possibility of a non-normal landing according to our training.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.